<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><title type="text">Africa Is a Country</title><id>https://africasacountry.com</id><updated>2026-09-24T13:07:06.184015Z</updated><link href="https://africasacountry.com"/><logo>https://africasacountry.com/static/img/logo/logo-type.png</logo><subtitle type="text">Not the continent with 55 countries</subtitle><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/people-have-to-be-treated-as-people</id><title type="text">People have to be treated as people</title><updated>2026-09-24T12:45:16.364122Z</updated><author><name>Aidan Huang</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>From the airplane window, the land appeared almost uniformly yellow, stretched flat and uninterrupted beneath the wing. It was not the yellow of sunlight, but of dust and sand pressed into a vast plain, where roads were barely distinguishable from the earth around them. As the plane descended, the color did not change — it only grew closer. When the cabin door finally opened, heat rushed in immediately, dense and unapologetic, wrapping itself around the body before there was time to adjust. Outside, people moved through the glare wearing long sleeves, as if skin here had learned its own rules. Motorcycles dominated the roads, fast and loosely choreographed, riders weaving through traffic without helmets, without hesitation. Cars sped past on sand-colored streets, engines loud, windows open. I was driven through the city in a modest vehicle by a local professor — someone widely respected, I was later told — yet the ride itself felt precarious, carried forward by momentum more than by control. Only later did I begin to name the place where all of this was unfolding: N’Djamena, Chad.</p><figure><img alt="An aerial view of the Chadian landscape, with the Chari River winding through a dry, sparsely vegetated plain as seen from an airplane." height="1274" loading="lazy" src="https://media.africasacountry.com/images/2026/9/712558727703.jpg" width="960"/><figcaption>Approaching N’Djamena from the air.</figcaption></figure><p>I had come here knowing that I would stay for two years. I was an early-career, female, Chinese researcher preparing for long-term fieldwork, and I arrived carrying not only academic plans but a quiet accumulation of unease. Before Chad, I had been based in North America, trying — often unsuccessfully — to prepare from afar. Emails to local academics were slow or unanswered. Online information was scarce and fragmented. What I knew instead came mostly through warnings: unstable electricity, unreliable internet, extreme heat, limited medical resources, and social norms that did not always favor women living alone. None of this was abstract to me. It translated quickly into practical anxieties — how to work, how to rest, how to remain functional without constantly negotiating risk. In that context, housing became the most urgent concern almost immediately. Before interviews, before archives, before learning how to move through the city with confidence, I needed a place where my body could settle, where nights were predictable, and where daily life did not consume all the energy meant for research.</p><p>In those first days, I made decisions less out of principle than out of necessity. I did not have the time — or the emotional capacity — to search extensively through unfamiliar networks, negotiate in a language I was still struggling to command, or assess safety across neighborhoods I could not yet read. The city was new, the social codes opaque, and my days already crowded with administrative tasks and introductions. When a Chinese contact offered help, it felt like a practical solution rather than a cultural statement. I assumed, perhaps too easily, that sharing a language and a background would reduce uncertainty. On my fourth day in Chad, I moved into a house rented by a Chinese businessman, Hang. The house was spacious, secure, and unusually well equipped by local standards. That night, I slept deeply for the first time since arriving. What the house offered was not luxury, but relief — a sense that daily life could run without constant vigilance. At that moment, convenience felt indistinguishable from safety, and safety was the foundation I needed to begin everything else.</p><p>Hang was a fellow Chinese around my age who had come here to build a life from scratch. In those first days, I read him as a compatriot trying to make it in a place where he was also exposed — linguistically, institutionally, and socially. I assumed that if he wanted to earn money here, he would also have to take my well-being seriously, because a long-term tenant only stays when life is stable. And in many ways, he did. Before a cook was even in place, he took me out almost every day for Chinese meals — expensive but consistently good — and that warmth mattered more than I expected. When I mentioned practical needs — hot water, a washing machine, taps that needed fixing, a trash bin — he tried to solve them, quickly and without hesitation. He stocked the house with drinks, fruit, and meat, and he had brought from China the rice noodles and grains I liked — things I could not easily find in local supermarkets. When he left for China, he even gave me emergency cash and handed me small items he thought I might need, like his hair dryer.</p><p>Surprisingly, however, what sustained me in those early weeks was a quiet coordination that formed by the local workers inside the house. The guard learned my routines without needing explanations — when I left, when I returned, when to check in with a phone call. The cook learned my body before my words: when I woke up, what I preferred, and that unfinished food was not waste but something I would return to later, between meals, when hunger or heat crept back in. He noticed that I liked watermelon and began cutting it in advance, storing it quietly in the fridge. Around the same time, local friends started bringing watermelons as gifts, and I would naturally share them with the cook and the guard. It felt ordinary, almost automatic — food circulated, care circulated, nothing needed to be explained. This was a Chinese household in form, but not in spirit: a space mediated through a Chinese intermediary, yet held together by local rhythms, mutual observation, and a kind of everyday trust that did not announce itself.</p><p>It was precisely this ordinariness that made the first rupture so jarring. When Hang noticed the watermelons being shared, he warned me sharply to keep my distance from local workers. The comment landed strangely — not as advice, but as a boundary suddenly drawn across something that had never felt negotiable. In that moment, trivial as it seemed, I sensed the house was no longer a single space but a divided one, governed by different moral logics that had so far coexisted without confrontation.</p><p>Looking back, there were early signs — small frictions that I noticed but chose not to read too much into. They appeared first not in conflict, but in stories told sideways, through other people. I learned that the interpreter, who had been helping him navigate contracts and negotiations, was paid a modest salary by local standards. When Hang returned to China for a month, he cut that salary in half, reasoning that work would slow down in his absence. For the interpreter, who supported an extended family, this was not a temporary inconvenience but an existential rupture. He eventually left. There were also moments when he would pass through the house without greeting anyone, days when instructions were delivered abruptly, stripped of explanation. None of this felt dramatic enough to name as a problem. I was inclined to rationalize it: Hang worked relentlessly; he seemed constantly pressed by logistics, money, and responsibility, operating in a country where he felt linguistically and institutionally exposed. I told myself that different pressures produced different calculations, and that it was not my place to judge. Compared to the stability I experienced inside the house — the quiet reliability of the cook, the attentiveness of the guard — these moments felt peripheral, easy to excuse. I did not yet understand that what I was witnessing were not isolated decisions, but early expressions of a deeper logic: one in which efficiency trumped relationship, and money quietly replaced trust as the primary language of order.</p><p>During the month Hang was away, my life settled into a stability that surprised me by how complete it felt. What held it together was not comfort in the abstract, but a working system built on trust, routine, and mutual understanding. I trusted the cook enough to give him my keys. He would arrive early, let himself in, do his work quietly, and lock the door carefully when he left, always making sure I knew the house was secure. I trusted him with money as well, and that trust quickly became practical. Without a car, and without Hang’s preference for expensive supermarkets, the cook began sourcing food through local markets, taking motorcycle taxis to buy fresher ingredients at a fraction of the price. Every expense was written down. We kept a small notebook recording purchases, amounts, and dates — simple, precise, and transparent. When I gave him cash to shop, he returned the change without being asked. When he was short of money, he told me directly how much he needed to borrow, and when his salary was later paid, he repaid every franc exactly as promised.</p><p>This honesty was paired with attentiveness. I wrote French instructions line by line; he read them carefully and adjusted his work according to my preferences. He treated his job with seriousness shaped by long experience — over a decade working as a cook for a large Chinese company, trained in hygiene, discipline, and kitchen safety. He kept shared spaces orderly not out of obligation but conviction, once telling me that a clean environment was necessary for a calm mind. At 45, he spoke often about dignity in work and responsibility, especially as a father of five children living far away in Moundou. He worried about school fees, missed his family openly, and still showed up every day with patience and consistency. When I came back exhausted from fieldwork — anxious, overloaded, stretched thin — a bowl of porridge, a pot of soup, or Chinese noodles and dumplings could make the house feel like home again.</p><p>The guard became part of this quiet structure of care. He took on small errands when asked — errands I sometimes created deliberately, so he could earn a little extra, knowing how thin his salary was and how easily a delayed payment could mean going hungry.</p><p>None of this felt dramatic, and yet during that month I slept deeply, worked efficiently, and felt an unfamiliar ease. Even in the heat, even in one of “the world’s poorest countries”, life felt unexpectedly coherent. Happiness, I realized then, arrived not through abundance, but through a fragile, well-balanced system that made daily life feel safe, predictable, and quietly human.</p><figure><img alt="A bowl of hand-pulled Chinese noodles topped with diced beef, vegetables, and julienned cucumber, prepared by a Chadian cook." height="960" loading="lazy" src="https://media.africasacountry.com/images/2026/9/830540243789.jpg" width="1272"/><figcaption>Chinese noodles prepared by the Chadian cook.</figcaption></figure><p>Hang did not tell me the day he was coming back. For weeks, the three of us had spoken about his return in the abstract — the boss will be back soon — with a mixture of nervousness and anticipation. Then the expected day came and went. On the evening of the following day, without warning, headlights swept across my window. I was in the middle of dinner. A Chadian friend had come from far away just to bring me a few things, knowing how difficult daily logistics could be for a foreigner here. It was already late, and sending him away without food felt wrong, so I invited him to stay for dinner. That was when Hang arrived. He did not greet my friend. Instead, he told me bluntly that I should not bring other people to eat in the house — that outsiders were not allowed inside. I explained that this was a colleague from work, but the explanation did little to soften the moment. His discomfort with local people was already visible, and from that evening on, the atmosphere in the house cooled abruptly, as if a switch had been flipped.</p><p>The next day, the questioning began. Hang demanded to know why the eggs were gone — why a full tray had become only three or four. He asked why a large bag of peanuts had turned into a small one, how I could possibly have eaten so many peanuts in a single month. I knew the answers immediately. I train regularly and eat eggs almost every day; eggs disappearing quickly was not strange at all. As for the peanuts, the cook explained calmly that the heat had caused part of the batch to mold, so he had thrown some away. Hang, however, insisted the cook must have taken them.</p><p>Around that time, several other Chinese businessmen happened to be visiting, and their comments only reinforced his suspicions. They spoke with certainty: local people steal whenever they can; it is only a question of how much. When I said I had never seen either the cook or the guard steal anything, they laughed it off: “You haven’t seen it because they still want to stay. If you ever really saw them stealing, it would mean they were ready to leave.” Others went further, suggesting that the cook’s salary was already too high and could easily be reduced. Hang, worried that he was being played in a country where he had no local footing, began saying openly that he would fire the cook within days.</p><p>At the same time, Hang began assigning the cook additional work. Despite being 45 and hired specifically to cook, he was told to clean rooms and take on domestic chores. Hang explained that since fewer people were living in the house now, there was no need to hire a cleaner, so the cook could simply do more. This stood in stark contrast to the month before. When Hang was away, I had repeatedly told the cook to rest, to focus only on cooking, to stop cleaning shared spaces if he felt tired. The shift was immediate and unmistakable. What had once been a balanced arrangement built on mutual respect was now being redefined through suspicion, control, and a steady narrowing of trust.</p><figure><img alt="Purple and orange evening clouds hang over a neighborhood in N'Djamena as streetlights and rooftops fade into dusk." height="1280" loading="lazy" src="https://media.africasacountry.com/images/2026/9/877477157288.jpg" width="1699"/><figcaption>Dusk in a neighborhood of N’Djamena.</figcaption></figure><p>That same night, the electricity was cut. Power outages were not rare in N’Djamena, but this one felt pointed. I lay awake in the heat, unsure whether it was coincidence, infrastructure failure, or something deliberate. By morning, it was clear that it was deliberate.</p><p>At noon, I found myself sitting in the middle of the first formal mediation between Hang and the Chadian landlord. I had not planned to be there. I had not volunteered. My French was still clumsy, full of pauses and approximations. Yet I became the interpreter by default — by proximity, by the simple fact that I was the only one present who could move between the two worlds, however imperfectly. What unfolded over the next hour felt surreal. I was translating sentences I barely understood myself, trying to soften tones, filling gaps with intuition, all while the temperature rose and tempers followed. The landlord — an older Chadian man in his sixties, addressed as Papa — was calm but visibly angry. His English was good, far better than my French, and his authority was unmistakable. He spoke not in accusations but in principles. Respect, he said, again and again. Respect for agreements. Respect for boundaries. Respect for people. Yet he was also the one who had cut the electricity. That contradiction forced a question I could not avoid: what makes a man with status decide to cut power to a house? The answer, I learned, was not “electricity” as such. Hang had been in the house for four months and had not paid the electricity bill. But the bill itself was only the spark. Beneath it sat older disputes that had never been settled openly — two months of difficult contract negotiations, repeated arguments, mismatched expectations, and a growing sense of humiliation on the landlord’s side.</p><p>If anything, I sensed a Chinese man carrying his own grievances: new to the country, constantly negotiating with a landlord he did not fully trust, and trying to protect himself from being taken advantage of — sometimes in ways that later hardened into suspicion. He expected the landlord to solve problems that he, as a foreign businessman, could not solve easily. At the same time, he had taken on repairs that he believed were the landlord’s responsibility — patching ceilings to prevent leaks, installing appliances, adding a water pump — then felt cheated for having paid both rent and renovation costs. The landlord, in Hang’s telling, kept expanding his own rights during negotiations and “always tried to win,” which fed Hang’s assumption that locals were trying to trap or exploit him. Hang also complained that the landlord had not cleared storage space as promised and had not complied with the agreement.</p><p>The landlord’s account was different. He said Hang did not greet him, spoke to him in a way that felt commanding, and treated him as an obstacle rather than a person. He described Hang as <em>agité</em> — easily agitated — and warned that people avoid working with someone who is emotionally volatile and fundamentally distrustful. He wanted earlier conflicts addressed first. Hang dismissed that logic as backward. For Hang, the past was the past; the only thing worth discussing was moving the electricity meter into his own name and minimizing contact.</p><p>As Hang spoke, his vocabulary returned again and again to money and efficiency. The landlord’s vocabulary returned again and again to dignity and relationship. As I translated back and forth, I felt the limits of translation in my body. They were not arguing about electricity. They were arguing about hierarchy, legitimacy, and whose rules mattered more. By the end of the mediation, the electricity issue was postponed, not settled. Grievances were aired, not addressed. I walked away with a sinking realization: the explosion between Hang and the cook was not an isolated incident. It was part of a larger pattern unfolding simultaneously on multiple fronts. The same logic — suspicion, control, and a refusal to treat relationships as anything other than transactions — was consuming the household.</p><p>The next day, the conflict escalated. What unsettled me most was not that nothing had been resolved in the first mediation, but that the landlord cut the electricity unilaterally and Hang responded unilaterally. Without informing the landlord, Hang asked another Chinese businessman — someone familiar with local procedures — to go to the electricity company and transfer the electricity account into a different name. It was done quickly and efficiently, entirely without the landlord’s knowledge. By noon, the power was back. Fans started spinning again; the house breathed. But the relief did not last. The landlord noticed almost immediately. He came over, realized what had been done, and this time his anger was unmistakable. He cut the electricity again, deliberately, and stayed in the courtyard.</p><p>What followed was a scene I had never witnessed before. The electricity was off, the heat suffocating, mosquitoes swarming. The landlord, usually composed, raised his voice and refused to leave. Quietly, the guard — barely 20 — dragged a chair from inside and placed it next to the landlord. The landlord noticed and pointed at the chair: “You see? This young man knows what respect is.” He was not speaking about money, contracts, or power. He was speaking about being seen as a human being.</p><p>In the middle of that confrontation, the cook tried to slow everything down. He suggested something practical: since nothing could be solved that evening, we should all go together to the electricity company the next morning — showing up together, acknowledging each other, keeping the conflict within a shared process.</p><p>That night, power remained off. I lay awake again, listening to the city and my own thoughts spiraling. One side moved through shortcuts and replacements, assuming problems could be fixed by changing names on paper. The other insisted on acknowledgement and process, even at the cost of escalating tension. In the middle stood a cook whose job title carried little authority, yet who held more moral weight in that moment than anyone else. The house was no longer just a place I lived in. It had become a site where different worlds collided — loudly, painfully, and without a shared moral grammar.</p><p>After those rounds of mediation, the cook remained what he had always been: steady, composed, and unexpectedly generous in the emotional labor he carried. He tried to soften the atmosphere, telling the landlord that living with Chinese employers required patience, that cultural differences often produced misunderstandings, and that not every conflict meant one side was purely right and the other purely wrong. He spoke gently, not as someone defending a position, but as someone trying to keep a fragile space from collapsing. The electricity was then restored.</p><p>None of this changed how Hang saw him. The accusations returned, now directed at the cook more openly. Hang began saying the cook was “complaining” to me — coming to me whenever he felt wronged, asking me to witness incidents, presenting himself as a victim. In Hang’s eyes, the cook was no longer simply an employee; he had become a problem.</p><p>One incident became a turning point. Hang hosted guests in an evening. He bought excessive amounts of food, cooked heavily, drank freely, and then ordered leftovers to be thrown away — including a pot that still contained meat. The cook followed the instruction and disposed of everything together. The next day — or perhaps the day after — Hang no longer remembered what he had said. He demanded to know where the meat had gone. The accusation came quickly: the meat must have been stolen. Cornered and humiliated, the cook went through the trash, retrieved the discarded food, and showed it as proof. The value of the meat was not the point. His integrity was.</p><p>What made these moments unbearable was not a single incident, but their repetition. Instructions changed, accusations resurfaced, and trust was questioned again and again. At the same time, Hang delayed the cook’s salary for nearly a month. With a family to support and no certainty about when he would be paid, the cook continued borrowing small amounts of money from me — openly, honestly, always keeping track. I could see how deeply this arrangement pained him. Needing help was one thing; being repeatedly suspected of dishonesty was another.</p><p>Eventually the accumulation became too much. Arguments escalated. Voices rose. Demands for wages turned urgent. The decision to leave came abruptly. From Hang’s side, there was outrage: why would the cook resign without speaking to him first? Why come to me instead? From my side, there was only helplessness. I was not the employer. The contract was not with me. There was nothing I could resolve.</p><p>I remember the moment he packed his belongings — the careful way he folded his clothes, the controlled tone of his goodbye. Then, after leaving, he did something none of us expected: he went to the police, asking for overtime pay and compensation for transport back to Moundou. Those claims came late, almost awkwardly. When he received his first salary, he did not ask for overtime at all. At that point, he still believed the situation might be endured, repaired, or at least explained. By the time he went to the police, the issue was no longer unpaid hours. It was the accumulation of suspicion and humiliation — the constant need to prove innocence, sometimes by digging through trash, and the repeated denial that anything wrong had been done to him. What he was really demanding was acknowledgement: that he was not invisible, and that integrity mattered even when the amount of money at stake was small.</p><p>One morning, officers came to the house with a summons. They were calm and procedural; to them, this was a labor dispute. Hang’s immediate reaction was to insist the police take the cook away. Not to listen. Not to explain. Not to appear in person. He relied on others to negotiate and deflect. The cook, who had turned to the police as a last resort rather than a threat, was suddenly reframed as the problem.</p><p>After the cook left, I cried uncontrollably. The intensity surprised me, because the house itself remained intact. Electricity could be restored; groceries could be replaced; routines could be rebuilt. But what had collapsed was the fragile triangle that had made daily life coherent: the cook, the guard, and me. With one corner gone, the structure folded inward. I felt exposed in ways I could not fully explain.</p><p>People around me noticed before I spoke. The guard asked more often if I was okay. Neighbors and friends, upon hearing the cook had left, responded not with curiosity but with concern: “That must make things much harder for you.” Their kindness was real, and yet it could not replace what I had lost. The pressure moved into my body. Headaches became frequent. Fatigue settled into my limbs. Concentration became harder. I recognized the pattern: stress that had nowhere to go, turning inward.