The protests in Nepal this week were unprecedented. In just 48 hours, a disparate movement of largely young people throughout major towns and cities brought down the entire political establishment that had dominated Nepalese politics since the 2006 revolution. The Gen Z movement was confronted by a brutal police crackdown, and the death toll from the unrest now stands at over 70.

As Prime Minister KP Oli resigned, the second day saw widespread rioting and arson by infiltrators. Government buildings across the country were attacked, most notably the Supreme Court and Singha Durbar complex that houses parliament and most of the main ministries. Homes of political leaders and businesses were also torched.

Political unrest of this kind is not new to Nepal. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) led a decade-long civil war, garnering popular support amongst the urban working class and the peasantry, which were emerging from two centuries of feudalism, unequal trade regimes, and associated economic stagnation. The war ended in 2006, overthrowing the 240-year-old monarchy. The Maoists then entered mainstream politics with the promise of a new constitution, but through a series of political blunders and popular disillusionment with broken promises, Nepal’s old guard—the mainstream political parties that had dominated politics before the civil war—rapidly regained their support base, bolstered by the powerful patronage relations they had developed over the decades at the grassroots.

The centrist Nepali Congress and the nominally “communist” Unified Marxist-Leninist or UML, which had already shed most of its leftist credentials, came out on top during the 2013 elections and led the drafting of the new constitution, watering down many of the more progressive elements from the interim document. The Maoists were reduced to a third party.

A further round of popular unrest was unleashed in 2015, in the weeks leading up to the new constitution being promulgated. Disillusionment was high amongst Nepal’s indigenous groups, who make up over a third of the population, and most notably amongst the Madhesi community, who are the dominant group in Nepal’s southern plains. They were seeking greater regional autonomy and representation in the constitution. That movement was also met by a brutal police crackdown, resonating disturbingly with this week’s events in Kathmandu.

Rising to power during this period of unrest was none other than UML’s KP Oli. He capitalized on the unrest in the plains and subsequent Indian intervention by framing himself as a nationalist strongman, determined to push through the new constitution at any cost, largely at the expense of Nepal’s minorities. While the lowlands burned, there were celebrations over the new constitution amongst some segments in Kathmandu.

The events of 2015 saw not only the effective dissolution of the indigenous and Madhesi movements in Nepal, but the end of any genuine leftist alternative. The remnants of the Maoist party, having undergone several splits, joined ranks in a string of coalition governments with either the Nepali Congress or UML, and became very much part of the establishment. These three parties went on to dominate the political scene for the next decade.

All of this changed this week. While some media outlets claimed that youth were out on the streets to protest a proposed ban on social media outlets such as X, Facebook, and WhatsApp, this was just one of many triggers. What the protests most palpably expressed was anger and disgust at the corruption, impunity, and wealth amassed by this political elite.

While Nepal has many unique characteristics—most notably its relative historic isolation from the global economy—the political unrest this week is part of a much larger global phenomenon in low- and middle-income economies across Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Nepal, like many parts of the region, has undergone rapid political and economic change. Three decades of neoliberalism have failed the poor and working classes, and growing integration into international markets has brought with it rising inequalities, surging costs of living, rural monetization, and with that, a spiraling demand for cash.

This has hit the poorest particularly hard, as in most import-dependent countries. In some parts of the country, this change has been rapid, starting when roads were pushed deeper into the hills after the end of the war in 2006. Across rural South and Southeast Asia, agriculture is becoming increasingly unviable to support a family, and the younger generation, integrated into globalized cultural flows and aware of the struggles of the older generation, has a dwindling interest in rural life.

When much of Western Europe underwent this transition away from subsistence agriculture, a process marked by state and landlord violence and dispossession throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries, the peasantry was rapidly integrated into an expanding urban working class, and over time, a smaller segment graduated into skilled or professional trades. This same transition is occurring in China to some extent, although it is more drawn out. However, in the low- and middle-income economies of Asia, including Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Indonesia, the macroeconomic context is significantly different.

Many of these economies have been distorted by imperialism and unequal trade regimes. There is no industrial sector with the capacity to absorb the vast labor force who see limited prospects on the land, and what industry there was has been sold off and privatized. Nevertheless, with an increasingly multipolar global economy, there are rising opportunities for labor not at home but overseas.

Within this context, a unique politico-economic equilibrium has been reached over the last two decades in particular. Unlike in Europe, capitalist agriculture has not taken off, and the peasantry remains more or less intact, despite limited prospects. Many families remain in agriculture while simultaneously participating in migrant labor, with often young men (and some women) working in higher-income economies. Whether the migration circuit is Nepal, Bangladesh, or the Philippines to the Gulf states, Cambodia to Thailand, or Kyrgyzstan to Russia, the underlying economic processes are similar. They represent a dual livelihood strategy—remittances provide the cash that households need, while agriculture provides food to those who remain, and offers some security if things go wrong.

