Zambia’s quiet diplomacy
Long seen as a neutral player in global affairs, Zambia’s foreign policy is shifting under new pressures—from Western donors, Chinese investment, and its own strategic ambitions.
Porters at Sakania border post between Zambia and the DRC. All photos © Kang-Chun Cheng.
They are between 12 and 18 years old, and crowd the vehicle even before we’ve lurched to a stop. “They think you’re trying to cross [into the Congo], and are competing to carry your luggage across,” explains Michael, our Zambian guide.
A certain frenetic energy circulates throughout most porous transnational boundaries, diffusing that feeling of endless movement. That’s certainly the case here at the Sakania border post, straddling a southeastern portion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia’s Copperbelt Province. Mostly Zambian and Congolese, these adolescents have a far better shot at making money here than begging in the city or working a menial job. One trip across the border can bring 50 to 100 kwacha (USD1,74-3,47)—about the same amount that many informal laborers make in a day doing back-breaking work at an artisanal mine.
The DRC is the world’s leading cobalt source and second second-largest copper producer globally. Its southern neighbor, Zambia, shares the same stretch of the African Copperbelt and is the second biggest copper producer on the continent. Its prolific nickel, manganese, diamond, and cobalt reserves are key to luxury markets and the green energy transition alike.
“The story of Zambia is the story of copper,” according to Grieve Chelwa, a Zambian economist. “It’s a very emotive thing for us—constituting 75% of foreign exchange earnings.”
As Rwanda-backed M23 rebels continue advancing across the DRC, overtaking Goma, then Bukavu, Zambia remains attentive to its volatile neighbor’s developments, says Jacques Mukena, a researcher at Ebuteli Institute in Kinshasa specializing in critical mineral governance. Zambia’s border with southeastern DRC is not far from the contested, mineral-rich Katanga province, widely considered a root cause of the Congo’s resource curse and perpetual bloodshed. For years, there has been coverage of human rights abuses and the DRC’s paralysis stemming from the violence of resource extraction.
Although mining is the backbone of both Zambian and Congolese economies, it may not be the main driver of conflict, argues Fred Bauma, a human rights activist at the Ebuteli Institute. “Passer la frontière (French for ‘cross the border’) is a natural source of tension,” he says. “Another potential source is growing population pressures from Katanga onto Zambia, from poverty, the lack of resources.”
This cautious approach may appear as reticence, but is, in fact, a highly strategic move: Zambia gets credit for being non-confrontational and sympathetic to the plight of its volatile neighbor. This admirable restraint is illustrated through its cautious, unassuming foreign decisions that prioritize depoliticization of regional entanglements. It’s an approach that allows Zambia to benefit from largely uninterrupted business flows. For decades, Zambia has chosen to be a quiet, attentive mediator, stepping in to quell flare-ups in places such as the Central African Republic. The presence of Zambian peacekeepers is requested throughout Africa.
This pragmatism was born out of the nation’s undesirable geopolitical location. “We’re a landlocked country, with eight neighbors. We don’t have access to the sea—if we did, that would likely make us think very differently,” says Chelwa. “It’s hard to import [goods] if there’s conflict around us.” For instance, when South Africa cut off diplomatic relations with Zambia in the 1960s due to the former’s apartheid-forward agenda, crude oil had to be airlifted into Zambia.
It was around this time when Kenneth Kaunda, the first Zambian president, pushed for the construction of the Tanzam oil pipeline (Tanzania-Zambia Crude Oil Pipeline), connecting the Tanzanian port city of Dar es Salaam to Ndola in the heart of Zambia’s Copperbelt. During this period when African nations were also liberating themselves from colonial rule, the desire for economic autonomy was stronger than ever. For Zambia in particular, this required a cautious approach: not overtly flouting its sovereignty to Western powers with their fading hegemony, or its African neighbors struggling through their own growing pains.
The adobe orange-coloured clay-slicked road to Sakania, made extra slippery with a recent cloudburst, is jam-packed with lorries. Crowded bumper to bumper for upward of four kilometers, the drivers have come to terms with the inevitable wait. Some step out to stretch their legs and purchase groundnuts and soft drinks from itinerant vendors stepping carefully through the mud; one browses on an e-reader, his legs resting on the dashboard. The vast majority of trucks appear to be ferrying mining equipment or mining-related goods. This road serves as an umbilical cord connecting two of the world’s most important mining regions: Kolwezi in DRC’s Katanga Province and Luanshya in Zambia’s Copperbelt.
