The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Beijing, accompanied by a military parade and ambitious economic discussions, drew global attention. In much of the international commentary, the event was portrayed as further evidence of the US’s decline and China’s inexorable rise. Across the Middle East and Global South, many voices repeated this binary narrative: Washington losing primacy, Beijing preparing to take its place. For Africa, however, this framing is unsatisfactory. It risks reducing the continent to a spectator in a drama staged by others. The real significance of the SCO summit lies in what it tells us about multipolarity, about the cracks in Western dominance, and about the opportunities and dangers these cracks create for African agency.

Africa’s relationship with global financial institutions has long been one of asymmetry. The IMF and World Bank imposed structural adjustment programs that dismantled social protections, privatized public goods, and left countries more vulnerable to global shocks. Dollar dependence tethered African economies to the policy decisions of the US Federal Reserve, exposing them to sudden capital flight and currency crises. In this context, the SCO’s discussions of new financial mechanisms—a potential development bank, greater use of local currencies, and coordination with BRICS initiatives—take on more than technical importance. They are symbols of possibility, suggesting that alternatives to Western-dominated finance may finally be emerging.

History, however, offers reasons for caution. External powers have long presented themselves as partners while entrenching new forms of dependence. China’s Belt and Road projects, for example, have brought much-needed infrastructure to parts of Africa but have also sparked debates about debt sustainability and transparency. Russia’s security engagements on the continent have raised questions about sovereignty and accountability. Multipolarity, if understood only as the replacement of one patron with another, risks repeating old mistakes under new banners. The critical issue is whether African states can approach these emerging institutions not as passive recipients but as active negotiators, shaping terms in line with local needs and priorities.

South Africa’s membership in BRICS underscores this dilemma. Pretoria occupies a dual position: embedded in Africa yet connected to the institutional experiments of the non-Western world. This duality is a strength if used wisely. South Africa can channel African concerns into BRICS and, through BRICS, into SCO-related initiatives. It can advocate for infrastructure financing that reduces inequality rather than deepens it, and for financial mechanisms that provide stability rather than impose austerity. Yet South Africa has also been criticized for aligning more with elite interests than with popular demands. The question is whether it will use its position to advance continental agency or to consolidate its own narrow influence.

The SCO summit also highlights the philosophical stakes of the current moment. Political scientist Amitav Acharya has argued that the future world order will not be unipolar but an “archipelago of powers.” For Africa, this metaphor is crucial. It means the continent is not condemned to choose between Washington and Beijing, but can instead navigate among multiple poles, forging diversified partnerships. At the same time, an archipelago is fragmented; without coordination, African states risk being played off against one another, courted piecemeal rather than collectively. Multipolarity rewards unity. A continent that speaks with one voice can demand better terms, while a divided continent will find itself bargaining from weakness.

Concrete examples illustrate the stakes. When Zambia defaulted on its debt, the negotiations were prolonged and painful, involving Western creditors and Chinese lenders alike. The process revealed both the potential and the limits of multipolar finance: Multiple creditors provided leverage, but lack of coordination prolonged suffering. Similarly, Kenya’s engagement with Chinese infrastructure financing brought new highways and rail lines, but also intensified debates about dependency and sovereignty. These cases show that multipolarity is neither a panacea nor a disaster by itself. Its value depends on the strategies and choices of African actors.

The SCO’s emphasis on local currencies and alternative financial mechanisms resonates deeply in Africa, where the dollar’s dominance has often been experienced as a form of coercion. The ability to trade or borrow without exposure to US sanctions would represent a step toward sovereignty. Yet it also raises questions: Will new institutions prioritize human development, or will they simply reproduce the logic of extraction under different management? Multipolarity opens the space for justice but does not guarantee it. The burden of turning possibility into reality lies with African agency.

Civil society has a role here too. Discussions of multipolarity are often confined to elites, yet the consequences of economic choices are borne by ordinary people. If multipolar institutions are to become tools of justice rather than new instruments of dependency, their design must be contested, debated, and shaped from below as well as above. Activists, unions, and social movements in Africa can push governments to demand fairer terms, greater transparency, and accountability in engagements with both Western and non-Western partners. Without such pressure, multipolarity may merely empower new elites while leaving structural inequalities untouched.

The SCO summit in Beijing was heavy with symbolism: missiles rolling past spectators, leaders shaking hands, declarations of solidarity echoing across the stage. But the symbolism that matters most for Africa is subtler. It is the recognition that the financial and political order is no longer monolithic. The cracks in Western hegemony create opportunities. Whether those opportunities lead to emancipation or renewed subjugation depends on Africa’s capacity to act collectively and strategically.

The choice before the continent is stark. One path leads to another cycle of dependency, with African states swapping one creditor for another, one patron for another. The other path leads to a more assertive Africa, one that treats multipolarity not as a slogan but as a space of struggle, where it can advance its own priorities. The SCO summit is a reminder that history is not predetermined. The future will be written not only in Beijing or Washington but in Pretoria, Lagos, Nairobi, and beyond. Multipolarity is not liberation, but it may be the opening through which liberation can be pursued if Africa insists on writing its own script.