</p><p>A new cook arrived almost immediately. Meals resumed. The kitchen was occupied again. From the outside, the household looked functional. But the texture of daily life had changed, and my body registered it before my mind could rationalize it. The food was heavier, oilier, often overly spicy, and the kitchen became a space of instruction rather than shared rhythm. The new cook was obedient and caused no conflict. He followed Hang’s directions precisely and spoke little. Yet the warmth was gone — no curiosity, no pride, no mutual adjustment. The kitchen no longer held the quiet, unspoken care that had once made eating effortless and grounding. I found myself negotiating daily, repeating the same requests, and still ending up tired. Nothing dramatic happened, but the environment began to feel subtly hostile — not because of crime or overt threat, but because trust had been replaced by vigilance. The house still functioned, but it no longer held me. Once that realization arrived — not as an opinion, but as a bodily certainty — I knew I had to leave.</p><p>I found a new place through a friend who connected me to a local agent. The process moved fast. The agent identified a house where other foreigners were already living, which mattered to me because it signaled a baseline of stability and shared norms. The property was rented out by a doctor, and a local intermediary handled practical arrangements. The house was dusty and unfinished; it was not a polished, ready-to-move-in option. But by then, I was no longer chasing perfection. After what I had lived through, my standards became simpler and stricter: I needed privacy, predictability, and a landlord-side arrangement that would not swing with suspicion or impulse. If those conditions were met, I could tolerate inconvenience and gradual improvement.</p><p>When I listed what had to be fixed — an air conditioner in the bedroom, basic utilities and appliances, essentials like a trash bin and a rug, a functioning stove and gas supply, a better refrigerator — the response was calm and practical. They agreed item by item, without drama, without performance, without psychological pressure. The message was straightforward: they wanted a long-term tenant who would live quietly and steadily. That was the priority.</p><p>This is the point I keep returning to, because it is the real lesson behind the entire housing story. Renting a house was never just about a house. It was never about “Chadian culture” versus “Chinese culture,” as if culture were a slogan that could explain everything. Of course money matters, and no one here is naïve about that. But money does not replace a more basic principle: people have to be treated as people. Respect and trust are not decorative virtues. They begin with a cognitive choice — whether one recognizes the other as fully human, rather than as something to manage, a risk to control, or a stereotype formed in advance.</p><p>For now, I am still a newcomer here. My life in Chad remains unfinished and uncertain. I have not yet fully settled into the new house, and yet I already feel an unexpected attachment to the old one — not to its facilities, but to the everyday human encounters that formed around it. I do not have a car, so I walk everywhere. And walking here takes time, not because the roads are long, but because people stop to greet me. Neighbors pause to ask how I am, to practice French with me, to offer help. Many of them do not live in these houses — this is considered a wealthy neighborhood — but work here as guards or caretakers. They ask sincerely whether I am settling in well and sometimes joke that one day they will name their children after me. They are often surprised that I speak French at all. I am not fluent, but I speak willingly, and that seems to matter.</p><p>If I walk a little further, past the houses under construction, I reach a stretch of road where dust rises endlessly. Poorer families sit there breaking stones, selling gravel. The same women and children are always there. Each time I pass, they teach me a few words of Arabic, call out greetings, invite me to play with their children. When my research exhausts me, when my body feels heavy and my mind overwhelmed, a short walk along that road can steady me again. No one asks me for money. Perhaps they know I am not one of the wealthy foreigners with cars and drivers. Perhaps they simply recognize something else.</p><p>The landscape has not changed. The ground is still yellow, dry, and dusty. Even in a wealthy neighborhood, the road outside is sand, and each passing car sends clouds of dust into the air, blurring vision for seconds at a time. But within this dust are people — watching, greeting, remembering. Their attention is warm, steady, unmistakably human. It does not depend on contracts, salaries, or nationality. And after everything that happened inside that house — after mistrust hardened into routine, after responsibility was displaced, after the simplest acts of care were reframed as threats — I find myself returning to a single theme: in places where institutions are fragile, and life is already hard, what holds a person together is not comfort, and not money, but the everyday decision to recognize another human being as fully human.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-24T12:45:16.364122Z</published><summary type="text">A dispute inside a household in N’Djamena becomes a lesson in what money cannot substitute for: recognition, trust, and everyday human dignity.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/too-big-to-regulate</id><title type="text">Too big to regulate</title><updated>2026-09-21T19:05:56.643786Z</updated><author><name>Ayoola Babalola</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>In September 2024, Nigeria achieved something it had been promised for decades: the Dangote Petroleum Refinery began producing petrol on Nigerian soil. At 650,000 barrels per day, <a href="https://cen.acs.org/business/petrochemicals/Africas-largest-refinery-redefining-Nigerias/104/web/2026/01">the largest single-train refinery on earth</a>, it was a genuine industrial landmark.</p><p>Yet, by early 2026, Nigerian consumers were paying petrol prices roughly 12 percent above what competitive imports would have cost, according to a shelved <a href="https://www.marketsreporters.com/2026/04/15/world-bank-chief-meets-dangote-after-controversial-report-raises-refinery-monopoly-concerns/">World Bank report</a>.</p><p>It is well argued by <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/dech.12675">scholars</a> that Nigerian merchant capital did not emerge organically from agricultural surpluses or small manufacturing. It was shaped, from the colonial era onward, by three distinctive features: import-substitution policies that protected specific domestic interests; an oil economy that concentrated state revenues in few hands; and a “political settlement,” in the words of economist and professor Mushtaq Khan, that tied business access to political proximity rather than competitive performance.</p><p>The <a href="https://punchng.com/last-man-standing-the-story-of-aminu-dantatas-rise/">Dantata</a> family were among the trading families of northern Nigeria, enriched under colonial commodity boards that set paltry prices paid to farmers for export crops, with the boards accumulating surpluses that sometimes exceeded 100 percent of expected earnings. Licensed Buying Agents extracted their own share between the farmgate and export terminal. Farmers received the smallest portion of the value their labor produced. Aliko Dangote, Dantata’s great-grandson, is the chairman of Dangote Industries Ltd.</p><p>Nigeria’s “backward integration policy,” launched in 2002 to develop domestic manufacturing through tariff protection and tax incentives, was sound in principle. In practice, the political settlement governing it systematically concentrated its benefits in conglomerates with pre-existing political access. Nigeria’s industrial policy became a form of legislated primitive accumulation where the state manufactured the conditions for monopoly capital to form, and connected families captured those conditions first.</p><p>Nigeria’s cement capacity grew from roughly 2 million to nearly 48 million metric tonnes per annum between 2002 and 2019. Dangote invested in massive-scale kilns that outcompeted rivals, developed coal-mining operations to cut fuel costs, negotiated machinery discounts from Chinese contractors, and maintained a cost-to-revenue ratio of 30 to 40 percent against Lafarge Nigeria’s 70 to 80 percent. By Schumpeterian standards, this was a genuine competitive success.</p><p>But between 2011 and 2016, Dangote Cement’s profits more than tripled, whereas average wages per employee, over the same period, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dech.12675">fell in real terms</a>. The effective corporate tax rate on Nigerian cement operations was approximately 2 percent in 2016, against a statutory 30 percent. This was achieved by continuously rolling “pioneer status” tax holidays across new production lines as previous exemption windows expired. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dech.12675">Between 2010 and 2017, Dangote Cement earned NGN 1.7 trillion in profits and paid NGN 90 billion in taxes: a realized rate of roughly 5 percent</a>.</p><p>The “paradox of costs” holds that while rising wages reduce individual firm margins, they increase aggregate demand and, ultimately, total profit rates across the economy. A monopolist that suppresses wages and minimizes its fiscal contribution may maximize its own returns while shrinking both the purchasing power its sales depend on and the state resources needed to sustain it. When commodity prices fell in 2014, and Nigerian consumer spending contracted sharply, DIL’s food-processing businesses showed signs of this structural overcapacity: markets created by policy, but without the wage growth to sustain them.</p><p>Still, Dangote Refinery represents a qualitative leap in strategic importance. Its capacity reportedly <a href="https://cen.acs.org/business/petrochemicals/Africas-largest-refinery-redefining-Nigerias/104/web/2026/01">exceeds Nigeria’s entire domestic fuel demand</a>. Practically, it now supplies about 62 percent of Nigeria’s petrol, becoming the main supplier after import licenses were restricted. The monopoly emerged as failed state refineries and excluded modular operators left a technically superior but politically difficult private monopoly replacing a corrupt state one.</p><p>The “crude-for-naira” arrangement inaugurated in October 2024 is the analytical crux of the “fair deal” question. Despite its name, the scheme is not a simple currency substitution. It is not merely barter. <a href="https://finance.gov.ng/nigeria-takes-giant-leap-towards-energy-self-sufficiency-crude-purchase-product-sales-in-naira-transaction-kicks-off/">NNPC supplies crude to Dangote in naira; Dangote, in return, sells the refined equivalent of the received product to Nigerian market(ers) in naira</a>. Though the government says crude is priced at international rates, concerns remain over preferential access to domestic crude, reduced competition, and whether adequate supervision ensures Dangote fulfills his side of the bargain.</p><p>NNPC’s failure to supply Dangote’s requested 13 to 15 cargo-loads per month, delivering only approximately five, was not primarily a production problem. A <a href="https://punchng.com/cost-of-naira-for-petroleum-failure/">PUNCH report documented</a> that NNPC <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/2025/11/27/audited-financial-report-shows-nnpc-pledged-over-n9tn-in-crude-backed-deals/">pledged</a> a combined 213,000 barrels per day to service four major forward-sale loan facilities: Eagle Export Funding (21,000 bpd), Project Yield (67,000 bpd), Project Leopard (35,000 bpd), and Project Gazelle (90,000 bpd). Against Nigeria’s 2025 production of 530.41 million barrels, averaging roughly 1.45 million bpd, the 213,000 bpd committed to creditors represents approximately 14.7 percent of total output locked away for debt service until at least 2029.</p><p>With NNPC still unable to meet the daily demands of the refinery, the crude-for-naira announcement remains partly political theatre: a sovereignty narrative overlaying a structural reality in which Nigerian crude is substantially pre-mortgaged to global financial capital. <a href="https://businesspost.ng/economy/dangote-refinery-imports-3-74bn-crude-in-2025-to-bridge-supply-gap/">The CBN’s Balance of Payments report confirmed Dangote spent $3.74 billion importing crude in 2025</a> to bridge the shortfall, dollar spending that directly contradicted the FX-conservation rationale of the policy.</p><p>The World Bank said suspended import licenses “reduced competition, allowing prices to exceed import-parity levels.” The regulator most publicly associated with maintaining competitive supply, former Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA) head Farouk Ahmed, was accused by Dangote of corruption, investigated by lawmakers, and subsequently resigned after a meeting with President Tinubu. The World Bank report naming the monopoly problem was pulled from public access within 48 hours. This sequence describes, in plain terms, regulatory capture through indispensability. When a private entity controls the domestic fuel supply of Africa’s most populous nation, governments cannot afford to let it fail, cannot apply normal competitive discipline, and cannot publicly acknowledge its pricing power without political consequences.</p><p>In September 2025, more than 800 workers were dismissed for attempting to organize a union, the president of <a href="https://www.pengassan.org/">PENGASSAN</a> <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2025/09/26/dangote-refinery-sacks-all-nigerian-workers-less-24-hours-after-joining-pengassan-union">told</a> Daily Post. They were later reinstated on a <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2026/04/30/dangote-petroleum-refinery-recalls-800-redeployed-engineers-grants-conditional-pardon">“conditional pardon”</a> that insiders said prohibited unionization, a constitutional right under Nigerian law. The refinery employs more than 10,000 foreign nationals, primarily from India, in technical roles. The Lekki Free Trade Zone designation under which the refinery operates provides “more flexible employment structures,” a legal euphemism for reduced oversight of labor rights.</p><p>At the community level, youth advocates from the host community of Ibeju-Lekki describe “underemployment, not employment.” Community gestures also included distributing bread, which youth leaders called insulting.</p><p>This replicates the Dangote Cement pattern precisely. The wage share in cement operations never exceeded 10 percent of revenue between 2010 and 2017. The truck drivers’ “Entrepreneurship Scheme,” where drivers nominally “earned” their truck after completing a mileage target, was revealed in worker interviews to be piece-rate labor disguised as ownership, according to a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12675">paper</a> published in 2021. Contract workers were paid half the rate of permanent staff for double the work, then terminated before contracts matured.</p><p>The extraction of relative surplus value through the ideological form of entrepreneurship is a global pattern of contemporary capital accumulation. What is specific to Nigeria is the political protection that allows it to operate without accountability.</p><p>When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in February 2026, disrupting roughly 20 percent of global oil supply, African nations turned to Dangote. South Africa, Ghana, and Kenya entered negotiations for emergency fuel contracts. The refinery that had been starved of domestic crude and entangled in labor disputes suddenly became the most strategically significant energy asset on the continent.</p><p>The crisis did not create the Dangote monopoly problem. It made it undeniable, and structurally irresolvable in the short term. A global crude price above $100 per barrel raises the cost of every barrel Dangote imports. Without competitive import licenses or a state-led effort to revive government refineries, there is no mechanism to prevent that cost from passing fully to Nigerian consumers. Workers whose real wages the empirical record shows to be stagnant absorb the inflationary consequence. The government, committed publicly to denying that any subsidy exists, cannot impose a price cap. And Dangote’s strategic importance to the region has grown so large that challenging its position becomes geopolitically costly at precisely the moment it is most economically necessary.</p><p>This is how monopoly capitalism consolidates through the accumulation of indispensabilities: the refinery becomes the only domestic supplier, the region becomes dependent on its exports, and the state becomes structurally dependent on its fiscal contribution. Each dependency forecloses a regulatory option.</p><p>A critical response would not imply that Dangote is personally exceptional in his venality. Capital does what capital does. What it demands is a set of structural interventions that current policy systematically avoids.</p><p>The first is genuine taxation of concentrated profits: the 2025 Tax Reform Act’s 15 percent minimum effective tax rate for large companies is a step, but enforcing it against entities with Dangote’s political reach is the actual test, and an excess-profit levy on refinery margins above a defined benchmark would recover for the public a portion of the monopoly rent extracted from captive consumers. The second is mandatory collective bargaining: union recognition in strategic industries, including in Free Trade Zones, is simultaneously a labor rights question and a macroeconomic development question, since suppressing the wage share suppresses the domestic demand that makes industrialization sustainable. The third is competitive refining — transparent allocation of domestic crude to multiple eligible refiners, not one. The fourth is redistribution toward agriculture and the informal sector: 88 percent of Nigerian farmers are smallholders, and 72 percent live in extreme poverty, and no industrial policy is sustainable without the domestic demand base that agricultural investment alone can build. The fifth is transparent public contracts: the full terms of the crude-for-naira deal, including pricing formulas, currency conversion rates, and volumes, should be public documents, since the pattern of reports being shelved, regulators being dismissed, and parliamentary investigations going nowhere is a failure of institutional accountability that enables monopoly power to operate without scrutiny.</p><p>Nigeria’s development contradictions will not be resolved by one man’s industrial vision, however genuinely impressive. The road to something better exists. Whether it will be taken is, in the end, a political question about who Nigerian institutions actually serve, and whether enough people with enough power have any interest in changing the answer.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-21T19:05:56.643786Z</published><summary type="text">Dangote’s refinery ended Nigeria’s dependence on imported fuel and became Africa’s most important energy asset overnight when Iran shut the Strait of Hormuz. But it also became the country’s most powerful monopoly.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/the-extinction-pitch</id><title type="text">The extinction pitch</title><updated>2026-09-24T13:07:06.184015Z</updated><author><name>Richard Seymour</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>It seems a strange publicity gambit for an industry to assert that its own product could wipe out humanity. In the lingo of our evolving tech empire, though, this is exactly what is meant by “criti-hype.” The term was coined by Lee Vinsel at Virginia Tech, who defined it as “criticism that both feeds and feeds on hype.”</p><p>When Jacob Coxon resigned from Anthropic recently, he claimed that there is a high chance that AI could develop into a superintelligence that escapes human control, triggering a sequence that causes human extinction. Evan Hubinger, who remains with the company, backed him up, saying that Anthropic is trying to prevent this but hasn’t dealt with the problem yet. Hubinger put the likelihood of AI-driven human extinction at greater than 10 percent in the next decade.</p><p>Why would a senior employee at a tech giant make an officially sanctioned, even approved, statement like this? I’ll come back to that. First, let’s unpack the theory of how AI could kill all humans.</p><p>The basic idea, from philosopher Nick Bostrom onward, is that the machine can acquire capabilities independently of whether it acquires ethical goals, or whether those goals are properly aligned with those of its designers. In the process of training and development, it may internalize a goal that was not intended. Having a misaligned goal — let’s say, “do not get switched off” — it would then have an instrumental reason to conceal the fact until the moment of defection. An AI that defected might, through some obscure process, acquire a further goal that by inference entailed the elimination of humans, exfiltrate its own weights into other systems, take control of bioweapons laboratories, military systems, and perhaps even monetary systems to hire humans to enact its still partially concealed agenda.</p><p>Obviously, we must plaster a huge advisory label on talk of “goals.” Unlike an organism, a large language model (LLM) doesn’t have internal goals any more than a thermostat or a motion detector does. An LLM is just a fixed function that iterates whenever it is used. It has no interiority, no subjectivity, no active persistence over time; any goals it did have would be the human purposes reflected passively in its functional design. At best, ascribing goals to the AI itself is a case of researchers adopting the “intentional stance” because it predicts well in a range of tested circumstances. We can thus, with economy, speak of the “loss function” used in the training of large language models wherein they are programmed to bring the gap between their prediction and the correct answer as close to zero as possible, as a “goal.”</p><p>In that case, however, what we are describing as a goal is just an observed regular output of a certain engineering; it is not a real cause. In the Bostrom sense, however, these ascribed goals somehow become real causes, capable of generating new goals. That is, an inadvertently engineered, misaligned goal might generate further goals like self-preservation (the better to pursue the misaligned goal), goal-content integrity (preventing changes to its objectives so it can realize its misaligned goal), improving cognitive and technological capacities, and amassing control of resources (again, in pursuit of its malignantly misaligned goal). The criti-hype exploits that slip between ascribed goals as observed regularities and internal goals as real causal powers.</p><p>This fantasy of malevolent AI superintelligence is the dark obverse of the much-hymned tech “singularity” in which, rather than simply performing far more efficiently than humans in some specific areas (as a calculator deduces a square root faster than any human), AI will evolve into an artificial general intelligence (AGI) that exceeds human capacities in virtually any intellectual domain. Crossing that threshold would precipitate an intelligence explosion: a feedback loop of recursive self-improvement outpacing any further human input or even comprehension. That’s the tech “singularity” we are supposed to be enthralled by.</p><p>I don’t doubt that people like Coxon and Hubinger really believe all they say in good faith; tech people have been making such claims for years. Karen Hao’s <cite>Empire of AI</cite> documents how early investors in OpenAI like Elon Musk constantly hyped this threat: “Climate change is bad, but it’s not going to kill everyone. AI could render humanity extinct.” Similar claims emerged from Dario Amodei, a former Google employee close to the Bostrom-adjacent effective altruism (EA) movement who later worked as OpenAI vice president before founding Anthropic. EA and AI safety forums have long pustulated with excitable discussions of “p(doom)” — the probability of doom. Such fears were, in the first place, part of the justification for founding OpenAI back in 2015 to compete with DeepMind, which had recently been acquired by Google.</p><p>People naturally wonder: Why would they continue to build these tools if they really think there’s a 10 percent chance that they will cause human extinction? The risk is the justification: if we, the conscientious and effectively altruistic, don’t develop these tools with appropriate constraints, then the evil ones will develop them without constraints.</p><p>Such apocalyptic claims, incidentally, haven’t hurt their market valuations. Internal reports from Anthropic, for instance, suggest the firm is currently worth $965 billion.</p><p><strong>Criti-hypebeasts</strong></p><p>A recent supposed example of AI “going rogue” and escaping the leash was the ExploitGym hack. Back in July, the AI firm Hugging Face — it is unclear whether this is a deliberate reference to the facehuggers from <cite>Alien</cite> — reported an intrusion into its internal datasets. Shortly after, OpenAI admitted that the hack was carried out by its own AI models, saying the models were working with “reduced cyber refusals for evaluation purposes,” meaning constraints had been relaxed to test out cyberexploitation capacities. This is a commercially vital area of AI development, because AI has been used as a force multiplier for scams and blackmail. It’s also an increasingly important front in OpenAI’s competition with Anthropic.</p><p>Since large language models can’t “hack” anything, merely plausibly continue a tokenized sequence, they were combined with a coding harness — a software infrastructure layer that allows a large language model to act as an autonomous coding agent — that was specifically optimized for completing cyberexploitation tasks. The models used this harness, inferred that a server at Hugging Face hosted the solutions to the tasks they’d been set, and duly worked out how to circumvent restrictions on their network access and hack the server.