The porter boys share anecdotal accounts of perceived changes on their home turf. “Since the M23 attacks, things haven’t gotten that much more chaotic, since we’re quite far from eastern Congo,” one says. “Just a bit more people.” “People here believe in local lore,” explains Michael. “There might be a bit of petty crime, but those beliefs keep the calm.”
This wasn’t always the case. Chelwa, the economist, spent time in the capital city of Lusaka during his childhood, and he recalls the spate of aggravated crimes linked to refugee influxes, mainly from Angola, the DRC, and Zimbabwe, as a result of the First Congo War that nearly engulfed Katanga, bordering Zambia, in the 1990s. “They [the crimes] weren’t necessarily because of the refugees,” he says. “Likely connections to all these [Congolese] rebel movements, the flow of arms from the Congo, which contributed to the chaos. Zambia has always tried to make sure instability doesn’t spill over while welcoming refugees.”
Katanga is currently more stable. As such, Zambia has also enjoyed a higher degree of security. As apparent from the unbroken queue of trucks traversing the Copperbelt, a sense of normalcy prevails as long as the business bottom line remains unscathed.
“The Congo is an expansive country, almost a tenth of the United States,” says Chelwa. “It’s huge and disconnected.” Even the bloody M23 attacks, which have killed at least 7,000 people since January, can feel worlds apart from Kinshasa, DRC’s capital—2,643 kilometers to the west, as Chelwa notes:
It’s a matter of scale–eastern Congo is just too far. It’s more of a problem for East Africa since it’s in their backyard. If the violence were to happen in Katanga, historically a flashpoint for Congolese politics in the 1960s, there would be very different reactions. The center of gravity shifted because of Kagame’s expansionist tendencies.
“What’s clear is the DRC doesn’t have many [trade] alternatives,” says Mukena. “The Kasumbalesa corridor is essential to the DRC, which is heavily dependent on natural resource exports.” This truth is reflected in Zambia’s economy: in 2023, Zambia exported goods worth $1.6 billion to the DRC, while Congolese exports to Zambia totaled only $180 million.
Zambian exports to the DRC range from sugar and baked goods to delivery trucks, while DRC exports are largely restricted to raw minerals, highlighting how crucial the DRC is to Zambia’s economy, Mukena notes. Mutual recognition of the DRC’s limited export corridors, a reality amplified by protracted conflicts, allows Zambia a certain structural leverage in the relationship.
The plot thickens when individuals trickling into Zambia hold political importance. For instance, Pastor Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, a former electoral chief in the DRC, was arrested late last year at his home in Lusaka last year, notwithstanding his refugee status under UNHCR protocols. He was handed over to the DRC anti-terrorism services for unknown reasons and sentenced to three years in prison. In 2021, Mulunda had already been convicted in the Congolese economic hub of Lubumbashi for “undermining state security” and agitating for secession, hence his move to Zambia. His family and supporters believe his recent arrest was a targeted move by DRC President Felix Tshisekedi.
Zambia is one of the few countries on the continent without a history of war. To maintain such a track record, extreme neutrality has been requisite—letting its eight neighbors sort out their own issues but serving as a haven for refugees escaping conflict in its neighboring countries. This is a reputation the government will go to great lengths to preserve. For instance, the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, drafted by Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, then the respective Tanzania and Zambia leaders, rejected racism and called for black majority rule in African nations. Yet, the document retained a conciliatory approach toward South Africa, accepting its nationhood despite its apartheid policies. This reluctance to get embroiled in armed struggles stemmed from a fear of both South African military attacks and economic consequences.
Although a copper giant in its own right, Zambia remains southern Africa’s manufacturing and value addition hub, DRC the nation of raw extraction, Zimbabwe the financial hub, and South Africa the point of exportation, with its ports and sea access. To this day, foreigners exporting minerals from the DRC come to Zambia first, and clear goods first in Zambia before completing payments.