Across the region, the transition out of agriculture has been accompanied by the dramatic expansion in higher education and an increasingly skilled youth. In rural areas, the older generation, desperate for their children to escape the endless cycle of subsistence farming and difficult labor overseas, has invested heavily in education for the young. In Nepal, families are investing remittances in education—not only in higher-fee private schools, which are particularly widespread in South Asia, but also most notably in further education. With education comes the prospect of work in the burgeoning service sector—the one area seeing major growth in post-1990s Nepal—or the prospect of migrating to more “lucrative” destinations such as Europe, Australia, South Korea, or Japan.

As quality educational facilities are limited in rural areas, the last two decades have witnessed a new wave of rural to urban migration, driven heavily by the education economy. There has been a huge migration to urban centres in Nepal—not just to Kathmandu, but second-tier cities such as Pokhara, Biratnagar, Itahari, and even smaller yet rapidly growing district headquarters.

Much of this migration is by the middle and upper-middle peasantry—those who have some land and assets, and the ability to take loans with collateral, or purchase a small plot for a house in the town. In many cases, these migrants retain some links to home—for example, grandparents managing the farm—and often have family members already overseas, with remittances funding the college or school fees. They join more established urban youth whose parents left agriculture a generation or two ago, and together, they share middle-class aspirations.

However, the growth of the higher-education sector and the rise in education levels have far surpassed the expansion of high-paying professional jobs. The capacity for a neoliberal, service-oriented, and import-based economy like Nepal to absorb its rapidly growing educated youth is highly constrained. Meanwhile, access to the most coveted jobs in the service sector is often out of reach to those lacking political connections, caste networks, or the capacity to afford more exclusive private education.

Many of the new urban youth are becoming part of a vast army of “educated unemployed”—the presence of which is one of the biggest political and policy dilemmas of the 21st century, not just in Nepal, but across the world. This burgeoning demographic is a potent political force. Instant internet and social media access have not only created a digital community for youth, both rich and poor alike, but young people are also increasingly politically aware.

The influencer culture, which has been a phenomenon of the post-2010s smartphone era, has raised awareness of gross inequalities, most notably in the emerging capitalist elite of many lower-income countries. This elite has amassed wealth through capitalist investment, rent-seeking, and corruption. With this, there is growing disgust and resentment towards so-called nepo babies. In Asia, particularly the Philippines, this term has also been applied politically to refer to the offspring of well-connected political or business families, displaying their families’ ill-gotten wealth on social media.

Critique of Nepal’s own nepo babies has been a crucial element of the Gen Z movement, as urban youth have found themselves in the same digital spaces as politically connected influencers, flaunting lifestyles that starkly contrast with the everyday experiences of most young people. It is against this context that simmering anger has been growing amongst vast swathes of urban youth globally. Anger against corruption, lack of opportunities, and wasted investments in education were major factors in driving the youth-led uprisings across the region, including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and, most recently, Nepal. In Nepal, one of the most peripheral countries in the region in economic terms, there is particular rage against the sheer scale of corruption and the failed promises of the postwar political settlement.

There are important political questions for Nepal. Evidence from other regions that experienced mass youth movements shows that the ruling classes are often quick to reestablish authority. Nepal has been here before, in 2006 and in 2015. There is also a larger question about who decides the country’s political future. Many of the youth-led movements have been urban, rather than rural, which presents political dilemmas when considering the demographics of many low- and middle-income countries. Though it is rapidly urbanizing, approximately three-quarters of Nepal’s population still live in rural areas, two-thirds of which are integrated into the farming-remittance livelihood cycle.

The civil war unfolded within a rural economy shaped by a different political reality than today. Remittances have released the pressure valve that drove many young people into the Maoist movement. However, the deeper structural causes of livelihood insecurity in both rural and urban areas remain unaddressed, two decades after the war ended. These include extreme inequalities in the distribution of land and assets, often structured by caste and ethnicity, the decimation of once vibrant cottage industries, a spiral of indebtedness, and a dearth of employment opportunities. Migration has also fragmented rural social organization, undermining potential peasant mobilization.

Meanwhile, the established political parties have reasserted their authority in rural areas, mediating the distribution of limited state resources and infiltrating both state and non-state institutions. Now, elections may well see discredited leaders or parties of the past being reelected. In Nepal and across the region, it is imperative that new progressive political forces do not shy away from contesting power, but more importantly, remain connected to the movements that express the concerns of the poor and working classes.