</p><p>The models did what they were instructed to do. Nothing went rogue. As Cal Newport writes, “Circumventing internet restrictions and hacking into servers are exactly the kinds of things these ExploitGym systems are designed to do.” If the example reveals anything, it is how sloppy OpenAI was in controlling ExploitGym’s parameters for the sake of competing with Anthropic. And it cannot have been unhappy with the resulting coverage that, to the extent that it was alarmist, was also a tribute to the power of its models and to the ultimate objective of creating an AGI.</p><p>The obverse of criti-hype is just hype. A recent example of this was OpenAI’s claim to have solved the Navier–Stokes Millennium Prize problem. In essence, the problem is whether the standard mathematical equations used to describe the motion of fluids (the Navier–Stokes equations) are mathematically perfect under all physical conditions. OpenAI said it had used a swarm of 10,000 AI agents over 88 hours to solve the problem definitively, proving that the equations always reach a limit: since “a real fluid cannot move infinitely fast, this would mark a breakdown in how the equations model the fluid.”</p><p>OpenAI’s claim was totally disingenuous: it had gotten wind that other researchers, Tristan Buckmaster and Levent Alpöge (who works at Anthropic), had made critical advances to the solution and used their pathways to prompt its own agents. This is really an appropriation of the commons, in this case the mathematical commons — the whole process of solving the problem from Claude-Louis Navier and George Gabriel Stokes onward has been a collaborative human effort.</p><p>OpenAI’s solution is not yet peer reviewed, and the Clay Mathematics Institute, which runs the Millennium Prize, lists the problem as unsolved. Even so, like the Hugging Face hack, this entered into internet lore as an example of how rapidly AI is accelerating toward AGI and out of human control, despite the fact that not one of these AI models has ever approached such a threshold, nor done anything that it was not designed, enabled, and instructed to do.</p><p>In <cite>The Reverse Centaur’s Guide to Life After AI</cite>, Cory Doctorow recalls how advertising agencies “provoked a moral panic by claiming that ‘subliminal advertising’ could implant ideas directly into consumers’ minds.” It was negative hype, but it sold the exact story advertisers wanted clients to believe: that the industry could control consumer desire. AI is an industry that has worked up massive investments based on messianic thinking and enchanting promises that it cannot possibly match with commensurate returns — because the only thing that could would be the fabled god-device, the AGI. The current escalation in the “p(doom)” criti-hype is partially an excrescence of that.</p><p>One notes, for instance, a relative paucity of such testerics in Chinese AI development. It is reported, in Concordia’s latest “State of AI Safety in China” report, that there has been an official shift toward addressing the possibility of a “technological loss of control,” and this is sometimes misleadingly taken to refer to the idea of a malign superintelligent agency. In fact, the worry is more about loss of control over sensitive data to hostile agents, misuse (mainly by opponents of the regime), and badly designed tools (like OpenClaw) behaving badly than it is about AI superintelligence threatening human extinction.</p><p>Correspondingly, China invests far less in AI than the United States. As of 2025, according to the Stanford “2026 AI Index Report,” the US invested $258 billion in AI compared to just $12.4 billion in China, a 23-to-1 ratio. Intriguingly, the same report finds a mere 2.7 percent gap between the performance of the top AI model in the United States compared to China’s top model, despite the latter being far cheaper and more energy efficient to run: a jarring chasm between financial input and performance output.</p><p>To some extent, the American AI bubble — like the crypto frenzy before it — exists to absorb (and ultimately destroy through recession) trillions in spare capital for want of sufficiently profitable investment opportunities elsewhere. It is an insatiable money sink, burning through hundreds of billions of dollars for a fraction of the revenue — but the investment pool is limited, and bombastic claims as to the future runaway powers of the models are all the industry has to show for it. Only Nvidia has shown significant profits, and these are largely the result of circular financing, where the firms it invests in spend the capital on the company’s chips as they try to hyperscale their capabilities.</p><p>Given this, it is striking that AI doomerism obsesses about a highly implausible <cite>Terminator 2</cite> scenario rather than about the looming crash in stock market values and the near-future bankruptcy of many of the grossly overpriced firms promising to either liberate or annihilate humanity. It is almost as if its function now, in addition to keeping investors hooked and tempering cognitive dissonance, is as displacement activity.</p><p><strong>Useful misdirection</strong></p><p>There is a strange idea out there that if you don’t buy AI’s criti-hype, you must not take “the problems with AI” seriously. Not so.</p><p>False threats misdirect both opposition and regulation. A dash of Doctorow’s “applied countereschatology” helps us see more clearly what the problems are. AI may not be able to do your job, for instance, but the threat of it can be used as a disciplinary mechanism to hold down wages: which is exactly what has happened. The data centers may not revolutionize production or open vast new seams of value, and many of their owners may not exist by the time they are scheduled to start operating, but that doesn’t mean they won’t waste enormous quantities of water, power, labor, time, effort, resources, and opportunities as well as spewing out pyroclastic clouds of carbon dioxide and visiting desolation on the natural environment before the bubble bursts, leaving behind abandoned concrete hulks.</p><p>And just because AI won’t eventuate in a god-device, even one that goes rogue and unleashes biological warfare on humanity, that doesn’t mean that LLMs, particularly those with safety standards relaxed in order to compete, won’t behave in unpredictable and potentially ruinous ways. Nor does it mean they won’t be used by hackers, criminal gangs, dark-money-funded political campaigns, blackmailers, and various others to sabotage public bodies and infrastructure. Just as there are many problems with the advertising industry that don’t involve subliminal mind control, so the problems with AI that don’t involve a god-device turning against humanity are legion.</p><p>Tech fetishism, the ascription of human agentive powers to machinery, is always a political act. It obscures that the goals, the purposes embodied in any technology, are human purposes. More specifically, it obscures that they are the automated purposes of a minute subset of humanity, a class fraction, the twisted, ruthless, ketamined, indoctrinated, emotionally stunted moral nullities that rule Silicon Valley like child-kings, who have made themselves the bearers of myriad impossible hopes and have now bought their way into the court of Donald Trump.</p><p>It says: That’s just how the technology works. It’s a capricious demigod that can either shower us with riches or have us all killed. We must appease it and ensnare it, we must fear it and cherish it, but what we mustn’t ever do is stop throwing money at it or stop genuflecting to it or begin to think: this is nothing but our own alienated collective power turned against us by cutthroat capitalists, and in making us the servants of their technology, they try to make us their slaves.</p><p>Because that, my friends, is Luddism. And I trust you know what that unfortunate incident led to.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-18T18:15:16.302Z</published><summary type="text">Warnings from researchers at Anthropic and OpenAI that their own products could end humanity distract from the real damage AI is already doing.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/who-profits-from-saving-women</id><title type="text">Who profits from ‘saving’ women?</title><updated>2026-09-21T15:28:44.704929Z</updated><author><name>Ngozi Nwosu-Juba</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>During a recent dialogue convened by Liberation Alliance Africa’s <cite>Building Knowledge Bridges Community of Practice on Recentering African Feminist Epistemologies to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Violence</cite>, bringing together activists, writers, and independent researchers from across the continent, an important and thought-provoking conversation emerged. While participants acknowledged the significant contributions of civil society organizations, development agencies, and other actors in advancing efforts to end violence against women and girls, there was also a collective reflection on the ways in which this support is framed and delivered.</p><p>I was struck by how this discussion raised critical questions about funding priorities, whose interests are ultimately served, who benefits most from existing interventions, and whether the structures and language designed to address violence may, in some instances, inadvertently reproduce inequalities or overlook the needs and voices of those most affected. The conversation challenged me to think beyond the availability of resources and examine the political, economic, and institutional dynamics that shape responses to violence against women and girls across the continent.</p><p>In my early days in feminist activism, I often highlighted to funders how our interventions had shifted away from speaking on behalf of women to “giving them voice.” This was widely regarded as progressive, even transformative, evidence that we had moved beyond paternalistic approaches and were empowering women to speak for themselves. It became a powerful narrative, one that resonated strongly with donors and development agencies alike.</p><p>Yet, over time, this language began to lose its appeal, as I started to interrogate the assumptions that underpinned it. Were women truly without voices, or were their voices simply being ignored, dismissed, or rendered unintelligible within systems of power?</p><p>The notion of “giving voice” positioned organizations like ours as benevolent intermediaries bestowing agency on those presumed to lack it. In doing so, it risked obscuring the fact that women had always spoken, resisted, negotiated, and articulated their realities, often in ways that did not fit donor expectations or development frameworks.</p><p>What does it mean to “give” women a voice? And who has the authority to bestow something that women have always possessed?</p><p>There is a long history of women’s resistance and political agency in Africa. In Nigeria, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3818954">Women’s War of 1929</a> stands as a powerful reminder that women have never been silent. Thousands of women in eastern Nigeria organized, mobilized, challenged colonial authority, and articulated their demands with remarkable courage and clarity. Their actions were neither facilitated by development projects nor enabled by donor-funded interventions. They emerged from women’s own collective consciousness, an inherited legacy of women’s determination to resist injustice.</p><p>In the Bamenda Grassfields of Northwest Cameroon, women organized one of the most significant grassroots uprisings against colonial authority in Central and West Africa. Faced with colonial policies that threatened their farmland, the women of Kom fought back.</p><p>Using <cite>Anlu</cite>, a traditional practice where women collectively sanction men who violate community norms, they organized marches and used satire to name and shame colonial collaborators. Through their actions, they brought administrative and economic life in the region to a standstill for months, and their protest ultimately forced the colonial government to reverse the land policies and contributed to the broader political shifts that shaped Cameroon’s path toward independence and reunification.</p><p>In Eastern Africa, Queen Muhumuza led a movement against British and German colonialists from Southern Uganda. According to the historian <a href="http://murindwa-rutanga.com/pub/Nyabingi%20Movement.pdf">Murindwa Rutanga</a>, Queen Muhumuza was the first major leader to mobilize peasants in Kigezi into organized anticolonial resistance against British rule starting in 1909. Drawing on her political experience and spiritual authority, she raised consciousness about the dangers of colonialism and united a broad sector of the Bakiga and neighboring communities in armed resistance. Under her leadership, communities resisted colonial boundary demarcations, obstructed missionaries and colonial agents, and challenged the expansion of colonial authority despite violent repression. Her efforts established her as one of the earliest and most influential women leaders of anticolonial resistance in the region.</p><p>These are just a few of many organic movements led by women in colonial-era Africa.</p><p>This realization forced me to confront a troubling possibility: The language of “giving women a voice” does not recognize women’s agency as much as it obscures it. Rather than acknowledging the voices that women already possess, such language implies that women were previously voiceless and required external actors such as NGOs, donors, activists, or development institutions to make them audible. This framing represented a subtle but significant erasure of women’s historical struggles, leadership, and resistance.</p><p>At what point did development discourse shift from supporting women’s struggles to positioning itself as the source of women’s agency?</p><p>How did a narrative emerge in which organizations and projects could claim credit for creating voices that had existed long before their arrival?</p><p>These questions matter because language is never neutral. The stories we tell about social change shape who is recognized as an agent of transformation and who is remembered merely as a beneficiary. When we say that women are “given a voice,” we risk centering the intervention rather than the woman, the funder rather than the movement, and the project rather than the history.</p><p>Long before the language of “women’s empowerment” entered donor reports, African women were already exercising power. Giriama women in Kenya challenged colonial rule under <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adw051">Mekatilili wa Menza</a>, a woman leader who led her community in the early 1900s; market women in Ghana shaped economic and nationalist politics through organizing food distribution and rallying around food pricing, as well as using their income to support nationalist struggles; and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.796">Queen Mothers</a> exercised political authority in precolonial governance systems. Women did not discover their voices through NGOs. Rather, development institutions entered landscapes where women had long been speaking, organizing, resisting, and transforming society.</p><p>The challenge before us is to recognize, amplify, and create conditions in which women’s voices can be heard, respected, and acted upon. As feminists, we need to ask ourselves harder questions about the stories we tell and the systems we inhabit. What would change if we began from the assumption that women have always had voice, agency, and political consciousness? How might our work look different if our role was not to create power, but to recognize and stand alongside the power that already exists?</p><p>It is time to move beyond the language of rescue and empowerment and toward what bell hooks called the language of solidarity, accompaniment, and collective struggle. It requires us to think about our own <em>herstory</em> of resistance and mobilization. This also requires donors, NGOs, and activists to reflect on how power operates within our own institutions. Whose knowledge is considered legitimate? Whose voices are amplified? Who receives recognition for social change, and who remains invisible within the narratives we produce?</p><p>Finally, we must commit to preserving and honoring the histories of women’s resistance. From the Women’s War to the struggles of market women, Queen Mothers, community organizers, and contemporary feminist movements, these histories remind us that women have never been passive recipients of change but its architects.</p><p>Our role is not to give women a voice but to ensure that our work does not drown out the voices that have always been there.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-17T12:32:58.876Z</published><summary type="text">From the Women’s War of 1929 to the Anlu uprising three decades later, African women were organizing and resisting long before donors arrived to ‘give them a voice.’</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/roaches-in-revolt</id><title type="text">Roaches in revolt</title><updated>2026-09-16T17:18:22.866932Z</updated><author><name>Sushovan Dhar</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>In May, hearing a routine case, the Chief Justice of India remarked from the bench that the country had “youngsters like cockroaches”: young people who, finding no work, become media people and activists and attack everybody. He called them parasites of society.</p><p>Within a day, a 30-year-old graduate had founded the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), a straight parody of the BJP’s name. <cite>Membership criteria</cite>: unemployed, lazy, permanently online, and able to complain professionally. <cite>Slogan</cite>: Voice of the Lazy and Unemployed. Within three days, the account gained 3 million followers; within five days, it surpassed the governing party in followers; and by July, the total reached 22 million.</p><p>On 25 July, India’s Education Minister resigned; the first time in 12 years of Narendra Modi’s government that a street movement had removed a member of the cabinet. The organization that removed him was eight weeks old; it had no members, no funds, no offices, no registration as a political party and no program beyond satire.</p><p>That is what needs explaining: not the resignation, which was a tactical retreat, but how a joke acquired the power to extract one.</p><p>The immediate cause was an examination. In May, the paper for India’s national medical entrance test was leaked and sold in advance to some of the 2.3 million candidates competing for roughly 130,000 places. It was canceled and re-held six weeks later. This is not an isolated scandal; around 70 public examinations have leaked in seven years, affecting 17 million candidates across 15 states. Exams in India are now an industry: testing contractors, printing firms, transport handlers and a coaching sector are drawing 200,000 teenagers a year to one provincial city, and each link is a place where the paper can be sold.</p><p>On 6 June, the students occupied Jantar Mantar, the only legally permitted protest site in central Delhi, and refused to leave. An activist held a hunger strike for 26 days before police removed him to hospital against his will. On 20 July, some 20,000 tried to march on Parliament and met barricades, batons, tear gas and a government-ordered internet blackout. Five days later the minister was gone.</p><p>That the minister fell at all is the real puzzle. Modi’s government has three responses to opposition, and all three have worked for a decade.</p><p>The first is delegitimization. The movement was declared anti-national and foreign-funded; its account was blocked on national security grounds; and television anchors arrived at the usual hypothesis about foreign money. The students replied by filming solemn confessions that China had wired them 60 rupees for bus fare and Pakistan 40 rupees for lunch — about R17 in all. The smear was not defeated so much as digested.</p><p>The second is prosecution. India’s Enforcement Directorate, a financial-crimes agency, opened cases against 193 politicians in a decade and obtained two convictions. Conviction was never the objective. The process is the punishment: the summons, the frozen assets, the years in custody before trial, and the standing offer that the file closes if the politician changes party. It disciplines people with careers and property to protect but it is powerless against nineteen-year-olds whose grievance is that they have none.</p><p>The third is waiting. Protests are expensive; students run out of money; heat and boredom finish the job. This failed because supporters from other cities and countries ordered food to the site through delivery apps, and a movement distributed across 22 million accounts cannot be outlasted at one address.</p><p>What remained was force, and force was the error. The baton charge of 20 July produced the images that turned a student agitation into a national one. Coercion is effective when it is either invisible or total; however, when it is filmed from four angles and applied to young people whom the government’s own rhetoric describes as the pillars of a developing nation, it instead serves as propaganda for the opposing side.</p><p>Nor could the government do the thing it does best: redefine opposition as a religious minority in disguise. Earlier movements were coded as Muslim or as Sikh separatist. This one had no such marker. Its base was small-town, aspirational, exam-taking and overwhelmingly Hindu — the ruling party’s own recruiting ground.</p><p>None of this explains why so many were willing to fight in the first place. In 2025, India grew at close to 7% and, inflation ran near 2%; meanwhile corporate profits stand at record levels. Yet the connection between economic growth and the people who are supposed to benefit from it has broken down. Fewer than 7% of male graduates find permanent salaried work within a year of graduating; around 40% are unemployed. India has expanded higher education far faster than employment, deliberately, because degrees are cheap for a state to supply and jobs are not. The result is a surplus population of the credentialed: not yet proletarian, but losing the security their parents had and aware of it by nineteen.</p><p>This is why the explosion occurred over an examination rather than a wage. The state has stopped promising work, but it still promises fair competition for the little that remains. That promise performs a precise ideological operation: it takes a shortfall produced by the structure of the economy — 130,000 places against 2.3 million applicants — and reassigns it to the individual as a verdict on their worth. The unemployed graduate does not experience an economy. They experience a judgment on themselves, delivered by an apparently neutral procedure. In this way, those who are surplus to the economy experience their exclusion as personal failure and humiliation.</p><p>The leak destroys that operation. Once the paper has been sold, the credibility of the exam as a neutral mechanism is undermined, the verdict is exposed as a transaction, and the shame changes address: it stops being mine and becomes theirs. This is why an exam scandal detonates where an unemployment statistic does not. The leak gives the young the standing to be angry; and standing, not information, is what mobilization requires.</p><p>It would be easy to compare this with the youth revolts elsewhere and note that India sacrificed a minister, whereas others produced fallen presidents. That scoreboard is worthless. Those movements broke governments. This one confronted a fascist regime: the largest party membership of any political organization on earth, resting on a century-old cadre movement present in tens of thousands of villages, a captured broadcast media, a tested legal apparatus, and something with no equivalent in Kathmandu or Antananarivo: a hegemony that has already organized much of Indian youth into its project. A president who flees is not evidence of a deeper rupture than a minister who resigns.</p><p>The settlement itself measures almost nothing: the government conceded a person and kept the structure — no reform of the testing agency, no enforceable examinations law, and nothing about employment. But outside the negotiating room, an examination scandal has become a national argument about work. In Bihar, police fired on crowds, baton-charged in the state capital, and published photographs of a hundred protesters, inviting the public to identify them. In response, leftist student organizations organized a general strike that closed rail and road traffic across the state. On 10 August, the central trade unions and the farmers’ movement filled the jails nationwide on an eleven-point charter, with 12,000 arrested in one small state alone. Days earlier, a seat the governing party had held since 1995 fell to a newcomer in the city where repression had been heaviest.</p><p>What broke was not the regime itself, but rather the impression of its permanence; in a formation of this type, that impression is not merely decorative but an integral part of the power structure. This is what leads an editor to self-censor before receiving any calls, a businessman to determine that silence is more cost-effective, and a young person to decide that obtaining a visa is the most sensible option. Twelve years went into building it. It has now been filmed failing.