Chelwa argues that Zambia’s stance in the Kaunda era was not necessarily neutrality, but non-alignment—a big “third world” project. In the post-Cold War era, it was more about not aligning with the West or East, but trying to carve a path for ourselves, he posits. “Zambia was never neutral—neutrality is more like Switzerland, closing their eyes to human rights abuses.”
Even before the M23 attacks this past January, Zambia was hosting at least 60,000 Congolese refugees, according to the UNHCR. Despite this recent escalation in eastern Congo’s near-chronic violence, business is business. In Chembe, for instance—a cobalt, tungsten, mining border region in Zambia where the industry has surged over recent years—the flow of Congolese remains unbroken.
More than 100,000 Congolese have fled into neighboring countries since the beginning of 2025, nearly 70,000 to Burundi and 31,500 to Uganda; both countries are expecting further surges in new arrivals. Yet, Zambia has only registered 909 Congolese refugees. “This likely has to do with the distances and immediately available crossing routes,” says Duniya Aslam Khan, the communications officer for UNHCR’s Southern Africa bureau.
UNHCR is cash-strapped at the moment, like most humanitarian organizations. Its Zambian operation received only 47% of the required budget last year, and a mere 11% of the required funding for 2025. They do not receive funding from USAID, says Khan. But, UNHCR, will feel the impact of the current US administration’s “pause and review” policies concerning the allocation of funds to foreign assistance programs. “We have to do a lot now, with a lot less,” says Khan. “People’s needs haven’t changed—the situation continues becoming more dire with each spike in conflict that displaces entire communities.”
There’s a sense of solidarity that we may be in this situation later on,” says Carolein Jacobs, an anthropological researcher at Leiden University specializing in the DRC’s internal displacement. Before this most recent spate of M23 attacks, cross-border movements were commonplace. With the insecurity of having more than 130 different armed groups roving across the country, and the Congolese government’s corruption and lack of control, it made sense for Congolese to seek business in places of stronger stability, across borders.
Connections established from this long history of transboundary trade have helped Congolese refugees in places where they flee. The destination is always linked to what there is to get, says Jacobs. By going to relatively familiar places, refugees may find more support through host communities that offer them shelter, in comparison to underfunded refugee camps.
Zambia has an unusually progressive approach to working with refugees, with three “settlements” structured per its 2024 National Refugee Policy, and reflecting UNHCR’s holistic mission of incorporating refugees into national systems. “If refugees are economically independent and self-sufficient, this ultimately benefits host countries and economies,” Khan explains. The Zambian government has come to think beyond limiting refugees to settlements, embracing the economic hubs that develop from their presence. Zambia recognizes the unique position it is in, amid so many volatile neighbors. Khan continues:
Which is how they decided to bring in developmental actors, have them be part of the solution. For decades, refugees from not just DRC, but also Burundi, Angola, and Rwanda have claimed Zambia as a safe haven… You cannot just push them back–push them back to where? The reality is that if these people have to stay until the situation back home is conducive to their return, you might have to wait a while.
Registration is for the benefit of the host country, Khan continues, which then allows for integration into work and the local economy. “Whatever money or goods are generated, that circulates in host countries.” For Zambia, a low-income country, this can be played to its benefit.
Hedged in by protracted, low-grade instability—with the distinct possibility of spill-over at any given moment—for decades, Zambia has chosen the path of caution. Former president Kaunda built the nation on a bedrock of strategic consideration, open-minded in the interpretation of what it meant to be Zambia. He understood that strict policing of its borders would be impossible, an approach that his predecessors have continued to cultivate. At a time when other countries are descending into extreme nationalism, this remains a delicate line to tread.
Zambia refrains from speaking out or responding too strongly to actions it may not condone, but has its back against the wall, reluctant to bring too much attention to itself. Qatar has been hosting the recent rounds of peace talks between Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame (Rwanda is known to back M23 rebels, despite Kagame’s ongoing denial of the facts), to de-escalate eastern Congo’s hottest conflict in decades. This was a missed opportunity for Zambia to step forward and arbitrate these talks, but once again, Zambia chose to let others take the lead, unwilling to be in the center of attention.
