While activists, politicians, and media professionals look at failed, ongoing, and planned EU military missions in West Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, South Sudan, or the Horn of Africa, one mission on the African continent has so far gone relatively unnoticed. In 2021, the EU agreed to a Mozambique training mission. The “EU Training Mission in Mozambique” (EUTM-Mozambique) aims to strengthen the Mozambican army given the escalating conflict in the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado, which has not yet been pacified. The EU recently agreed to an extension and expansion, which took effect from September 1, 2024.

It is a violent conflict unknown to the global public: in October 2017, attacks by Islamist actors on police stations began and later spread. The conflict in Cabo Delgado is complex and does not offer the simple answers often suggested in terms of the causes or the response. There are numerous interwoven causes. For example, the religious radicalization of parts of the Muslim population probably began in the early 2000s. This radicalization is mixed with ethnic tensions and rivalries, as well as neglect. Both during Portuguese colonial rule and after Mozambican independence, the north remained marginalized and far removed from the political center in the south. Despite its peripheral location, Cabo Delgado has increasingly come into the spotlight for profitable business in recent years, especially since the discovery of natural gas deposits. TotalEnergy (France), ExxonMobile (USA), and ENI (Italy) have either started drilling for gas or are planning to start.

The feared and real impacts on the local population, such as displacements that have already taken place, which are again accompanied by a sense of marginalization, were the third driver of the violence. In July 2021, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) launched the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) to combat Islamist forces. Several countries deployed soldiers but have withdrawn them in recent weeks. There are different views on the reasons for the withdrawal. Some voices cite insufficient funding, while others suggest that SAMIM is leaving the country because it has fulfilled its task of pushing back the insurgents (which, given the increasing activities of the insurgents since January, is questionable). However, the ongoing tensions between the Mozambican government and the SADC are a more plausible explanation. The heads of state of the SADC did not agree with deploying Rwandan troops to Cabo Delgado. Paul Kagame’s autocratic regime is trying to position itself as a state mercenary selling security. France also likely invited Rwanda to protect Total’s investments as part of a sub-imperialist agreement. Among others, a Rwandan security company is involved in protecting TotalEnergy’s facilities, and Rwandan construction companies are reportedly benefiting.

Additionally, Rwanda is striving for a more significant geopolitical position in eastern and southern Africa. Critics suspect that Kagame wants to divert attention from his involvement in the war in eastern Congo. The country is eyeing Rwandan dissidents and needs the Mozambican authorities’ goodwill. At the end of February, the Mozambican parliament ratified a controversial extradition agreement with Rwanda, which raised concerns about the possible persecution of dissidents in exile.

Largely unnoticed, three years ago—in July 2021 and October 2021—the EU decided on and launched a training mission for Mozambique that was originally intended to last two years. EUTM Mozambique was set up with the aim of training and supporting the Mozambican armed forces in combating the violent insurgency in the province of Cabo Delgado, in particular, training units of the still-to-be-formed Quick Reaction Force (QRF). It was equipped without an executive mandate. Forty million euros supplemented the four million euros originally provided in the following months and by a further 45 million euros from the European Peace Facility (EPF) in April 2022. Eleven companies with more than 1,700 military personnel have been trained so far. Also, through the EPF, the European Union has supported the Mozambican armed forces in purchasing non-lethal equipment for the units trained by EUTM Mozambique.

The training mission includes a wide range of countries. Unsurprisingly, Portugal and France have taken on a leading role. As an EU mission, member states are present accordingly, but Serbia—an EU accession candidate—and Cape Verde are also present with individual soldiers.

At the start of this year, the Mozambican government asked the EU to extend the training mission. According to a report by “Canal de Mocambique,” the EU representation in Mozambique hesitated to commit quickly. Well before that (in December 2023), the government of Portugal—the former colonial power—unsurprisingly stated that the EU mission should be extended. The EU Council recently extended the mandate of the training mission until July 30, 2026. The new mission will be funded with 14 million euros. However, the extension is accompanied by a change in objectives: instead of focusing on “training,” the focus is now on “support.” The rhetoric also reflects the change. EUTM Mozambique became the “EU Military Assistance Mission Mozambique” (EUMAM Mozambique) in September. In addition to light weapons, Mozambique also wanted war materials from the European side. This demand, repeatedly made and consistently refused, was last presented in Brussels in May by the Mozambican defense minister Cristóvão Chume, among others.

The engagement in Mozambique is embedded in the developing European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which began a few years ago and is being strengthened by the EU’s “Strategic Compass” from 2022. This includes, in particular, the European Peace Facility (EPF) as the new financing instrument that covers all EU foreign policy measures with a military or defense dimension as part of the CSDP. According to the EU Treaty, it is not permitted to finance military measures from the EU budget. To circumvent this ban, a budget for military financing outside the EU budget will be created, which is to be endowed with 17 billion euros for the period of 2021-2027 (mainly to support Ukraine).

With the EPF, the EU is seeking greater flexibility that will allow it to bypass the African Union and directly fund national and sub-regional military initiatives. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell stated that the EPF would “make the EU an even more effective security provider worldwide.” The mission in Mozambique was one of the first visible signs of this move and was only the third support measure adopted by the Council since the EPF was established.

In addition, the EU wants to use the EPF to facilitate arms deliveries to crisis regions and directly finance training and equipment for national armies. According to the International Crisis Group and other organizations, this could exacerbate the tense situation in fragile states. Although the Mozambican government’s requests for arms deliveries have been rejected so far, its beloved partner and actor Rwanda has benefited from the EU. Not only does the EU’s training mission fall under the Facility, but a precedent has also been set in another case. In 2022, an army received direct financial support of 20 million euros for the first time under the facility. According to a Bloomberg report, the EU is considering significantly increasing support, but this has been rejected for now. SAMIM was also supported with almost 17 million euros for equipment such as camp fortifications and vehicles.

What is missing so far is a critical assessment of the current success of the training mission and the effect the training is having on the Quick Reaction Forces. The EU’s expected success stories at the conclusion of EUTM focus on quantity (e.g., trained soldiers) rather than quality. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, the Mozambican authorities are not granting the EU military trainers access to the region. And generally speaking, the militant threat remains high in Cabo Delgado.

Another geopolitical dimension could make the EU mission even more interesting. Until now, China has only supplied weapons to Mozambique. Now, Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi has announced that China may support the training of Mozambican military personnel.

Certainly, and without any question, the protection of the population—including by strengthening the Mozambican armed forces—is indispensable. Nevertheless, the EU mission gives the impression of the political primacy of the military over civilians (the latter would be characterized by a newly established civilian conflict resolution). This conflict will never be effectively ended unless a channel for dialogue is opened, with the role of the local community at the forefront. Local initiatives have already produced results by the group freeing about 60 fishermen who had spent three days with them after having been kidnapped in August.

Furthermore, socio-economic measures beyond “development projects” must be taken. In this way, the EU is also negating both the social and economic causes of the war in Cabo Delgado, forcing the marginalization of communities and supporting the controversial position of the army and security forces as well as the Mozambican elite. It is unclear how “peace enforcement,” (creating peace through violence), is to become “peacekeeping.” Hence, even if not directly involved, the EU is becoming part of the increasing militarization.

However, the assessment should not stop there: The EU mission must be categorized in a triangle of “security, investment protection, and access to resources,” even if it is not mentioned so explicitly. While the rhetoric of EU diplomacy tends to emphasize a European defensive stance, the missions suggest a much more offensive character. This is about the military defense of an extractivist project and its previous investment, as well as European security of gas supply.