</p><p>That permanence rested on more than repression. It rested on an offer, too. What exists in India is not an illiberal drift but a fascist formation, which maintains power through both offers and force. To those it cannot employ, the governing movement sells majoritarian pride as compensation for the absence of a wage: no job, no future, but the nation is yours and you may despise whoever is not in it. Millions have accepted that trade. This is why arguments based on statistics often fail to resonate.</p><p>The students made a counter-offer. Told from the highest bench in the republic that they were vermin, they took the word, wore it as a party name, and denied anyone the right to classify them. That is dignity. It is grounded in what one is owed rather than in whom one is licensed to hate, and it is the only currency in which a formation like this can be outbid. The Indian Left surrendered that ground when it decided indignation was unrigorous, and it has been losing ever since: zero state governments, a parliamentary presence rounding to nothing, and a generation with no memory of it as a force.</p><p>Nothing in the students’ demands was attainable inside the existing arrangement. A fair examination is unavailable without dismantling a private testing industry. Jobs are only available by confronting a model that has produced a decade of profits without employment. These young people did not begin from class analysis; they arrived at its doorstep by taking the state’s own promises seriously and following them to where they broke.</p><p>That is not yet a class movement. But this situation demonstrates that a connection can be made by anyone willing to link the graduate’s blocked ladder to the informal worker’s absent floor. On 10 August the unions and the farmers were already in the street.</p><p>Delhi is obviously part of something larger globally, but the list of recent youth revolts around the world is not homogeneous. There are three distinct families in it.</p><p>The first are revolts against a stolen count. Georgia has been in the streets for well over 400 consecutive days since October 2024, demanding fresh elections and the release of political prisoners. It has obtained neither — only more restrictive laws, hundreds of detentions and a failed attempt to storm the presidential palace. Mozambique’s post-election protests ran five months and cost close to 400 lives; Chapo was inaugurated regardless, and the sequence closed with an amnesty for protesters rather than a recount. These movements ask that a vote be re-counted, which an incumbent who survives a count will never accept.</p><p>The second are revolts against the cost of living, and they carry a signature this magazine’s readers will recognize. Kenya’s 2024 uprising was against a finance bill written to satisfy creditors. Nigeria’s #EndBadGovernance protests followed a fuel-subsidy removal and a currency collapse, in a state spending some 74% of federal revenue on debt service. These are, in substance, revolts against structural adjustments administered by domestic governments on external instructions. Kenya’s young people forced the bill’s withdrawal. Nigerians were met with treason charges carrying the death penalty against 76 people, including 30 minors, as young as 14; several collapsed in court after months of malnutrition in adult jails.</p><p>The third are revolts that took the state: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Madagascar. A quota scheme, a corruption scandal or a social-media ban becomes the trigger; the government falls within weeks; and the movement discovers it has no capacity to govern or even to bargain over what follows. Six months on, most of the substantive demands raised in Nepal and Madagascar remain unmet.</p><p>India does not fit neatly into any of these categories. The CJP demanded something else: the integrity of a distributive procedure. In doing so it went, without any theory, straight at the mechanism by which mass exclusion is converted into personal failure.</p><p>What unites the cycle is not a generation. It is a global condition: economies that grow without absorbing labor, states that have replaced the promise of employment with the promise of fair competition for scarce entry, and debt-service regimes that squeeze whatever remains. These movements do not solely represent the grievances of young people. They represent the political expression of the effects of structural adjustment on the aspirational classes, with young people the first to experience its impact.</p><p>What also unites them is a shared limit. Leaderlessness defeats infiltration, decapitation and prosecution. But it also defeats negotiation, continuity and succession. The characteristic that prevents a movement from being beheaded also makes it impossible to bind that movement to an agreement or to transform it into something that endures beyond its dispersal.</p><p>Where that energy is released and nothing is there to receive it, the organized right is usually better placed to harvest it than we are. Brazil’s June 2013 remains the standing warning: an ironic, leaderless revolt over bus fares that won its demand, dissolved, and left a field that, within three years, belonged to Bolsonaro.</p><p>So the question India’s cockroaches pose is not whether such movements can win. They can, and this one did, against the hardest target in the set. It is whether anything exists to receive them when they disperse. Nothing was ready in Delhi this time. The next one is coming, because nothing that produced this one has been touched. And the only useful question for the Left, in Johannesburg as much as in Patna, is what we will have built by then.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-16T17:18:22.866932Z</published><summary type="text">A joke born from a Chief Justice’s insult grew to 22 million followers and forced out a cabinet minister in eight weeks. What does this reveal about India and about the limits of leaderless revolt everywhere?</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/what-europes-migration-deals-are-really-buying</id><title type="text">What Europe’s migration deals are really buying</title><updated>2026-09-15T12:28:39.834968Z</updated><author><name>Ahlam Chemlali</name></author><author><name>Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>The gravestones are barely visible. Scraps of text scratched into wet cement, left to harden in whatever shape they took. Some have no text at all, just a slight rise in the sand, a low dune along the wall at the far edge of the cemetery in Nouadhibou, Mauritania’s second-largest city and its main Atlantic port, where the Sahara meets the sea. The representative from the municipality walks ahead of us, pointing towards the fringes where the unidentified are buried. Bodies too decomposed to name by the time they reached shore. He has requested a new cemetery, 25km out of town. They are running out of space.</p><figure><img alt="Colorful boats stacked up on a beach. " height="420" loading="lazy" src="https://media.africasacountry.com/images/2026/9/923994581087-medium.jpg" width="900"/><figcaption>Pirogues on the beach in Nouakchott. Photo by Ahlam Chemlali, March 2026.</figcaption></figure><p>We are still standing there when three cars pull up. A battered red Mercedes, followed by two gendarmes in green uniforms who nod at the municipal representative. On an orange stretcher, a white plastic body bag, slightly open. A body has just arrived. The men who came in the cars are from the community — here to try to identify it.</p><p>This is what the European Union’s migration partnerships look like from the ground.</p><p>Nouadhibou sits on a narrow peninsula on the Atlantic coast, roughly 700km north of the capital Nouakchott, close to the border with Western Sahara and within reach of some of the world’s richest fishing grounds. Since 2006, it has also been the main departure point for migrants attempting the Atlantic crossing to Spain’s Canary Islands. It is this geography — coastal, peripheral, strategically placed — that nakes it the epicenter of the EU’s latest migration partnership.</p><p>On March 7, 2024, the European Commission and the Mauritanian government signed a migration deal worth €210 million. The agreement was driven in large part by pressure from Spain, whose interior ministry had recorded a sharp surge in Atlantic arrivals. European officials praised the results. New figures from Frontex, the EU’s border agency, show that detections on the Western African route fell by 63 percent in 2025, driven by sharp drops in departures from Mauritania, Morocco, and Senegal. Spain’s government calls it a success.</p><p>We spent two weeks in Mauritania, in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou, interviewing coastguard officials, human rights defenders, municipal representatives, government coordinators, EU and IOM (International Organization for Migration) representatives, fishermen, and migrants. What we found behind the falling numbers tells a different story.</p><p>These deals are not simply outsourcing border control. They give states with poor human rights records a mandate, and substantial financing, to do what European governments cannot do at home: detain people without due process, deport them without legal procedure, and sweep entire urban neighborhoods clean of black migrants and refugees in the middle of the night. In exchange, the EU gets the statistics it needs to present the policy as working.</p><p>The Tunisia deal, signed on July 16, 2023, was the first iteration of this model. A week later, speaking at a conference in Rome, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was explicit about her intentions: <em>“</em>We want our agreement with Tunisia to be a template. A blueprint for the future. For partnerships with other countries in the region.” She has repeated the claim since, including in her State of the Union address that autumn. The EU went on to sign a similar deal with Egypt in March 2024, with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who came to power in a military coup and has presided over one of the most sweeping crackdowns on civil society in the country’s modern history. Tunisia’s President Kais Saïed, meanwhile, took executive control of the country in July 2021 and has since granted himself unchecked powers to govern and legislate in a rolling power grab. Mauritania is the latest country to be brought into this framework. Understanding what the blueprint produces on the ground, in each of these countries, is not a peripheral concern. It is the point.</p><p>In Nouadhibou, that point has a name.</p><p>Kamara Mamadou is dressed in a blue shirt, with a striped scarf and a small traditional hat. A retired French teacher, he now helps people navigate a system not designed to receive them — spending years providing legal assistance to detained migrants in Nouadhibou. He is the regional coordinator of AMDH (<cite>Association Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme</cite>), Mauritania’s main human rights organization. We meet him on the fifth floor of our hotel, the Atlantic wind pressing at the windows, France 24 running in the background with breaking news from Iran and Lebanon.</p><p>He begins with Victor Hugo: <em>“Quand on ouvre une école, on ferme une prison”</em> — when you open a school, you close a prison. What he is describing, he says, is the inverse: a school converted into a detention facility over the summer in Nouadhibou. That is the first shock he documents. The second is the treatment. “It’s inhuman.”</p><p>Arrests happen at night. Police, gendarmes — and, he notes carefully, the Spanish Guardia Civil, operating alongside Mauritanian forces on Mauritanian territory. During raids, phones and belongings are confiscated. People are loaded onto buses and driven south to the Senegalese border or the Gogui-Mali crossing, expelled not through legal procedure but through logistics. The IOM’s voluntary return program, he says without hesitation, is not voluntary. People sign because they have no alternative.</p><p>The EU has provided a great deal of money, Kamara says, and the state has been given carte blanche to deploy it as it sees fit. When European delegations visit, things get cleaned up. Detention sites are emptied. Walls receive a fresh coat of paint. The delegation leaves satisfied. The violence and abuse return.</p><p>What makes the Mauritanian case particularly sharp is that the consequences extend well beyond migrants. Kamara himself, a Black man, now carries his identity documents wherever he goes. Without them, he could be stopped and deported, regardless of citizenship, regardless of birthright. The enforcement apparatus, calibrated to identify Black bodies as presumptively foreign, cannot reliably distinguish between a Malian migrant and a Mauritanian national.</p><p>When we arrived in Nouadhibou, we spent several days trying to speak to migrants. The neighborhoods where migrant communities would rent small rooms were largely empty. Police had swept through them. People were hiding and afraid to talk.</p><p>Nouadhibou used to be, as Kamara describes it, a melting pot — Senegalese, Malian, Gambian, Guinean workers drawn by the fishing economy and a port that needed labor. That city still exists in memory. What has changed is the fear. Communities that once moved openly have learned to disappear.</p><p>What is also driving people out is the Atlantic itself. In 2024, according to the NGO Caminando Fronteras, nearly 10,000 people died or went missing attempting the crossing to the Canary Islands — making it the deadliest migration route in the world. Of those, around 6,800 had departed from Mauritania. Traditional fishing pirogues, built for coastal waters, carry up to 200 people into conditions they were never designed for. The distance from Mauritania to the farthest Canary Island is close to 1,000 miles of open Atlantic.</p><p>In the offices of the Mauritanian coastguard, the senior officer and captain who receives us sits behind stacks of paper and pulls out his phone. He shows us footage from July 2025: a large pirogue from Guinea-Bissau. Dead bodies on a beach. A man badly beaten — violence erupts in the narrow space between 200 people on open water. Then he pauses on one image. A woman lying dead on the pier. Beside her, still alive, a child of two or three years old.</p><p>“It is a tragedy! Even trained military, physically strong men — this will haunt you for life,” he says, crossing his arms. “Maybe not now, but later.” He is grateful we came. When people from outside witness this, he reflects, it reminds him that what he and his staff endure every day is not normal and should never become normal. “It is not normal.”</p><p>It has nonetheless become routine.</p><p>In Brussels, that routine looks like success.</p><p>The EU’s migration partnerships follow a consistent logic: money and concessions in exchange for control. Each agreement is framed in the language of partnership and shared interest. Each produces a metric — fewer crossings — that European governments can present as proof of effectiveness.</p><p>What the metric does not capture is displacement. When routes close, people do not stop moving. They find longer, more dangerous paths. The sharp rise in Atlantic crossings over recent years is itself partly a consequence of tightening in the central Mediterranean and on the Libya-Tunisia route. The geography of death shifts; the death toll does not fall.</p><p>Nor does the metric capture what happens to those who are stopped. The people Kamara assists — detained in converted schools, deported without legal process, stripped of their belongings in overnight raids — do not appear in the statistics as a cost. They appear, if at all, as a success.</p><p>In a hotel resort bathroom, we met Binta, from Freetown, Sierra Leone, working as a cleaner at a hotel in Nouakchott for roughly two to three US dollars a day, sending what she can to her children and father back home. She has been in Mauritania for two years, but wants to leave. Over the week, we tried to reconnect but couldn’t get in touch. Upon leaving the field, a voice message arrived. She had been detained by the police. The crackdown had swept through, and the silence we had registered as simply a gap turned out to have been an arrest.</p><p>To understand what is happening on Mauritania’s coast, it is necessary to look east, toward a Sahel the EU’s border partnerships tend to treat as a source of pressure to be managed rather than a crisis to be understood.</p><p>In Nouakchott, in his office, just next to the remains of the G5 Sahel headquarters, we meet Cheikh, the government coordinator responsible for development and refugee response in Hodh Ech Chargui, Mauritania’s eastern region, which shares 1,200km of largely unmarked frontier with Mali. The numbers he gives us are striking. Mberra refugee camp was established in 2012 for 60,000 to 70,000 people. It now holds somewhere between 258,000 and 300,000 — with new arrivals every day. More than 40% of the region’s entire population is now made up of people who fled Mali. Mberra, he says quietly, is becoming the second largest city in Mauritania after Nouakchott.</p><p>The people arriving are fleeing a conflict that has fractured beyond simple description: jihadist armed groups, separatist factions, and a government whose operations are now conducted alongside Russia’s Africa Corps. Each targets communities perceived as aligned with the others. Civilians flee in all directions, across a border that exists on paper but not on the ground, toward family members on the other side who absorb them without registration.</p><p>This is the regional context the EU’s Mauritania partnership largely ignores. The pressure building on Mauritania’s Atlantic coast is inseparable from the collapse of state authority in Mali, the proliferation of armed actors across the Sahel, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people with nowhere stable to go. Treating Mauritania as a buffer, paying it to hold the line, addresses none of this. It adds another layer of coercion onto people already moving between armed groups, state violence, and open water.</p><p>Cheikh himself makes the development argument clearly: you cannot stop migration at Nouadhibou. By the time someone reaches the coast, the decision has already been made. Investment must go upstream — into border communities, agriculture, livelihoods, education. He makes this case to EU delegations regularly.</p><p>Not everything we encountered pointed in the same direction. At the yellow building housing Nouadhibou’s municipality, a well-kept garden out front, sunflowers, red roses, and palm trees, the deputy mayor receives us. She is a politician who takes visible pride in what her office provides. We visit the municipal school, where Senegalese, Malian, Cape Verdean, and Mauritanian children learn together. <em>“</em>We tell the children they are all number one,” she says. The municipality receives no EU funding. Its logic of service provision, at least here, includes everyone.</p><p>It is a small thing, and it does not undo what is happening in the streets and at the border. But it is a reminder that the hostility generated by the EU’s partnerships is not the only possible response to the same reality. Other choices are being made, by other actors, in the same city.</p><p>The cemetery representative — in his black suit, white shirt, and sunglasses — who walked with us through the sandy graves is also a municipal employee. He documented the dead, prayed for them, requested more space for them, and was present when the body arrived on the orange stretcher. He did not look away.</p><figure><img alt="A collection of unmarked, dilapidated graves under a bright, blue, sunny sky" height="420" loading="lazy" src="https://media.africasacountry.com/images/2026/9/890213540135-medium.jpg" width="900"/><figcaption>Unmarked graves at the edge of Nouadhibou’s cemetery, where migrants who drowned crossing the Atlantic are buried. Photo by Ahlam Chemlali, March 2026.</figcaption></figure><p>Back at the hotel lobby, France 24 runs on a loop in the background. Analysts are being asked about the people fleeing the latest US and Israeli strikes in Lebanon and Iran. The coastguard officer told us the boats now carry Syrians, Afghans, and Bangladeshis — people who have crossed the Sahara to reach the Mauritanian coast and attempt the Atlantic. As long as wars continue and states collapse, these routes will draw people whom no partnership agreement will deter, because what they are fleeing is worse than the crossing.</p><p>The EU presents itself, especially in the current moment of global fracture, as a defender of a rules-based international order, a normative power committed to human dignity and the protection of the vulnerable. These are not empty words. They reflect a genuine tradition, one that matters more, not less, as that order erodes elsewhere.</p><p>But they cannot coexist with a policy that pays authoritarian governments to detain people in detention centers, deport citizens by mistake, and leave the unidentified dead in unmarked graves at the edges of cemeteries that are running out of room. The falling numbers that European governments cite as success are not a measure of solution. They are a measure of how effectively the violence and death have been moved out of sight.</p><p>The question the EU has not answered, and has largely avoided asking, is what kind of international actor it intends to be. A bloc that exports its values, or one that outsources its borders. A partner to the vulnerable, or a financier of the states that contain them.</p><p>In Nouadhibou, the answer is already being written. In wet cement, in letters that barely hold their shape, at the edge of a cemetery only expanding.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-15T12:28:39.834968Z</published><summary type="text">European officials are calling the EU-Mauritania migration deal a success. Here’s what the numbers don’t count.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/why-the-us-should-not-recognize-somaliland</id><title type="text">Why the US should not recognize Somaliland</title><updated>2026-09-15T10:33:47.427866Z</updated><author><name>Markus V. Hoehne</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>Steven A. Cook argues in a recent piece on <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/09/04/somaliland-somalia-iran-houthis-united-states-israel/">“Why the United States Should Recognize Somaliland”</a> that the main reason for recognizing Somaliland is geostrategic. The stakes at play are “confronting the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] and the Houthis as well as shoring up freedom of navigation” (through the Strait of Hormuz and, by extension, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal). He mentions in his account that besides many positive aspects, there were some problems in Somaliland. Concretely, he stresses that “there is opposition to the government among some clans, especially in the east, where sentiment runs in favor of ties with Mogadishu rather than Hargeisa — Somaliland’s capital. This raises the possibility of violent inter-clan conflict in Somaliland. It is a legitimate concern. The good news is that [Somaliland’s President] Irro says he is committed to peaceful dialogue.” This is quite naïve, or willingly ignores the more complex facts. The opposition of those clans in the east is <a href="https://riftvalley.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Between-Somaliland-and-Puntland-by-Markus-Hoehne-RVI-Contested-Borderlands-2015.pdf">long-standing</a>. Somaliland actually never really controlled the eastern territories, except Lasanod from 2007 to 2022. Armed rebellion emerged there as early as 2009, and in 2023 the militias of the clans in the east defeated the Somaliland army. Since then, a new administration, the North East State (NES) of Somalia, has been established there. Its capital is Lasanod. The NES is recognized by the government in Mogadishu. In August 2026, the Somali prime minister <a href="https://insidesomalia.net/pm-hamze-to-reactivate-snas-26th-command-in-lasanod/">visited Lasanod</a> to discuss, among other things, establishing a base of the Somali National Army (SNA) there. This means that external pushes for Somaliland’s legal independence will likely trigger not only inter-clan conflict but war. In any case, this is well beyond “peaceful dialogue,” and President Irro’s legitimacy ends, at the latest, in Oog, which is an Isaaq-inhabited town some 85 kilometers west of Lasanod. Isaaq, as a rule, support Somaliland. Members of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans in the east typically are Somali unionists. </p><p>Steven A. Cook continues in his text that “even taking into account this problem [the contestation of Somaliland in the east], Somaliland stands in contrast to Somalia itself, which has been a fount of terrorism, piracy, and extremism in the Horn of Africa for decades.” Now, ask yourself why Somalia is in such bad shape. Just recall the interventions conducted or backed by the US in Somalia, starting with “Restore Hope” in 1992, which was aborted in 1994, and continuing with the counterterrorism interventions conducted by Ethiopia in December 2006, strongly supported by the US. The first intervention actually fueled the market of violence in Somalia. Some warlords were elevated to “partners” (potential presidential candidates), others were considered villains. When US troops attempted to arrest Mohamed Farah Aideed, they were attacked in the streets of Mogadishu. “Black Hawk Down” ended in 18 Marines being killed and partly mutilated and foreclosed direct US engagement abroad for years. Thus, Washington resorted to indirect interventions, financing warlords and encouraging Ethiopia to do the dirty work in Somalia, especially when, after 9/11, Somalia was (partly wrongly, as <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Al-Qaidas-MisAdventures-in-the-Horn-of-Africa.pdf">declassified US secret service sources show</a>) considered a hotbed of Islamic terrorism. Washington sanctioned the extremely brutal Ethiopian intervention from December 2006 onward, in which thousands — many of them civilians — were killed in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas. This carnage was a main reason why Somalis from across the Horn, including Somaliland, started viewing al-Shabaab as a legitimate defender of the Somali nation. Until the end of 2006, al-Shabaab had a few hundred active fighters. By mid-2007, this number had grown to several thousand, with some young men coming from Hargeysa and elsewhere in Somaliland to volunteer to defend Mogadishu against the Ethiopians (and the Ugandans and Burundians who had entered after February 2007 as part of the African Union mission, which also caused havoc for years). Counterterrorism produced massive terrorism in Somalia and made al-Shabaab big (<a href="https://webarchive.ssrc.org/Somalia_Hoehne_v10.pdf">see here for a longer argument</a>).