Months before Ghana’s December 7, 2024, election, many Ghanaian commentators were certain of two things. First, despite other contenders on the ballot, one of two dominant parties, the incumbent New Patriotic Party (NPP) or the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), would surely take the helm. Second, neither party would do much to reduce the excessive influence of money politics, which many citizens abhor as a key driver of the corruption that blights their government and society.

The first expectation was borne out when the NDC won handily, with John Mahama (who had been ousted by the NPP in 2016) retaking the presidency. Corruption was not the dominant issue motivating voters. The poor state of Ghana’s economy was. Many blamed the incumbent and strongly pro-market NPP for seriously mismanaging things.

Yet as in earlier election cycles, corruption’s impact was nevertheless a troubling concern. For former auditor-general Daniel Yaw Domelevo, it was not an election year, but an “auctioning year” in which nominees bid for offices. And for the Presbyterian Church of Ghana, in a communique from its general assembly, the country’s democracy is threatened by “moneycracy,” a term that has gained currency in recent years. In such a system, said the church, candidates with “dubious intentions” run not to advance national interests, but their personal gain.

Of course, many Ghanaians are thankful for the relatively smooth and orderly ways in which their elections unfold, as they have since the restoration of electoral democracy in 1992. Although there has been some occasional violence, it has been more limited than in some African neighbors. And while the two main parties differ in their ethnic and regional support bases, most candidates take care to avoid overtly ethnic appeals.

Nevertheless, election campaigns are usually sharply polarized contests—and 2024 was no different. Yet that has not unduly disrupted transitions of power. Beginning with the election in 2000, when the then-ruling NDC first lost to its rival, there have been a total of four turnovers between the two, with each holding office for eight years (two successive presidential and legislative terms).

International observers often praise those transitions as confirmation of Ghana’s democratic consolidation. Many Ghanaians are less sure. In surveys conducted by Afrobarometer, clear majorities regularly say they would prefer to move away from such a “duopoly” by enabling other parties to play greater roles.

Fundamentally, the current two-party system reflects an “elite consensus” between the NDC and NPP, argues Ghanaian political scientist Kwame Ninsin. The parties take turns at the helm in order “to control the state for private accumulation.”

While Ghana’s 1992 constitution did not foresee the problems of “moneycracy” or electoral corruption, some provisions facilitated them. Most seriously, as I argue in a recent book, the Constitution gives inordinate appointment powers to the strong executive presidency. In addition to cabinet ministers and large presidential staff, the president names the heads of departments and agencies, chief executives of state-owned enterprises, boards of all state institutions, and 30 percent of district assembly members—nearly 4,000 posts.

That large pool of potential patronage jobs heightens the stakes of winning or holding office. Both parties issue detailed manifestos on a wide range of issues, and candidates focus on those in their rally speeches. But more quietly, monetary persuasion also plays a role.

Overt cash payments to voters are illegal. Yet the NPP and NDC, whether in power or opposition, have both been accused (including in this election) of trying to sway the electorate with money and gifts of textiles, bicycles, sewing machines, cutlasses, and other goods.

The role of money has been most visible in the primaries that each party uses to select its candidates. Those are conducted by electoral colleges of party executives, constituency leaders, and officeholders. In the absence of laws criminalizing vote-buying within parties, bribery has often been blatant. As one-time NPP Chairman Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey told aspiring parliamentary candidates, “if you have money, then use the money.”

Several years before he died in 2020, former President Jerry Rawlings, who governed through most of the 1980s and 1990s and founded the NDC, expressed exasperation over the practice. He accused both parties of using “huge monetary and material inducements of offensive proportions” to sway nominations “in favor of the highest bidder.”

Despite such conduct, both parties regularly denounce corruption and promise that they will combat it vigorously. My analysis of Transparency International’s corruption rankings and Afrobarometer’s public opinion surveys, however, shows no clear differences in performance between NDC- and NPP-led governments. Typically, incoming administrations exhibit a flurry of new anti-corruption initiatives and prosecutions of former officials, but less so as they settle in. The party in opposition campaigns more heavily on an anti-corruption plank when seeking to return to power.

The recent campaign confirmed that pattern. While outgoing President Nana Akufo-Addo ran hard on fighting corruption in his successful 2016 bid, Mahamudu Bawumia, the party’s 2024 presidential aspirant, did not. The NPP’s lengthy election manifesto mentioned corruption only twice.

By contrast, Mahama, his running mate Jane Opoku-Agyemang, and other NDC candidates frequently decried the corruption and related misdeeds of the outgoing administration. “We will hold those who have misconducted themselves accountable,” Mahama promised in his inaugural campaign speech, a note he also echoed at his final campaign rally.

But will the new leaders follow through? Judging from the past, probably yes, though only to an extent.

For that reason, “we cannot leave it to only politicians,” advises Samuel Kofi Darkwa, a Ghanaian political scientist. Fortunately, the same constitution that overlooked the risks of money politics also created a number of independent monitoring institutions. It simultaneously entrenched numerous rights and freedoms that enable activists and citizens to launch their own initiatives.

Ghana, dating back to the British colonial period, has a long tradition of pursuing the rule of law, if often imperfectly and inconsistently. In recent decades, laws relating to corruption, fraud, and related misconduct have been periodically updated and strengthened.

The courts often struggle to apply those laws. While a few judges have themselves succumbed to corruption, the biggest problem has been political pressure from the national authorities. The attorney general appointed by the ruling party often pushes prosecutions against figures from the opposing party. While there has been some improvement, perceptions of partisan biases in the judicial system linger.

That was one reason anti-corruption activists campaigned for naming an independent prosecutor to go after cases of high-level corruption, freer from immediate political pressures. In 2017 the Akufo-Addo government created the Office of the Special Prosecutor. While not fully independent, the prosecutor has pursued numerous cases against public procurement officers, bank executives, police recruiters, and even a sitting minister, from both parties.

Although they have no prosecutorial powers, several other watchdog institutions also have brought instances of corruption to light. Those include the auditor-general’s office and especially the constitutionally mandated Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, which annually hears thousands of citizens’ complaints and has made exposures leading to the downfall of several ministers.

Other constituencies—completely independent of government—also play major roles in fighting corruption. Ghana’s robust independent media, which include daily and weekly newspapers and hundreds of local radio stations, have broken many stories of high-level misconduct.

The country has a multitude of civil society groups, some of them dedicated to fighting corruption. Individually, and sometimes in coalitions, they have succeeded in pressing legislators to adopt laws protecting whistleblowers, strengthening the right to information, and monitoring how Ghana’s oil revenues are used.

Just months before the election, several civil society groups and trade unions organized raucous street protests to denounce illegal and unregulated small-scale gold mining. While their main concern was the land degradation and water pollution that often results, the protests in effect also challenged one of the sources of illicit financing for local party candidates.

Election campaigning may be over for now. But Ghanaians’ battle to cleanse their political system carries on.