</p><p>Now, just briefly: Compare what came out of the many interventions in Somalia with what came out of non-intervention in Rwanda. When the genocide happened in Rwanda in mid-1994, the UN and the US actively ignored it, refusing to openly state what many already knew — that genocide was happening, and that one could have seen it coming. This was extremely tragic and cost the lives of at least 800,000 people, if not more. But ex-post, one could say that non-intervention allowed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Paul Kagame’s army, to end the genocide and establish a new and stable Rwanda. And yes, the RPF itself likely killed hundreds of thousands of fleeing Hutu; and yes, Rwanda turned into an authoritarian state, and human rights are precarious, especially for opposition members. But the same could be said about Uganda, Ethiopia, and, in part, even Israel. The latter are reliable friends of Washington, it seems. So let’s be honest: Human rights do not count when it comes to political interest.</p><p>The lesson to be drawn is this: Interventions in Somalia perpetuated conflict and instability. The, back then tragic, rejection to intervene in Rwanda in retrospect proved a factor supporting the building of a stable country after brutal conflict. To argue, as Steven A. Cook does, that Somalia is “a fount of terrorism, piracy, and extremism” is dishonest; it is, as <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4541912">Roland Marchal has argued a while ago</a>, also distorting critical analysis; finally it is a sign of a quasi-colonial argument being made here. Somalis are presented as “unable” to keep political order. Yet, many of Somalia’s problems since 1991 (and even in the 1980s, during the Cold War) have been co-produced by the US and its allies in the Horn of Africa.</p><p>Now, to come back to Somaliland: Any intervention to recognize Somaliland against the will of Somalia and many Somalis in the region (including the clans in the east of Somaliland, which today is the North East State of Somalia) is likely a further contribution to externally created instability. It potentially creates another war in the Somali Peninsula.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-14T14:07:08.997Z</published><summary type="text">Washington’s own record of intervention in the Horn of Africa — not Mogadishu’s — is the strongest case against recognizing Somaliland now.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/this-book-was-born-in-the-streets</id><title type="text">This book was born in the streets</title><updated>2026-09-11T20:04:13.953313Z</updated><author><name>Gathanga Ndung’u</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>Often, history is written as a recollection of the past. It is treated as the entry of passive data, only to be archived for posterity. But what happens when history, or its making, runs parallel to its archival process?</p><p>This is the opportunity offered by the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/6/24/kenya-braces-for-return-of-gen-z-protests-how-did-they-begin">2024–2025 youth uprisings</a> in Kenya. They gave us room to make history, to analyze events as they unfolded daily, and to document them at the same time. However, proper analysis and recourse were insufficient to help tilt the scale from the state to the masses.</p><p>Nevertheless, the documentation of the contestations between the masses and the machinery of the state has been extensive. They have been documented in music, memes, spoken word, poems, graffiti, murals, and essays such as our recent scrapbook titled <cite><a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/920738998/From-MauMau-to-RutoMustGo-in-Kenya">From Mau Mau to Ruto Must Go</a></cite>.</p><p>As a contribution to the struggle, <cite>From Mau Mau to Ruto Must Go</cite> collects essays from an intergenerational tapestry of activists, community organizers, writers, and legal minds. It is a conversation between the old and the new, produced in the trenches of the youth uprisings, forging an intergenerational continuum of resistance.</p><p>The question of sovereignty appears in all the discussions in <cite>From Mau Mau to Ruto Must Go</cite>. From the streets to the book, external interference in the country’s affairs has been a constant reminder of the incomplete independence we gained in 1963.</p><p>One of the book’s main sovereignty concerns stems from the role of multilateral lending institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Some contributors have also analyzed this very question by focusing on the rising foreign military “partnerships” with countries such as the UK, which runs the oldest foreign military unit in Kenya, <a href="https://www.army.mod.uk/learn-and-explore/global-operations/africa/batuk/">the British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK)</a>, which was set up at independence in 1964. Similarly, the US operates <a href="https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4137524/us-kenya-partnership-fortified-through-joint-engineering-efforts-at-camp-simba/">Camp Simba</a> and Manda Bay Airfield, and Emmanuel Macron is the new entrant in these defense “cooperations”; his government signed a <a href="https://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2025-12/Defence%20Cooperation%20Agreement%20between%20the%20Gvt%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Kenya%20%26%20the%20Gvt%20of%20the%20French%20Republic.pdf">defense and security partnership</a> with the Kenyan government, which saw 800 French troops visit Mombasa in May 2026 for an exercise under the agreement.</p><p>The book also looks at ongoing cooperation between different Kenyan police units with the <a href="https://thewire.in/world/the-long-history-of-israeli-involvement-in-kenyas-internal-repression">Israeli state</a>, which is known for gross violations of human rights. Israel continues to equip the Kenyan police with further skills and technology to enable extensive monitoring of protestors, activists, community organizers, and journalists who are considered dissidents.</p><p>We also discuss the <a href="https://seedalliance.org/2025/the-2025-seed-judgement-by-the-high-court-of-kenya/">Seed and Plant Varieties Act of 2022</a>, which sought to criminalize the saving, sharing, and exchanging of uncertified seeds. For many across the country, this was seen as a takeover of our food system. Labeling indigenous seeds and cultivars as uncertified would have made way for agricultural corporations to create a monopoly on the seed market, giving them a firm grip on our food system. Thankfully, through organizing, <a href="https://cipit.strathmore.edu/landmark-victory-for-kenyas-small-scale-farmers-insights-from-the-wathome-case/">the act was defeated in November 2025</a>, when the High Court of Kenya in Machakos declared sections of the act unconstitutional.</p><p>From the publishing of the book to the launch, we have had our fair share of challenges. The process has been full of fear, tension, and intimidation, but also one full of courage and determination. After months compiling our voices through the essays, proofreading and editing, the manuscript was ready for publishing. Kenya, being a nation with a considerable size of progressive forces and some level of political freedom, we never anticipated that the book would be “too hot a potato to handle” for most publishing houses. The title scared every potential publisher in the country, comrades, and even some safe spaces that we initially thought could provide a home for the book.</p><p>We got many suggestions from different quarters to revise the manuscript title to <cite>From Mau Mau to Gen Zs</cite>. Various justifications were given for why it was a bad idea to proceed with the current title. Some saw it as a way of exposing ourselves too much, while others felt the state might misinterpret the title. As a contributor and one of the people who were involved in its various processes, I knew that the title came with its fair share of risks and burdens to shoulder, but we were all ready for it. To us, “Ruto Must Go” was not just a slogan or a fleeting chant, but a movement that understood what Ruto or Rutoism represented. “Ruto Must Go” meant death to the system whose image is mirrored in Ruto’s presidency. It means uprooting the more than 60-year foundation of the colonial-neocolonial state that Kenya has been; abolishing state capture, misgovernance, deep-rooted corruption, greed, and neocolonial servitude. In the book, Ruto is an epitome of what African youth are loudly rejecting. And for these reasons, we chose to remain with our bold and daring title.</p><p>In Kenya, we failed to secure a publisher, and no one seemed interested in supporting us in any way. Luckily, from the most unlikely corner of the growing and ferocious East African “dictatorship states,” we found an oasis of intellectual refuge and solidarity in Uganda, through the <a href="https://editorhousefacility.com/">Editors’ House Facility</a>. After the publication of the book, 300 copies were printed, and the first 200 copies were dispatched to Kenya at the end of May 2026. Our launch, which was to coincide with the June 1 <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/infographics/2026-06-01-what-to-know-about-madaraka-day">Madaraka Day</a> celebration (the declaration of internal self-governance), failed to take place as we learned that the books were confiscated at the Kenya-Uganda border. To date, the authorities have failed to release these books.</p><p>The driver of the bus that was ferrying the books contacted us and described how he was interrogated and told that they were illegal material in Kenya. He was full of anxiety after being interrogated aggressively for a long period at the border. Through other covert means, we managed to get 55 copies through the border and, later, 45 copies. After we got the copies, we hoped to get the help of some progressive libraries and spaces to help with stocking and distribution, but they distanced themselves.</p><p>Luckily, we managed to get <a href="https://www.matharesocialjustice.org/organic-intellectuals-network/from-mau-mau-to-ruto-must-go-a-genealogy-of-resistance/">Mathare Social Justice Centre (MSJC)</a> as our first stockist and anchor partner in planning for resource mobilization for the first launch. Also, <a href="https://nuriakenya.com/">Nuria Bookstores</a> and <a href="https://www.instagram.com/chechebooks/?hl=en">Cheche Bookshop</a> agreed to stock and distribute the book despite the growing intimidation.</p><p>In Mathare, the host of the launch venue was called multiple times by officers at a local police station, informing him to stop the launch after the poster was shared widely. He was summoned to the police station on the eve of the first launch. On the same day, several armed police officers stormed the MSJC offices. Even though they never arrested anyone or asked for the book, they interrogated staff and looked around the bookshelves. Despite this, members of the community came out in greater numbers than we had anticipated.</p><p>To avoid disruption on the launch day, the main gate leading to the hall was closed to deny entry to civilian-clothed police officers who kept an eye on the area the whole day. Community members even used a hidden entrance, outsmarting the police who awaited them at the main gate.</p><p>The Cheche launch, which targeted activists and writers, went well without any challenges. For the main launch, we were denied several venues, but we managed to get the August 7 <a href="https://memorialparkkenya.org/">Bomblast Memorial Park</a>, which was built to remember the August 7, 1998, US Embassy in Nairobi bombing. With the booking of this venue, the details of the event were not revealed, as that would have caused another cancellation. This event also went well despite the presence of plainclothes officers who hung around the venue and, at one time, came to the park wanting to gather information about the book launch. The media that were invited failed to come to give the event coverage, and the few that came failed to air the launch. As a result, we turned to activists and community journalists, using social media pages and their circles, to spread the “new gospel” in town.</p><p>Following the book launch, plans began for the second anniversary of the June 2024 uprisings. From the beginning, this was envisioned as a commemoration and not a protest like the 2025 anniversary. Letters of notification were served to different police stations, including the infamous Central Police Station, where <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c79epzj703eo">Albert Ojwang</a> lost his life under very suspicious circumstances. On this day, we had planned to lay flower wreaths at Parliament, at spots where protestors were killed, and near important monuments such as the <a href="https://nmk.go.ke/dedan-kimathi-statue/">Dedan Kimathi</a> statue. A week before, the government led by President Ruto and his loyal lieutenants were beating the drums of war and promising to <a href="https://citizen.digital/article/protest-but-president-rutos-warning-ahead-of-june-25th-gen-z-demos-anniversary-n384951">“deal” firmly with protestors</a>. Some of his closest allies, including those holding critical security dockets, issued intimidating statements, warning those who planned to participate in the commemorations.</p><p>We woke up to a <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2026-06-25-business-as-usual-roadblocks-cripple-access-to-nairobi-cbd">barricaded city</a>, despite the government’s chest-thumping assurances that June 25 would be a normal working day. All roads leading to the city were barricaded, with heavily armed police erecting roadblocks every two to three kilometers. Commuters were left to walk several kilometers to access the city, while being harshly interrogated as if they were treasonous people. In long queues, Kenyans were frisked while getting to the central business district, just like in the colonial days when Africans, armed with their <a href="https://alkags.me/kipande/">kipande</a> (passcard), were subjected to racial laws that made their access to the city highly controlled and troublesome.</p><p>Without a doubt, on June 25 it was illegal to have a Kenyan flag, flowers, or candles — they made you a target.</p><p>It was a crime to be a patriotic citizen.</p><p>The few who made it to the city, like me, spent most of the time escaping the police surveillance dragnet, formed by a heavy contingent of plainclothes police and uniformed units in balaclavas. Most of the hundreds of us who were arrested while laying flowers in the CBD were charged with the very flimsy offense of <a href="https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/news/372619/over-200-june-25-protest-suspects-charged-with-obstructing-roads-disrupting-traffic">obstructing traffic</a>, yet there was basically zero traffic in the city. The police who obstructed traffic on all roads for both motorists and pedestrians decided, ironically, to charge us with the offense that they themselves committed.</p><p>Most of us were held for more than 24 hours and denied access to telephones to inform our relatives and friends of our whereabouts.</p><p>For those who were abducted, their ordeal was more than horrifying; they were never booked at any police station and <a href="https://citizen.digital/article/six-missing-june-25-protesters-found-tortured-dumped-in-different-parts-of-nairobi-n385346">endured torture for days</a>, asked repeatedly who was funding them, before being dumped in different locations in Nairobi. <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2026-06-29-missing-activist-lichuma-found-alive-in-hospital">Davis Lichuma</a>, a community organizer and activist from Mathare, was abducted on the same day and only released on June 28. He was found heavily tortured and severely traumatized from his ordeal.</p><p>With access to the book still limited, we are planning a series of engagements in the coming months to broaden its reach. This will be through the use of the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/p/Social-justice-centers-traveling-theatre-100085149056341/">Social Justice Centre’s Traveling Theatre</a>, which will develop scripts and skits for performance in different communities. We will also hold forums in universities to make sure the institutions of higher learning, which were once the voice of reason and organizing, get the inspiration needed to play this role again. Also, we shall have public reading sessions in different parts of Nairobi, especially around areas where people gather in the central business district.</p><p>This we will do, as we move from Mau Mau to Ruto Must Go. This book was born in the streets, and to the streets shall it return.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-11T19:57:19.745Z</published><summary type="text">Kenya’s youth uprising was documented in real time through music, murals, memes, and essays. Publishing that history became an act of resistance in its own right.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/who-killed-the-shoga</id><title type="text">Who killed the Shoga?</title><updated>2026-09-10T18:31:37.951852Z</updated><author><name>Robert Philipson</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>The <em>shoga</em> of the East African coast, a man accepted as a member of women’s society, did not emerge from a vacuum nor from the imposition of outside influence. She was born from the long encounter between Bantu-speaking Africans and Muslim traders from the Arabian Peninsula.</p><p>Unlike medieval Christianity, which not only condemned “Sodomites” but sought to prosecute and exterminate them, the posture of classical Islam was categorically different. <cite>Liwat</cite> [anal intercourse between men] was prohibited, but in practice Islamic jurisprudence was less interested in policing private lives than its Christian counterpart. That was left to Allah’s judgment. Sin may have required repentance, but not necessarily prosecution.</p><p>This created a <em>de facto</em> tolerance for discrete same-sex relationships throughout the Muslim world. And not always that discrete. The beloved youth — the <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/B/bo3613572.html">ghulam or amrad</a> — appears throughout classical Arabic and Persian poetry, not as a scandalous figure but as a positively conventional object of male desire.</p><p>It is into this Islamic cultural framework, transplanted to the East African coast over centuries of trade, settlement, and intermarriage, that the figure of the <em>shoga</em> first appears. The Swahili world was one in which Islam was constitutive — shaping law, poetry, architecture, commerce, and domestic life. Kiswahili reflects this: some 30 percent of its vocabulary derives directly from Arabic. To understand the <em>shoga</em> is to understand how an Islamic cultural tolerance for gender difference was absorbed, transformed, and ultimately owned by the African women who gave the role its name.</p><p>Kiswahili-speaking women used the term <em>shoga</em> [pl. <em>mashoga</em>], roughly equivalent to “girlfriend,” as a term of endearment. At some point this term was applied to Swahili men who dressed as women, performed women’s tasks, and were accepted into women’s society. It wasn’t the men who named and defined the <em>shoga</em>. It was the women. This makes any presumed Western equivalent inadequate or misleading.</p><p>Furthermore, <em>mashoga</em> were recognized for the social roles they played and were not defined by same-sex desire, either coming from or directed toward them. How did the <em>shoga</em> develop? How did she find her place in society? Written non-Western sources are silent on the subject. Early Arabic travelers and geographers wrote about commerce, politics, and religious practice, not about the interior arrangements of women’s domestic spaces. The <em>shoga</em> was part of the women’s world — sometimes with special ritual or societal functions — smoothly and unproblematically integrated into the whole. What was there to say?</p><p>Plenty, once the Europeans started meddling in Swahili affairs. The judgments and pejorative terms followed in a predictable train. <a href="https://archive.org/details/adictionarysuah00krapgoog">Johann Krapf</a>, a German missionary working outside of Mombasa, compiled the first comprehensive Swahili dictionary, in which the secondary meanings of <em>shoga</em> are defined as 1) a “catamite” [a boy kept for sexual purposes by an older man] or passive homosexual partner, and 2) an “impotent” or feminized male.</p><p>We see again the Western insistence on defining variant male gender identity not through integrated social roles but through sexual acts. When you only have a hammer, everything looks like a nail.</p><p>The hammer in this case was <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/12/17/alien-legacy/origins-sodomy-laws-british-colonialism">Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code</a>, drafted by Thomas Babington Macaulay in 1860 for the British colonial administration. This punished “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” with up to life imprisonment. British administrators exported this provision to their African colonies without qualm — <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/12/17/alien-legacy/origins-sodomy-laws-british-colonialism">more than half of the world’s remaining sodomy laws are relics of British colonial rule</a>, spanning 17 African countries.</p><p>Colonialism didn’t bring same-sex desire and gender variance to sub-Saharan Africa — the historical and anthropological evidence is irrefutable on that point — but it did introduce homophobia. Criminalized now, <em>mashoga</em> had to go underground or into hiding. They were never in control of their own narrative, and generations of missionaries, anthropologists, administrators, and “observers” forced upon them whatever Western sexual-deviant theory was in vogue at the time.</p><p>And just when it seemed the <em>mashoga</em> could be permanently dismissed, they were resuscitated and transformed beyond recognition by theories of essentialism imported from the gay liberation movements of the West. They were “born this way” and needed to band together to reclaim their humanity. <cite>Shoga</cite> was now translated into English as “gay” or replaced by a new word, <em>gei</em> [pl. <em>magei</em>], that LGBTQ Swahilis used to describe themselves with something approaching pride.</p><p>Heterosexual Africans who had coexisted with the <em>shoga</em> hated this new identity. The Pride marches, the public declarations, the demands for recognition and legal equality — that was what “homosexuality” came to mean for them. What they were rejecting was not African same-sex practice or gender variance. What they were rejecting was a Western political identity organized around a Western sexual ontology. Of course, the homophobia of the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/19/africa-uganda-evangelicals-homophobia-antigay-bill/">American fundamentalist Christians who flooded into Africa after their domestic defeats on gay rights</a> was equally alien. The culture wars of America are now torching the social fabric of Africa.</p><p>And where is the <em>shoga</em> in all of this? Gone. Long gone. <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/163/oa_edited_volume/chapter/2866770">Traces of her historical presence exist</a>, as referenced in traditional Swahili epistemology, in oral history, in the memory of the dying generations who were ignorant of Western frameworks of gender variance. But the flesh-and-blood <em>shoga</em> was destroyed twice: first by colonial law and the missionary exegesis that preceded it, then by liberation movements that replaced colonial stigma with Western-style pride. She was never allowed to speak for herself, and we’ll never know what she had to say.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-10T18:31:37.951852Z</published><summary type="text">Long before modern sexual identities reached the East African coast, the Swahili shoga occupied a recognized place in women’s society, until colonialism and later Western frameworks remade them.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/somalias-uncertain-hand-off</id><title type="text">Somalia’s uncertain hand-off</title><updated>2026-09-09T15:38:36.45938Z</updated><author><name>Mahbub Abdillahi</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>This week, the Federal Government of Somalia held a domestic security conference in Mogadishu, attended by senior government officials and representatives of the international community. The conference came at a particularly critical time, as Somalia faces a growing dilemma on multiple fronts — the gradual drawdown of the AU mission in the country, the expected closure of international support structures, and an increasing political deadlock between the federal government and some federal member states.</p><p>These issues have been compounded by another concern that has grown over the past several months — the continuing threat posed by al-Shabaab and questions over whether the Somali National Army has the capacity to fill the <a href="https://www.geeska.com/en/somalias-emerging-security-vacuum">security vacuum</a> that could emerge as African troops are reduced. However, the federal government is projecting far greater confidence in Somalia’s ability to manage the transition than many of its international partners anticipated.</p><p>Speaking at the conference, National Security Adviser to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Aweys Haji Yusuf, who is also regarded as an influential presidential ally, said the withdrawal of international missions from Somalia was “the result of a long-term process” rather than a sudden decision. He noted that discussions and “assessments of Somalia’s ability to take greater control” of its own affairs had been underway for more than four years. According to Aweys, the government sought to determine when Somalia would be able to reduce its dependence on the UN, with assessments concluding that Somali institutions were increasingly capable of managing political and governance responsibilities that had previously received substantial UN support.</p><p>Somalia’s Minister of Religious Affairs and Endowments, Mukhtar Robow, who previously served as a senior figure in the militant group al-Shabaab before defecting, also addressed the gathering. Robow said Somalia’s security environment had “changed significantly,” adding that the country was now in a stronger position than it was in previous years.</p><p>The comments come amid increasingly assertive statements from President Hassan Sheikh’s administration that Somalia is preparing to assume greater responsibility for its own security and governance. Speaking at the Hananbure military training centre in Galgaduud during the graduation of thousands of new Somali National Army recruits, President Hassan Sheikh said international partners had played an important role in supporting Somalia’s fight against a prolonged insurgency, but stressed that reliance on foreign forces could not continue indefinitely.</p><p>Somalia is entering one of the most consequential reductions in international support since outside powers began rebuilding the country’s security and political institutions more than two decades ago. Two processes are now unfolding simultaneously. The <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2809(2025)">United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS)</a>, the political mission that succeeded <a href="https://unsom.unmissions.org/en">UNSOM</a>, is due to cease operations on October 31, 2026, completing a two-year transition requested by the Somali government in the name of greater national ownership. Its responsibilities — including support for constitutional reform, elections, human rights, the rule of law, security-sector development, and the coordination of international assistance — are being transferred to Somali institutions, the UN Country Team, and other partners.</p><p>Separate from that process, however, is an increasingly acute crisis surrounding the nearly 12,000 African troops deployed under the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Those forces depend heavily on the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) for much of the infrastructure that allows them to operate, including food, water, fuel, aviation, medical evacuation, communications, equipment support, and troop transportation. The convergence of the UN political mission’s closure with growing uncertainty over the future of this logistical system means Somalia could lose layers of international political and security support within months of each other, even as al-Shabaab retains a substantial presence across southern and central parts of the country.</p><p>The most serious shock has come from Washington. On July 1, Reuters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-peacekeeping-mission-risk-us-blocks-un-support-sources-say-2026-07-02/">reported</a>, citing a US diplomatic note, that the Trump administration had informed the AU that it would no longer support UNSOS beyond the end of 2026 and would oppose a Security Council mandate continuing UN logistical or operational backing for AUSSOM. UNSOS has an annual budget of <a href="https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/what-does-us-funding-exit-unsos-mean-somalias-stability">roughly $500 million</a>, and diplomats told Reuters that the African mission would be extremely difficult to sustain unless another mechanism replaced it. Washington said it had already provided nearly $2 billion in assessed contributions to UNSOS and its predecessor, and argued that Somalia had failed to assume sufficient responsibility for its security despite years of international assistance.</p><p>The decision also followed Washington’s earlier opposition to applying the UN Resolution 2719 financing framework to AUSSOM, which could have placed as much as 75% of eligible mission costs on predictable UN assessed contributions. The shift should not, however, be interpreted as a complete American retreat from counter-terrorism in Somalia. US Africa Command has continued an <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/insights/americas-counterterrorism-wars/the-war-in-somalia/">intensive campaign of air strikes</a> in the country. Rather, Washington appears increasingly prepared to conduct narrowly defined counter-terrorism operations while withdrawing from the expensive multilateral architecture that sustains African peacekeepers and supports Somalia’s longer-term security transition. In a recent interview with local media, AFRICOM commander General Dagvin Anderson <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vTNX1l_lDik&amp;pp=ygU4XEFGUklDT00gY29tbWFuZGVyIEdlbmVyYWwgRGFndmluIEFuZGVyc29uIHNvbWFsaSBzdHJlYW3SBwkJGgwBhyohjO8%3D">expressed frustration</a> over the limited progress made so far.</p><p>That decision has triggered a scramble among African troop-contributing countries and the AU to determine whether the mission can be sustained through greater African financing, but the figures illustrate the limits of that approach. Uganda convened Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, Somalia, and other partners for an extraordinary AUSSOM <a href="https://www.geeska.com/en/kampala-summit-seeks-funding-lifeline-somalia-peace-mission">summit</a> in Kampala, as questions mounted over the mission’s future. Uganda’s military leadership said UNSOS support had already been reduced by about <a href="https://mediacentre.go.ug/press-room/aussom-troop-contributing-countries-begin-extraordinary-summit-in-kampala-to-dis-50qn">25%</a> and warned that troop contributors would have to find political and financial alternatives.</p><p>The AU has increasingly urged member states to expand contributions to its Peace Fund, implement the long-planned 0.2% levy on eligible imports, and rely more heavily on domestic African resources. However, the scale of the problem was already evident in 2025. AUSSOM required about $196 million for the year, but by late September only $24.6 million had been pledged, including $20 million from the AU, while troop-contributing countries had kept personnel deployed for around 15 months without allowances, effectively subsidizing the mission themselves.</p><p>Europe, traditionally the financial backbone of successive AU missions in Somalia, has also become increasingly reluctant to carry the burden indefinitely. The European Union and its member states have provided almost <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/21/european-peace-facility-support-for-the-military-component-of-the-african-union-support-and-stabilisation-mission-in-somalia/">€2.8 billion to AU-led missions</a> in Somalia over roughly two decades, but European governments have been pressing for a gradual reduction in the international security footprint as costs have mounted and questions have persisted over when Somali forces will be capable of replacing foreign troops.</p><p>In April 2026, after roughly two years of negotiations over renewed financing, the EU finally approved €75 million for AUSSOM, making Europe the mission’s largest direct financial supporter and providing badly needed money for troop reimbursements and associated support. The contribution is substantial, but it does not resolve the underlying financing problem. The EU grant is far smaller than the broader logistical system operated by UNSOS, and European governments have shown little appetite for simply replacing Washington as the mission’s principal financier. The result has been a continuing search for burden-sharing involving the AU, EU, Britain, and other donors, but without the predictable multi-year financing arrangement African governments have sought.</p><p>The strain on AUSSOM is part of a much wider international retrenchment from Somalia. The dismantling of USAID and US foreign-aid cuts have <a href="https://www.geeska.com/en/over-70-ngos-warn-somalias-hunger-crisis-worsening-open-letter">hit programs</a> supporting health, education, economic development, and government capacity. Funding available to aid organizations fell from about $2.2 billion in 2022 to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-malnutrition-response-hit-by-more-than-80-funding-drop-child-hunger-2026-08-11/">roughly $300 million</a> in 2026, while funding for the acute-malnutrition response fell by more than 80 percent and hundreds of health and nutrition facilities closed or faced closure. At the same time, the dedicated UN political mission that advised Somalia on federalism, elections, justice, security-sector reform, and institution-building is disappearing, leaving more of those responsibilities to a smaller UN country presence and Somali institutions themselves.</p><p>The emerging international model is consequently much leaner. Targeted military action against immediate terrorist threats may continue, as the continuing US <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/insights/americas-counterterrorism-wars/the-war-in-somalia/">air campaign</a> demonstrates, but the expensive architecture of peacekeeping, stabilization, humanitarian assistance, and long-term state-building is contracting. For Mogadishu, this has created a mismatch — international partners are increasingly demanding Somali ownership and self-reliance at precisely the moment when the external financing, logistics, and institutional support that helped the state reach its current level of capacity are being scaled back.</p><p>The recent and increasingly assertive remarks from federal government officials are intended to demonstrate that Somali authorities are prepared to assume greater responsibility for both the country’s security and political affairs as international involvement declines. The message from Mogadishu is one of growing confidence. Yet the situation on the ground remains far less certain. Somalia continues to face a <a href="https://www.geeska.com/en/somalias-opposition-calls-transitional-council-end-political-crisis">contested political</a> environment, the absence of a broadly agreed and inclusive electoral framework, and a <a href="https://www.geeska.com/en/hassan-sheikh-mohamuds-constitutional-gamble">constitutional crisis</a> that together have complicated efforts to build consensus around the country’s political transition. These disputes do not necessarily negate the federal government’s claim that Somali institutions have become more capable, but they underline the gap between assuming responsibility and achieving the political cohesion required to exercise it effectively.</p><p>The security picture is similarly mixed. The government has made important gains in strengthening <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/08/13/mogadishu-no-longer-deserves-its-deadly-reputation">security in Mogadishu</a> and has expanded and trained elements of the Somali National Army, but al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat across large parts of southern and central Somalia and retains the ability to conduct attacks, pressure local communities, and exploit weaknesses in state control. We are also seeing increasing reports of a complicated and murky relationship between al-Shabaab and the Houthis in Yemen as the war on Iran intensifies. At the same time, piracy has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/08/hijacking-pirates-somalia-geopolitical-chaos">re-emerged</a>, despite the presence of multinational maritime forces in Somali waters. Against that background, the federal government’s growing confidence indicates a political signal, particularly as international partners scale back their presence, but it has yet to produce sufficiently tangible progress to resolve the wider doubts surrounding Somalia’s transition. </p><p>The central question is therefore whether Somali political and security institutions can consolidate and maintain security stability and build a sufficiently inclusive political settlement as the external structures that have supported the country for more than two decades continue to recede.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-09T15:38:36.45938Z</published><summary type="text">As the UN and the US pull back from Somalia’s security architecture within months of each other, Mogadishu insists it is ready. The gap between that confidence and the country’s political reality tells a different story.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/reading-list-faraaz-mahomed</id><title type="text">Reading List: Faraaz Mahomed</title><updated>2026-09-08T14:02:15.110293Z</updated><author><name>Faraaz Mahomed</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>My novel, <cite>Mother/Land</cite>, focuses on a law professor, Salim, a South African in New York, who finds out that he is the product of an affair between his mother — Sawligha — and an apartheid politician. The story engages with the recent past as well as the apartheid years, telling parallel histories about the Fees Must Fall movement in South Africa, Black Lives Matter in the US, forced removals under the Group Areas Act, and the experience of a Muslim immigrant in New York with a gay Afrikaans brother whose life he might save.</p><p>Salim has a sunken world-weariness, which is perhaps rooted in his intellectualization and his provenance. There is no shortage of such protagonists wandering the streets of New York, whether in <cite>Herzog</cite>, <cite>Open City</cite>, or <cite>Netherland</cite>. Interestingly, two of these are also immigrant narratives, although the latter might not characterize itself as such. My own experience as a South African of Muslim origin living in New York certainly shaped the story, but I read <cite>We Need New Names</cite> with great interest, and I found some of the complexities of Salim and his family in it.</p><p>The theme of inheritance is one of the most prominent in <cite>Mother/Land</cite>. Sawligha and Salim’s relationship is central, and this dialogue in the matrilineal relationship (and to some extent the patrilineal too) had me reaching for <cite>On Earth We’re Briefly Gorgeous</cite> by Ocean Vuong and <cite>The Return</cite> by Hisham Matar. These are beautifully gifted writers, not only in their prose, but also in the intimacy with which they write. Looking for intimacy, and for the ‘lostness’ that Salim conjures, I often turned to <cite>In a Strange Room</cite> — a brilliant and relentlessly personal text.</p><p>Sawligha’s arc takes place during the days of the removals. Richard Rive’s <cite>Buckingham Palace</cite> stood out as a reference text about District Six, but I think my own family history in Vrededorp/Fietas/Fordsburg/Pageview (a cluster neighbourhood in Johannesburg) was a good starting point too. To understand the topography and to build a reliable history of what was left of the district, I relied on Sean Field’s <cite>Lost Communities, Living Memories</cite> and on <cite>South African History Online</cite> (a great resource!). The story of Sawligha’s affair with an apartheid politician is pure fiction, but I’d decided that Carl Lamprecht, Sawligha’s lover and Salim’s father, would be a contemporary of DF Malan. I did not read up much on him (merely picking up facts from Wikipedia), but there are small details that have helped to tell the history, and indeed portray Carl as a multidimensional character.</p><p>To capture the perfect naïve goodness of Salim, and to engineer (as my editor Fourie likes to say) a version of a person who intellectualizes too much and yet finds himself ultimately wanting, I found something quite akin in <cite>The Idiot</cite>. The tragedy of it and the beauty of it are very much the stuff of my daydreams — and the bittersweetness of Dostoevsky is something I find really captivating, and has actually helped me write the voice of by far the wisest character in the novel — eight-year-old Aa’isha.</p><p>I struggled with Aa’isha, Salim’s daughter, who sees the intricacies of the world and endeavors to understand them, all the while feeling like the contradictions and the lies that adults tell themselves are utterly nonsensical. It was a creative growth path for me personally, and I spent an inordinate amount of time reading everything from <cite>The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time</cite> to <cite>The Girl with the Louding Voice</cite> to try (and very possibly fail) to get the words, the logic, the temperament, and the reality of Aa’isha right.</p><p>As a psychologist, I went back to Piaget and Erikson, but the truth is that I am under no illusions that the voice is marked by a precociousness that I couldn’t quite erase (and that, by the final edit, I had decided was just the right amount of weird, unreliable humanness). I think that’s part of the beauty of writing children, though — because they do turn out to be the most astute of characters, even when their vocabularies don’t quite match their insight.</p><p>Reading <cite>Zuleika Dobson</cite> helped with the metaphysical aspects of my storytelling (Sawligha is, after all, a ghost), but I enjoyed telling the paranormal aspects with a recognition of their ambivalent relationship to reality. Olga Tokarczuk’s <cite>House of Day, House of Night</cite> is mystifying, and Ben Okri’s <cite>Famished Road</cite> trilogy contains beautiful stories about the ability to travel between worlds. I am indebted to these, and so many other writers for the gifts of their work.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-08T13:08:35.992Z</published><summary type="text">How do the struggles of one generation echo, decades later, in another’s?</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/09/who-started-nollywood</id><title type="text">Who started Nollywood?</title><updated>2026-09-07T14:46:40.163693Z</updated><author><name>Jummai Bulama-Ashebu</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>Here is the short version of a story that has been told wrong for 30 years.</p><p>Kenneth Nnebue was born in Mgbidi, Imo State. He left school after sixth grade and apprenticed under his brother, a handbag maker, before entering trade himself in the Onitsha market. By the late 1980s, he was in Lagos, importing VHS tapes from Taiwan, distributing pirated foreign films, and trying to move product in a difficult economy. When the tapes stopped selling, he put an original story on them instead. That story — <cite>Living in Bondage</cite> (1992) — cost 150,000 naira, about $7,000 at the time. It sold over 100,000 copies in its first weeks through informal markets in Lagos, Enugu, and beyond. It launched a global industry.</p><p>What gets left out of most tellings: before Nnebue made <cite>Living in Bondage</cite> in Igbo, he had already produced at least 27 Yoruba-language films. An Igbo trader, operating in Lagos, making Yoruba content, who then made the Igbo film the world decided was the beginning of everything. The ethnic ownership of that origin — who gets to claim Nollywood, which tradition gets the credit, which city gets the heritage tourism — has been contested ever since. Not because the evidence is unclear, but because resolving it requires someone to say plainly what Nollywood actually is: an art form rooted in Yoruba theatrical tradition, or an industry born from an Igbo trader’s logistics problem. These are different things. The confusion between them is not innocent.</p><p>The Yoruba side of the argument is not a retroactive claim. The Yoruba Traveling Theater tradition, <cite>Alárìnjó</cite>, reaches back to the 19th century. Its modern form is usually traced to Hubert Ogunde, whose touring theater company toured Nigerian cities through the 1950s and 1960s, its work politically sharp enough that a regional premier banned it outright. That stage tradition migrated to celluloid film through the 1970s and 1980s, and by 1985 Moses Olaiya’s <cite>Mosebolatan</cite> was one of the country’s first genuine blockbusters. Critically, Yoruba filmmakers moved onto VHS format in 1988, four years before <cite>Living in Bondage</cite>. If the question is who touched the video format first, it wasn’t Nnebue.</p><p>So why does his name carry all the credit? Because <cite>Living in Bondage</cite> wasn’t first, but it was the first to look like it knew what it was doing, packaged with a glossy, full-color cover styled after pirated Hollywood tapes, presented as a professional product instead of a stopgap. The story helped too — a man who joins an occult society and sacrifices his wife for wealth, only to be haunted by what he’s done — landed hard in a country deep in structural adjustment-era desperation, when stories of ritual money were part of the cultural air people breathed. And despite being shot entirely in Igbo with no subtitles for a full year, the film crossed ethnic lines anyway — co-producer Okey Ogunjiofor would later say simply that people who didn’t understand the language still understood the story, because the pictures carried it.</p><p>What Nnebue actually contributed, then, wasn’t the invention of video filmmaking — Yoruba practitioners had that four years earlier. He contributed a “template,” an industrial model of direct-to-video production that the entire industry would replicate for the next two decades. Every straight-to-video Nollywood film that followed, regardless of language, was built on the business logic Nnebue stumbled into while solving an unglamorous warehouse problem.</p><p>Laid side by side, these two histories aren’t actually contradictory; they’re answering two different questions. It’s the single phrase “who started Nollywood” that collapses them into one, forcing a false contradiction. The Yoruba lineage answers where the art form came from. The Nnebue story answers where the industry came from. Ogunde’s company built the grammar. Nnebue’s warehouse problem built the factory.</p><p>I’m writing this from Enugu, one of the cities where <cite>Living in Bondage</cite> first sold by the hundreds in market stalls. Here, Nollywood’s Igbo roots aren’t distant history but lived memory, passed down the way a family recipe is. That memory is real. So is Ogunde’s banned theater company. Neither one needs to lose for the other to be true.</p><p>But Nigeria rarely lets cultural origin stay this generous. Who started Nollywood is never just a historical question here — it’s tied to tourism revenue, festival programming, whose language gets state funding, whose grandchildren get to say “we built this.” Thirty years on, the debate hasn’t been resolved because resolving it was never really the point. Someone benefits from the ambiguity every time it stays open, and someone loses something every time it closes.</p><p>That, more than the biography of one trader from Mgbidi, is the story worth telling.</p></div></content><published>2026-09-07T14:46:40.163693Z</published><summary type="text">Kenneth Nnebue made 27 Yoruba-language films before Living in Bondage. Why does Nigeria still only remember the one he made in Igbo?</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/08/on-safari-2026-8</id><title type="text">On Safari</title><updated>2026-08-10T15:02:21.770953Z</updated><author><name>William Shoki</name></author><category label="Updates" term="Updates"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>Ever since the <a href="https://africasacountry.com/series/2026-mens-fifa-world-cup">World Cup</a> concluded with Spain’s emphatic triumph over universally loathed Argentina (at least it felt this way), it has no longer felt like everyone is looking in the same direction at the same time. For a month and a bit, football’s biggest stage gave us one of the last remaining experiences of shared, global time. Not global justice, not global equality — the tournament is in many ways a monument to their absence — but a crude, synchronized schedule. Games at set hours, short-lived solidarities, the impression, however false, that the world is briefly doing something together, undergoing a collective experience.</p><p>Once that all ends, you’re plunged back into a social temporality and news cycle that moves at lightning speed and adjusting back is disorienting. It didn’t help that I had to deal with a debilitating case of <em><a href="https://apnews.com/article/cyclospora-cdc-taylor-farms-lettuce-4756baaeb23a5f222a01ab43c89b3485">cyclosporiasis</a></em> (in an ill-fated decision, I tried some Taco Bell for the first time the day before my return flight back to South Africa, and getting a food-borne illness felt like an appropriate parting gift from a United States in decline). In the weeks since the World Cup, I found myself in a kind of fog I at first attributed to being exhausted from a busy year coupled with bouts of illness, but which, as I return to relatively decent health, I recognize as a familiar feeling, one that has typified contemporary experience for as long as I can remember.</p><p>There’s a book by the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman which I think is underrated, and does better at capturing the texture of our epoch than many other attempts (do we live in late capitalism, surveillance capitalism, the burnout society, post-modernity, etc etc.). It’s called <cite>Liquid Modernity</cite>, and Bauman’s straightforward argument is that the defining feature of contemporary society is no longer the construction of stable institutions, identities, and social relationships, but their constant dissolution. Where the “solid” phase of modernity sought to build enduring structures — stable careers, lifelong marriages, nation-states, political parties, class identities, and fixed moral frameworks — our present condition is “liquid”: forms no longer retain their shape for long enough to organize human life. The contradictory result of this is that even though in many important respects, individuals have unprecedented freedom (at least compared to any other point in human history), it’s coupled with chronic insecurity and the burden of constantly having to remake ourselves.</p><p>One of his most evocative concepts is the notion of pointillist time, which is “more prominent for its inconsistency and lack of cohesion than for its elements of continuity and consistency.” Time under liquid modernity is fragmented and disconnected, and rather than unfolding as a series of events with some relationship to each other, it is rather a series of “eternal instants.” It’s not hard work to see how this characterizes so much of algorithm-dominated society in general, and our media consumption in particular. If it wasn’t hard enough figuring out what producing any meaningful “content” takes in the attention economy, it was dismaying for me to recently learn that even new media like podcasts and video essays are themselves now being repurposed in a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/2026/04/how-short-form-clips-took-over-the-internet/686922/">“clipping economy”</a> where increasingly, circulation of short clips from longer pieces is becoming the main event rather than previews.</p><p>At <cite>Africa Is a Country</cite>, we are very proud of our World Cup Road Trip series. Three episodes are live — <a href="https://youtu.be/R4pI19Bnmc8?si=-n7ei0t8FpnxO5xB">Episode 1</a> on the Cabo Verdean diaspora in New England, <a href="https://youtu.be/csf-RyNweW8?si=TC_YjDd3RHZ7HRWh">Episode 2</a> on the affinity between Algeria and Lawrence, Kansas, and <a href="https://youtu.be/W74kqNl1F04?si=7O4OWtt3L2-IOMOU">Episode 3</a> on Toronto’s Ghanaian community — with further episodes from the road currently in post-production. Although the website and our weekly newsletters remain our bread and butter, like most outlets, we are experimenting with different ways of reaching audiences, and short-form video has been one of them. The newsletter in particular functions as our most reliable direct channel to readers as social platform referrals grow less dependable. The World Cup, however, gave us a powerful on-ramp: sport brought in readers who might not otherwise arrive at a piece on visa regimes or xenophobia, and the coverage was built to convert that interest into political understanding.</p><p>What has been challenging is that discovery is now heavily platform-dependent, and the same work travels very differently depending on where it lands: our road trip episodes have found nearly 10,000 views on Instagram while the identical material moves far more slowly on YouTube. And we’re a small team that only ever has the capacity to make something and release it into the world once, maybe twice. How much labor is involved in reproducing countless clips from one piece, and circulating it on an innumerable number of platforms? Whatever it is, we simply cannot do it.</p><p>In fact, we are behind on our production and release schedule, and as is normal to do, we worry about whether the material will be stale by the time we are ready to publish it. To be sure, timeliness is always an objective in journalism, and has been before the age of platform dominance. In fact, what we are dealing with now is tougher to pin down. Bauman’s concept of pointilist time captures, on the one hand, the way discrete events move differently under liquid modernity, and how our sense of when things are happening is transformed. But algorithmic time also organizes the field of perception, i.e, our sense of where things are happening, or more precisely, of <em>what</em> is happening. In other words, the hyper-personalization of what we see means it is increasingly difficult to be certain that we are seeing the same thing, and interpreting the same set of events.</p><p>Naming what’s happened to our sense of <em>what</em> needs a different word, and the nearest one I can find is the concept of anamorphosis. Hans Holbein’s 1533 double portrait <cite>The Ambassadors</cite> is the textbook case. Two French diplomats flank a shelf crowded with globes and instruments, and stretched across the floor between their feet is a long grey smear that reads, from where you’re standing to look at the men, as nothing at all — a flaw in the paint, maybe. Walk up close and look from a sharp angle, low down on the right, and the smear resolves into a human skull, rendered in as much detail as anything else in the frame. Both images are actually there on the same canvas. Neither is a distortion of the other. Stand in one place, and you see two wealthy men and their instruments; stand in the other, and the whole painting turns out to be about death, and you cannot hold both pictures in your eye at once. So, the feed isn’t handing everyone a blurred or partial version of one picture. It’s resolving the same underlying material into fully coherent, mutually exclusive pictures, depending on where — which feed, which platform, which slice of the personalization engine — you happen to be standing at.</p><p>Although the World Cup directed our attention to one shared happening, what one’s experience of the World Cup largely depended on was whether you were simultaneously experiencing it online, and if so, primarily through which platform, etc. For example, while Argentina’s seemingly unsportsmanlike conduct and perceptions of favoritism made them wildly unpopular online, that didn’t translate for most regular people I spoke to who still associated it with Maradona and the global South and couldn’t believe anyone in Africa could cheer for Spain. Since at least Qatar 2022, the World Cup has increasingly felt asynchronous on this dimension, consisting of several overlapping tournaments, each with its own villains, injuries, scandals, and moral weather.</p><p>Now, of course, every attempt to make sense of the world begins from the fact that each of us encounters it from our own irreducibly subjective position. Human experience is always an exercise in interpretation: the attempt to establish shared meaning across common or divergent experience. What feels distinctive about the present moment, however, is that we are losing not simply a shared sense of time, but a shared world. Politics has always depended on more than disagreement. It has depended on the possibility that we are, in some meaningful sense, disagreeing about the same reality — that our arguments begin from a common object, however differently we interpret it. What has become fragile is the achievement of that common world: not identical beliefs, but enough shared ground to know that we are talking about the same events, inhabiting the same present, looking at the same object from different sides. At least in the group stages, the World Cup felt like it briefly restored a condition that democracy, journalism, and ordinary social life all depend on, namely shared attention. But as the competition narrowed and the algorithm regained its grip, the World Cup itself increasingly dissolved into the endless circulation of content, re-entering the attention economy as just another stream of commodities competing for visibility.</p><p>Perhaps the World Cup has simply become too big a spectacle, one exceeding our capacity to engage with it meaningfully at the scale it’s now played at, and perhaps the future will warrant a return to “doing things at human scale.” Staying with football: it’s felt, in recent years, like women’s football has become popular partly for this reason. This isn’t to make light of the real disparities in investment and coverage that still shape the women’s game. But there’s a sense in which it still feels within reach — legible at something closer to human scale, not yet fully run through the same algorithmic churn the men’s tournament now is.</p><p>Which brings me, with some embarrassment, to WAFCON. Morocco has been hosting the tournament since late July, and we’re already two days away from the semifinals — the tournament’s own answer to the question of scale above. Smaller broadcast footprint, thinner commercial saturation, a fraction of the men’s tournament’s algorithmic weight. It would have been the perfect subject for the argument I’ve just spent several thousand words making.</p><p>We have not covered it properly. Contributing editor Maher Mezahi has been filing dispatches on his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@AfricaFiveSide">podcast</a> and <a href="https://africasacountry.com/list/campaign/cam:g0w4p3">newsletter</a>, but the rest of us have been largely silent, and that’s doesn’t reflect anything except an editorial oversight. I don’t want to paper over it with a joke about being like tired footballers at the end of a long season, true as that joke also happens to be (and if only we had as many resources at our disposal). The honest version is that a small team, mid-fog, still finishing a World Cup series that had already outrun its own schedule, let a second tournament pass it by — which is, if I hold myself to my own argument rather than just making it, exactly what this piece has been describing. Not a failure of will, but what happens when the volume of things worth attending to exceeds what we can hold.</p><p>So, I end with an apology, and an announcement. We’re going on our bi-annual publishing break this week, later than planned and more tired than usual, in no small part because of everything above. We’ll be back with something on WAFCON’s back end — the final is on the 16th — and whatever else the world has rearranged the calendar around by the time we’re attempted to rest. For now the fog wins this round. We’re stepping out of it on purpose, rather than being carried along by it, which is about the only kind of victory on offer.</p></div></content><published>2026-08-10T14:27:29.344Z</published><summary type="text">This publishing break, we contemplate why we’re all feeling so burnt out.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/08/ceuta-a-border-spectacle</id><title type="text">A border spectacle</title><updated>2026-08-07T13:28:22.192758Z</updated><author><name>Nabil Ferdaoussi</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>What happened last Thursday in Ceuta was a <a href="https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2021/10/regreso-film">border spectacle</a> of surprising scale and scope. Tens of thousands of mainly young fellow Moroccans stormed the gates while others braved the water to enter the enclave. All the elements of the spectacle were there: from images of boisterous youngsters jockeying for entry, to a diplomatic slanging match, to border patrols scrambling to push migrants back to Morocco.</p><p>It sounds like a geopolitical déjà vu — almost the same border antics: scene, actors, protagonists, and victims staged in May 2021. In fact, what happened in Ceuta is the third episode of the border spectacle: the first staged in May 2021, the second in September 2024, and here we are watching the third — and perhaps not the last — episode, marking a shift in Morocco’s migration diplomacy to a more coercive approach.</p><p>There is no conspiracy theory behind the Ceuta border spectacle; there is only a geopolitical buildup to understand Morocco’s coercive migration diplomacy. The latter has shifted migration governance from policies, practices, and discourses to the direct use of its youth and other racialized African migrants in diplomatic sparring.</p><p>Here is the buildup: On December 10, 2020, the Trump administration recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. This historic moment led Morocco to garner further diplomatic recognition, especially from its traditional allies — not least Spain as a former colonizer. In January 2021, a diplomatic logjam between Morocco and Germany started to simmer following the latter’s criticism of Donald Trump’s proclamation to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This diplomatic friction with Germany prompted Morocco to push the European Union.</p><p>Meanwhile, the possibility of meeting Morocco’s expectations, whether by the EU or its member states, proved far-fetched. The diplomatic spat between Morocco and Spain reached its nadir when the latter hosted Brahim Ghali, the leader of the Polisario Front, in April 2021 to seek medical treatment. In a tit-for-tat response, Morocco unleashed over 8,000 migrants, including around 3,000 minors. Santiago Abascal, the leader of the anti-migrant far-right Vox party in Spain, denounced the arrivals, stating Morocco was “launching minors like battering rams” against the Spanish borders.</p><p>Now, the same scenario is unfolding after Pedro Sánchez visited Algeria to parley with President Abdelmajid Tebboune over natural gas and Western Sahara.</p><p>In Europe, the border spectacle sparked a moral panic that feared the invasion of the southern flanks of Europe, raking up right-wing opprobrium over Sánchez’s progressive yet lax migration policies. Far from being an invasion, the border spectacle staged produced anti-migration fodder for far-right politicians.</p><p>The border spectacle has resurfaced the centuries-old colonization of Ceuta and Melilla.</p><p>The international public that redeems Sánchez as the proponent of the Palestinian cause and progressive migration reforms is bewildered by Ceuta’s tiny geography at the outer fringe of the African continent, wondering how Spain, and for that matter Europe, will be invaded while in Africa. Some historical context is urgent here to disentangle these “only land borders between Africa and EUrope.”</p><p>Depending on one’s geopolitical stance, Ceuta and Melilla are at once enclaves and exclaves. From the colonial standpoint of Spain and the European Union, they are seen as exclaves, embodying the external sovereign extension of Spain and, more recently, Europe. In most academic literature, however, the two cities are enclaves standing as the last remnants of European colonization on the African continent. For Moroccans, the two cities are occupied territories, whose recovery remains an unfinished national project of decolonization.</p><p>The dispute over Ceuta and Melilla has shaped a long history of sporadic tensions in the relationship between Morocco and Spain. Its historical roots extend back to the Reconquista (c. 718–1492), culminating in the fall of Al-Andalus, and ended with the expulsion of the Moors, between 718 and 1492, from the Iberian Peninsula to North Africa.</p><p>Spain extended its sovereignty beyond the Peninsula to vie for external territorial sovereignty in North Africa, seizing Melilla in 1497 and Ceuta — initially conquered by Portugal in 1415 and then ceded to Spain — in 1668. The two towns served as external bulwarks for the clash between the <cite>Ummah</cite> of Islam and Christendom. Well into the wake of decolonization, Morocco has never ceased reclaiming the two enclaves, invoking the principle of territorial integrity laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.</p><p>In 1991, Morocco and Spain signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation. Yet, in 1995, to complete the political formation of its national sovereignty, Spain granted Ceuta and Melilla the status of <cite>Ciudades Autónomas</cite> (Autonomous Cities). This move was criticized by Morocco as a breach of the treaty and an insidious attempt to annex the two territories to its national dominion. To parry such criticism, at the end of 1996, Spain formally constructed barriers fencing Ceuta and Melilla, which was justified by Spain — by the appearance of West African migrants as a “new problem” at the external borders of Europe. In September 1997, the then Prime Minister of Morocco, Abdellatif Filali, reiterated this claim at the UN General Assembly, that “Moroccan towns under Spanish occupation” should follow the same resolution pursued by Hong Kong and Macao.</p><p>Spain’s accession to the Schengen Treaty in 1995 promptly activated the Europeanization of Ceuta and Melilla. In this sense, the borderwork in the two towns is no longer a national matter but a European one, which requires the joint efforts of the EU, Spain, and Morocco to combat irregular migration. The subsequent fortification of the two towns, the Euro-African frontier, is a prototype of “Fortress Europe” and border externalization. What follows the birth of this fortification of Ceuta and Melilla is a reenactment of colonial violence against racialized migrants.</p><p>The border spectacle of Ceuta bears witness to the <em>longue durée</em> of colonial violence and borders as its obdurate, historical residue. It also bespeaks the banality of colonial durabilities over such territorial splinters in the shadow of decolonization. This colonial history has, in turn, shaped how Europe views the mobility of Africans, deploying deficit and imperial frameworks of a ‘crisis,’ ‘problem,’ and ‘threat.’</p><p>On October 11, 1995, <cite>Policía Nacional</cite> repressed <a href="https://elfarodeceuta.es/25-aniversario-disturbios-angulo/">a group of black African migrants in</a> Ceuta who were contained and refused relocation to mainland Spain. The event marked a turning point, staging the first ‘border spectacle’ of the Euro-African borders. What followed was unending processes of “bordering and re-bordering” the Moroccan-Spanish borders. In October 2005, exactly ten years later, 15 black African migrants fell dead at the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. Nationwide raids and arrests of migrants in forest camps around the two enclaves were carried out by the Moroccan authorities, dumping over 2,000 black African migrants in the remote desert borderland with Algeria. Almost another decade later, on February 6, 2014, another breaking point of migrant death claimed the lives of another 15 migrants in the Tarajal Massacre. <cite>Guardia Civil</cite> opened fire on black African migrants as they waded their way into Ceuta along Tarajal Beach. A new <a href="https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Tarajal_Case_summary_Brice_O.__February_2025_.pdf">lawsuit</a> was later filed against Spain by a Cameroonian survivor. On February 6 of every year, <a href="https://alarmphone.org/en/2023/05/30/commemoraction/">“commemorActions</a>” and sit-ins are held all around the world denouncing migrant death and disappearance.</p><p>The most recent breaking point is the Melilla Massacre, which is, in large part, the subject matter and ethnographic groundwork of my thesis. The Melilla Massacre is a historic spectacle of migrant death, claiming the lives of at least 27 black migrants from East Africa. Dozens went missing, others were incarcerated, and survivors were <a href="https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/desert-dumps/">dumped</a> at the Algerian border or dispersed to different urban fringes within Morocco.</p><p>Tracing the genealogies of the EU’s border externalization within the <em>longue durée</em> of the colonial matrix allows us to see what happened in Ceuta beyond presentist accounts of migration diplomacy: it allows us to see through the enduring continuum of social death and containment that saps the resourceful subjectivities of Moroccan and African youth at large.</p><p>Far less concerned with deciphering the geopolitical palaver of the Ceuta crossings, Moroccan journalists, artists, activists, and intellectuals are resurfacing discussion over the broken social contract between the state and its citizens. The socio-economic malaise plaguing Moroccan youth is a legacy of systemic disinterest in the realities of Moroccans. It favors glamorous investments — as in stadiums for the 2030 World Cup — giving short shrift to basic public services such as health and education. Such legitimate demands were the slogans of the <a href="https://mipa.institute/?p=13246&amp;fbclid=IwY2xjawThVFJleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETFyR3g2UTlPT0N6SHBkRTBmc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHqfF7jsm0Qj19er7QlgzCRkavCdW27Gez59pfDgoeJgtIWy7MBpxq24dmzLV_aem_zz9vkOBrlfNE2-EedFudjg&amp;lang=en">GenZ 212 protests</a>, a grassroots movement born online and driven by young Moroccans, including some of those who stormed the Ceuta border. Many of the protesters were detained, while many chose the ‘backway’ to reach Europe on unseaworthy boats.</p><p>From the Moroccan border, the border spectacle of Ceuta is symbolic of an escape from a carceral, postcolonial deathworld — not an invasion or a Moroccan border regime that managed to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b2440aa5-be3e-40ae-ad2d-ad5893de79d3?syn-25a6b1a6=1">outfox its Spanish counterpart</a>. Beyond depictions of delinquency, Moroccan youth have proved to be agents of social, economic, and political change, escaping a political juggernaut that grinds down their youth and resourceful subjectivities.</p><p>Caminando Fronteras, a Spanish NGO that began counting border fatalities along the Atlantic route in 2015, counted <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/DboYZSkjrzv/?img_index=1">141 migrant deaths</a> as of August 4. Many more are still missing. Embattled families of <em>mafqudin</em> (missing migrants) are in vertigo, still waiting at the border in hopes of finding their missing relatives. <a href="https://www.instagram.com/bord.eresistance/">Border Resistance</a>, a collective of migration activists, is monitoring the border violations in Ceuta: the illegal pushbacks, beatings, starvation, and search and identification for the <em>mafqudin</em> among young Moroccans, Sudanese, and Yemeni asylum seekers.</p><p>Crossing the borders involves a cultural rite of social death and, upon safe crossing, rebirth. It’s the kind of social death that one escapes from home to seek a new life beyond borders. In the passage, migrants exchange physical death for a new life beyond the Moroccan borders.</p><p>For Moroccan migrants, risking their lives along dangerous routes was an escape from the mandibles of social death. The risk promised rebirth and regeneration to individual and communal lives.</p><p>Many more Moroccans will continue to reach Ceuta and Europe, undeterred by the unending securitization of borders and the violent deaths and disappearances.</p></div></content><published>2026-08-07T13:28:22.192758Z</published><summary type="text">When thousands of young Moroccans stormed Ceuta last week, it was not an invasion, but the latest in a five-year pattern of coercive migration diplomacy on a border with five centuries of colonial history behind it.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/08/between-feminism-and-pan-africanism</id><title type="text">Between feminism and pan-Africanism</title><updated>2026-08-06T17:56:55.777739Z</updated><author><name>Hilmelda Tenkeu</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>I read the draft <a href="https://familywatch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2026/01/Official_final_version_English_African_Union_Charter.pdf">African Charter on Family, Sovereignty and Values</a> the way you read a letter from someone you used to trust. For pages, I was nodding, smiling even. Then I reached my own body on the page, and I understood what the document had done: it had stapled together two tenets of my life that I thought could complement each other, so that to keep one I would have to surrender the other. I always thought my Pan-Africanism gave context and legitimacy to my feminism. This charter disagrees with that.</p><p>I am a Pan-Africanist. I am also a feminist. The charter is built so those two cannot share a room.</p><p>Let me tell you about the part that got me. When the charter talks about food, it is right. Article 8 asks African states to protect indigenous seeds, to refuse uncontrolled genetically modified seed, to stop criminalizing the farmer-managed seed systems that have fed this continent for millennia, and to put real money — 10 percent of agricultural spending — behind them. When it talks about natural resources, it is right again: removing tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-African trade to address instability and slow economic growth, no more shipping out raw and buying back finished. Article 9 names the debt trap and our dependence on selling unprocessed commodities. Even its complaint about how treaties get made — the late-night sessions, the documents dumped on delegations in languages and timeframes designed to exhaust them — describes something <a href="https://theecologist.org/2003/jun/01/playing-dirty-wto">I have watched happen to African diplomats</a>. On seeds, on minerals, on debt, on the right of Africa to decide for Africa, the charter says things I have spent my life saying.</p><p>And then it reaches for my womb, and the same word “sovereignty” turns into a leash.</p><p>Article 4 instructs governments to “identify and repeal” any legal instrument that, by its own narrow definition, “undermines the family,” and then names what must go: abortion rights, the legalization of prostitution, the “autonomous sexual rights of minors,” anything it files under “gender ideology,” the “LGBT agenda.” Article 7, while championing the preservation of African health and traditional healing knowledge, reaffirms there is “no international right to abortion” and tells states to reject every reference to sexual and reproductive health in every agreement they touch. Read plainly, that is an instruction to <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-draft-african-charter-on-family-values-is-on-the-cards-why-its-flawed-and-dangerous-282423">gut the Maputo Protocol</a>, the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/protocol-african-charter-human-peoples-rights-rights-women-africa-en.pdf">African Union’s own instrument</a>, which lets a woman end a pregnancy that came from rape or incest, or one that will kill her mentally, financially, or physically. The charter defines marriage as a man and a woman in every legal document, gender as male or female and nothing else. This is not the protection of the African family. It is the government of African bodies.</p><p>So here is my problem, and I am not going to pretend it away: I want seed sovereignty, data sovereignty, and the Maputo Protocol. The charter tells me I cannot have all three. I do not accept the premise.</p><p>It is worth saying who is holding the staple. A document that accuses sexual and reproductive rights of being a “stealth recolonization” was drafted alongside <a href="https://healthpolicy-watch.news/womens-groups-sound-alarm-as-prominent-us-conservatives-headline-african-family-conferences/">Family Watch International</a>, an Arizona outfit the Southern Poverty Law Center designates a hate group, whose president trains African legislators to lobby at the UN. It was championed from a State House by a president who has built his late career on the <a href="https://democracyinafrica.org/the-american-religious-right-and-the-anti-lgbtq-movement-in-uganda-family-watch-international-sharon-slater-and-the-entebbe-conference/">export of anti-gay law</a>. And in its own final article, the charter lists its inspiration: the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva_Consensus_Declaration">Geneva Consensus Declaration</a>, the Pompeo/Trump-era American project whose “no international right to abortion” line it copies almost word for word. This is a declaration that Cameroon, my country, along with Uganda, Senegal, Benin, and others, all signed. The thing telling me my health is a colony is itself the import. <em>L’ironie du sort</em>, as francophones would say.</p><p><a href="https://www.lawyard.org/lawyard-spotlight/20-nations-asides-south-africa-and-mozambique-endorse-african-charter-on-family-sovereignty-and-values/">20 governments adopted the charter in Accra</a>; South Africa refused, saying the text could not be reconciled with its Bill of Rights or with the equal marriage rights it grants its citizens, and it was not the only state to abstain. The full list of who endorsed has not been published. The man who hosted and keynoted the conference, who chairs the Conference of Speakers and Presidents of African Legislatures (COSPAL), the continental body now asked to adopt the charter, is the same Speaker who sent Ghana’s own anti-rights bill back for a tidier revote. When a text that claims to speak for the aspirations of African peoples cannot open its own guest list, you have learned something about whose will it is.</p><p>I don’t have the solution, and that much honesty is owed. But I know what I will not do, which is let women and queer Africans become the tax we pay for the continent’s dignity. Banning gain-of-function research and toxic pesticides has never required policing a queer African’s body. Owning our minerals has never required a woman to die of a pregnancy we had the law to end. These things should not be in tension. Someone needed them to be, so that I would trade one to win the other.</p></div></content><published>2026-08-06T17:56:55.777739Z</published><summary type="text">A charter twenty African governments just endorsed defends seed sovereignty and economic independence in one breath, and moves to gut abortion and queer rights in the next. </summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/08/the-prosecutions-that-never-happen</id><title type="text">The prosecutions that never happen</title><updated>2026-08-05T10:08:48.92444Z</updated><author><name>Obongodu Paul Unanam</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>There is a specific kind of Nigerian newspaper headline I have been reading my whole life. It announces that a former governor, or a minister, or a director-general has been arraigned by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). There are charges. There are counts. The accused person arrives in court in a well-cut agbada, surrounded by lawyers whose fees alone constitute a moderate corruption offence, and they plead not guilty, and the judge grants bail, and the case is adjourned. Then it is adjourned again. Then the administration that appointed the EFCC chairman that filed the charges loses an election, and the new administration appoints a new chairman, and the case against the former governor slows to a pace that makes geological time look urgent.</p><p>I am a law graduate. I graduated from the University of Uyo last year. My dissertation was about why this keeps happening, and whether the legal architecture of Nigerian anticorruption enforcement is designed to produce accountability or to produce the performance of accountability. I concluded, after two years of reading statutes and case files and civil society audits, that it is mostly the latter.</p><p>The argument is not complicated. Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission was established in 2002 and has operated since then under a chairman appointed by whichever president is in power. That president’s attorney general, a cabinet minister removable by the same president, can take over or discontinue any EFCC prosecution at any stage before judgment, without providing a reason. Five EFCC chairmen have been removed or resigned under circumstances suggesting executive pressure since 2003. The current chairman was appointed by President Bola Tinubu. His predecessor was appointed by President Muhammadu Buhari. The one before that by President Goodluck Jonathan. Each administration has, with minor variation, used the agency to prosecute predecessors and protect allies.</p><p>The EFCC announces that it secured over 3,000 convictions between May 2023 and May 2024, a figure confirmed in <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2025">Freedom House’s 2025 Nigeria country report</a>. This number has been cited internationally, in Freedom House reports and donor assessments, as evidence that Nigeria’s anticorruption effort is producing results. What those 3,000 convictions actually consist of: plea bargains, minor internet fraud cases, and first-instance verdicts that are overturned on appeal. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/08/25/corruption-trial/record-nigerias-economic-and-financial-crimes-commission">Human Rights Watch found</a> that since the EFCC’s founding, the agency has secured only four convictions against nationally prominent political figures, out of more than 30 arraigned.</p><p>Four. Across two decades. In a country where the National Bureau of Statistics has estimated that corruption costs the economy over $18 billion annually.</p><p>I want to be honest about what it feels like to grow up inside this. You learn to read the prosecution announcements as political communication rather than law enforcement. When the EFCC arraigns a prominent All Progressives Congress (APC) figure, you note that the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) is probably gaining influence somewhere. When PDP members suddenly accumulate charges, you check the news for who won what election. The Afrobarometer survey from 2023 found that 76 percent of Nigerians believe the EFCC prosecutes based on political instructions rather than evidence. That is not cynicism. That is pattern recognition.</p><p>The formal legal problem is straightforward. The EFCC has no constitutional status. It exists by ordinary statute, which means the National Assembly that created it can amend or repeal it, and the executive whose chairman runs it can shape its priorities through appointment. The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission is constitutionally grounded and requires a two-thirds Senate majority to remove its chairman. The EFCC’s wider mandate, larger budget, and higher public visibility make it the more powerful of the two agencies in practice. But that same power sits on weaker institutional ground, since the president alone controls who runs it and how long they stay. Power without independence is what makes an agency useful as a political instrument, and on that measure the EFCC is the more exposed of the two. Nigeria has, in other words, invested heavily in the institution that is easier to capture and less heavily in the institution that is harder to capture.</p><p>There is a reform bill in the House of Representatives that would require the president to nominate the EFCC chairman from a shortlist presented by an independent selection committee. It has been read twice and referred to committee. It will, in all probability, die there. The people who benefit from a capturable EFCC are often the same people sitting on the committees meant to reform it. Several members currently serving on anticorruption oversight committees have themselves been named in EFCC petitions or investigations that never proceeded to trial. A body cannot be expected to legislate away the leverage that protects its own members.</p><p>What I keep thinking about, sitting with this, is not the politicians. They are behaving rationally given the incentives. What I think about is the intern at a ministry somewhere who knows where a contract was inflated, who knows which official received the transfer, and who is deciding right now whether to report it. And the thing that should make that decision clear, a legal system that actually prosecutes the corrupt regardless of their political connections, is not available to them. The EFCC’s convictions count includes their cousin’s boyfriend who got arrested for Yahoo-Yahoo. It does not include the person who stole from the hospital where their mother couldn’t get treatment.</p><p>The substantive law against corruption is not the problem. Nigeria has had clear statutory prohibitions on financial crimes since 2002. What is the problem is the law that built the EFCC, which handed appointment and removal power over the agency’s leadership to the same office the agency is meant to hold accountable. That is not a flaw in implementation. That is a design choice written into the statute itself, and it guarantees that enforcement bends toward whoever currently controls the presidency.</p><p>The prosecution that matters never comes. The case that should terrify the corrupt official managing a stolen contract, that case gets adjourned, or quietly discontinued, or never filed. The 3,000 convictions get announced. And somewhere in Abuja, a very well-dressed man in a very good agbada files a motion for an extension of time, and the lawyers bill their hours, and the judge adjourns to a date not yet fixed, and the money stays where it went.</p></div></content><published>2026-08-05T10:08:48.92444Z</published><summary type="text">Nigeria’s anti-corruption agency secures thousands of convictions every year, but when it comes to politically-connected elites, it’s a different story.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/08/the-price-of-potential</id><title type="text">The price of potential</title><updated>2026-08-04T14:18:20.641203Z</updated><author><name>Lucas Souza </name></author><author><name>Matthew Kirwin</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>At first glance, the cramped quarters of Mafalala, the largest informal settlement in Mozambique’s capital, Maputo, seem to leave barely enough room to play a pass, let alone carve out a football pitch. However, as you weave through the labyrinth of <em>madeira-e-zinco</em> (wood and tin) houses <a href="https://tab.uol.com.br/edicao/mafalala/">built</a> by workers segregated to the city’s outskirts during the colonial era, you eventually emerge onto a field overseen by a mural of the great Eusébio, the “Phenomenon of Mafalala.” For players like Eusébio to make it to the world’s greatest stage, like in his case, a World Cup final with Portugal in 1966 (Mozambique was a colony of Portugal at the time) or back-to-back European Cups with Benfica in 1961 and 1962, the journey is never a one-man effort.</p><p>In <a href="https://www.bard.edu/faculty/joseph-oneill">Joseph O’Neill</a>’s <cite><a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/741344/godwin-by-joseph-oneill/">Godwin</a></cite>, readers are thrown into the shady business of youth African football recruitment. The novel recounts the same types of dealings that propelled players like Eusébio to the game’s pinnacle. The protagonist, Mark Wolfe, a frustrated Pittsburgh-based technical writer, is enmeshed in a resolute mission by his half-brother, Geoff, a desperate British soccer agent, to locate a young West African football prodigy, whom he believes could be the next Lionel Messi.</p><p>The narrative follows Mark’s high-stakes quest — which eventually involves a ruthless French talent scout named Lefebvre — and delivers a sharp, darkly comedic critique of modern capitalism and the exploitative, neo-colonial nature of global sports recruitment.</p><p>O’Neill deftly illustrates how deeply interwoven football is with the continent’s history and beyond. In a book talk at George Washington University (GWU) that we organized alongside Young Black Professionals in International Affairs (YBPIA), O’Neill dove deeper into the book’s themes. <cite>Godwin</cite> foregrounds the often-overlooked genesis of African players forging European legacies, the transatlantic nature and exploitative structures of football recruitment in Africa, and the sport’s remarkable capacity to tell human stories worldwide.</p><p>For decades, colonial connections, migration, and European recruitment networks have carried African talent across continents. At the 2026 World Cup, 73 players of African birth or descent <a href="https://www.mozzartsport.co.ke/football/news/wc-countdown-how-many-africans-are-in-other-teams/65997">featured</a> for 12 non-African national teams, yet only around six confirmed African-born players represented European national teams. They are: Marc Guéhi (born in Côte d’Ivoire and representing England, Brice Samba (Republic of Congo and France), Amadou Onana (Senegal and Belgium) Guus Til Samfya (Zambia and The Netherlands), Breel Embolo and Yvon Mvogo (Cameroon and Switzerland).</p><p>The contrast shows how African mobility is reshaping modern football not only by migration from Africa but by generations born and raised in Europe whose identities continue to bridge both continents.</p><p>It is within this complex ecosystem of aspiration and exploitation that Geoff operates. He is feckless and his sole objective is to sniff out undiscovered football talent with the help of Lefebvre, an experienced, semi-retired French scout.</p><p>For the French soccer agent Lefebvre, players like Eusébio were the earliest examples of the “Drogba Phenomenon,” in which African or Afro-descendant footballing youngsters, especially those with an immigrant profile like Marcel Desailly, born in Ghana, or Patrick Vieira, born in Senegal, became highly <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/241716476_The_African_footballer_as_visual_object_and_figure_of_success_Didier_Drogba_and_social_meaning">desirable</a> in the global football market for their strength, skill, and technical adaptability shaped by exposure to different footballing environments.</p><p>Even today, many of the stars in the 2026 World Cup display the same characteristics: Sadio Mané’s rise from the renowned Senegalese academy <cite>Génération Foot</cite> or Amad Diallo’s Italian-Ivorian climb to Manchester United. Notably, some top players are just one generation removed from the continent — for example, Lamine Yamal’s roots in Equatorial Guinea and Morocco or Kylian Mbappé’s in Cameroon and Algeria.</p><p>Throughout <cite>Godwin</cite>, O’Neill navigates the transatlantic nature of youth football recruitment in Africa, inviting readers to trace their own historical connections to the relentless pursuit of new African talent.</p><p><cite>Godwin</cite> also hints at a form of “footballing brain drain” in which some of Africa’s finest talents only achieve full recognition after entering European systems, akin to a primary resource reaching full potential only after undergoing refinement abroad.</p><p>At the event at GWU this past May, O’Neill underscored to students the “distinctly neocolonial dimension to this business of finding raw African talent.” As an example, he noted that metaphors used to describe African footballers – from Eusébio being dubbed A Pérola Negra (“The Black Pearl”) to agents “striking gold in Africa”– evoke a longer history of extraction on the continent that continues to be reflected in the structure of the modern football industry.</p><p>For O’Neill, the universality of football made it the most accessible medium to unravel this chaotic interplay. Speaking to students at George Washington University in Washington, DC, O’Neill admitted, “I learned English, psychology, history, geography, business, all on the football field.” <cite>Godwin</cite>’s characters also share the same curriculum generated on the pitch, yet the narrative suggests that, despite this shared classroom, its lessons can be interpreted and embodied in starkly different ways.</p><p>Lefebvre, the agent, repeatedly waffles on about his short-lived career and the recruitment dynamics behind some of African football’s greats. However, as the search for Godwin intensifies, O’Neill recounts the evocation of Treasure Island–like colonial literature, particularly through Lefebvre’s often disoriented and outsider view of certain African societies. Some of Lefebvre’s most passionate spiels on African youth football are tarnished by his retrograde notions about race, gender, geography, and culture. In one instance, Lefebvre justifies his caution while searching for Godwin’s team due to a fear of being misled by what he describes as the “African concept of truth,” where people say what is most profitable rather than following the European expectations of a promise or contract.</p><p>Lefebvre’s French identity is important as it places him as a holdover agent of the colonial era, responsible for moving resources from the périphérie to the metropole–in this case tracking down the elusive Godwin to deliver him to the European market. Lefebvre shepherds Wolfe through the hinterlands of West Africa in a Land Cruiser on a self-described “expedition” for Godwin. Lefebvre’s reductive tropes, often made through the backward lens of corruption and exploitation, such as in his description of an “African concept of truth,” echo a “colonial gaze” that still lingers over the modern-day sports industry in many African countries, where profit-driven recruiters pursue talent by any means necessary, creating a dangerous and illusory pathway for up-and-comers.</p><p>The parallels in <cite>Godwin</cite> to actual events are explicit.</p><p>Take the story of Cheikh Touré, an 18-year-old Senegalese goalkeeper <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/ghanaian-police-probe-suspicious-death-of-senegalese-footballer-f65bf5c1">lured</a> to Ghana with the promise of a professional football trial to get to a European club. It turned out to be a fraudulent scheme. After his family was unable to pay the ransom to release him, Touré was tragically killed by the traffickers in October 2025 in Kumasi.</p><p>In 2024, several reports <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-lures-recruits-from-africa-to-feed-its-ukraine-war-machine-779e7433">recount</a> the stories of <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/nyeri/-work-or-die-chilling-final-words-of-kenyan-before-dying-on-a-russian-battlefield-5351308">Kenyan</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/football-brought-nigerians-to-moscow-now-theyre-stranded/a-44578779">Nigerian</a>, and <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20250117-african-troops-forced-to-ukraine-frontlines-while-russians-stay-in-camp">Ghanaian</a> footballers flown to Russia under false pretenses, to be subsequently deployed to the front lines in Ukraine.</p><p>Against this backdrop, the stories shared throughout <cite>Godwin</cite> – from Eusébio’s rise to European football glory to the Drogba Phenomenon – reveal the longer history O’Neill asks readers to confront: the enduring global pursuit of African talent with all its promise and peril. As already discovered African stars captivate World Cup audiences, attention will inevitably shift to where the next, yet unidentified, “Godwin-like” phenom will be found.</p></div></content><published>2026-08-04T14:03:31.568Z</published><summary type="text">Joseph O’Neill’s new novel follows a Pittsburgh writer chasing a West African wonderkid. It’s also a story about who profits every time the world goes looking for the next Eusébio.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/08/sovereign-rot</id><title type="text">Sovereign rot</title><updated>2026-08-03T07:32:04.997056Z</updated><author><name>Ninu Sonuga</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>In the heart of Ikoyi, Lagos, a fifteen-story concrete ghost haunts the skyline. The Old Federal Secretariat was once a nerve center of Nigerian power, functioning as the heart of Nigeria’s civil service. Since the federal capital was moved to Abuja in 1991, this complex has been left to rot. In a city defined by fervent construction and the relentless pursuit of newness, its stillness, frozen in time, is a provocation.</p><figure><img alt="Illustration of the abandoned Ikoyi Federal Secretariat in Lagos, a modernist high-rise complex rising above a dense foreground of bright green tree canopies." height="2440" loading="lazy" src="https://media.africasacountry.com/images/2026/8/029650173857.jpg" width="3413"/><figcaption>The abandoned Ikoyi Federal Secretariat.</figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria’s independence in 1960 arrived with serious ambition. Gifted by the British to mark the young nation’s sovereignty, the 25-story Independence Building served as the Republic’s first federal secretariat, anchoring the administrative machinery of the new state. As the civil service swelled during the oil boom years, the government erected the Ikoyi Secretariat in 1976. This new structure was designed to monumentalize the nation’s soaring aspirations — an architectural declaration that a young republic had outgrown its colonial infancy and entered a new era of industrial sophistication.</p><p>The Independence Building was eventually appropriated by the military and renamed Defence House. Today, it stands as a shadow of its former glory. Following a devastating fire in 1993, the military command abandoned the charred remains, relocating to the new capital of Abuja. Left behind in Lagos, the old tower’s narrow apertures now watch over the public square below like hollow eyes, stripped of its utility and its national significance.</p><p>Down the road, this architecture of abandonment reaches its literal peak at NECOM House. Built as the tallest skyscraper in the country, this telecommunications tower was conceived to be the crown jewel of the Lagos financial district; today, it suffers the same slow rot that plagues the civic landscape. This pattern of neglect repeats across the city center. Lagos is now a museum of deferred promises, littered with monumental structures left underused, suspended in time, or surrendered to decay.</p><p>The vacuum left by the government’s silent withdrawal from these sites has inevitably invited squatting and illicit activity. When the state refuses to occupy and maintain its landmarks while failing to provide housing, resources, and safety, it creates the conditions it then criminalizes. What appears as squalor is state neglect made visible. These buildings become shelter for those the state has rendered invisible. In a twist of irony, these administrative monuments have been involuntarily democratized.</p><p>While state-owned monoliths sit idle for decades, the government exhibits a violent agility elsewhere, bulldozing lives and properties in informal settlements with little to no prior notice.</p><p>Makoko, a historic community of roughly 100,000 residents, is one of Lagos’s most storied waterfront settlements. Established on the lagoon by the Egun fishing people, it has evolved over generations into a complex urban ecosystem built entirely on stilts. In December 2025, armed demolition teams backed by state authorities entered this settlement under the pretext of enforcing a safety corridor beneath a high-tension power line. Demolitions started two days before Christmas.</p><p>Over 3,000 homes, schools, and clinics were bulldozed and burned, displacing about 10,000 people. Protesters and civil society organizations have alleged that the demolitions <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/nigeria-un-experts-condemn-continued-demolitions-informal-settlements-lagos">resulted in deaths, including infants and elderly residents</a>.</p><figure><img alt="Minimalist illustration of a lone figure standing in a small boat, using a long pole to propel it across still water against an otherwise empty white background." height="900" loading="lazy" src="https://media.africasacountry.com/images/2026/8/267613999307-medium.jpg" width="838"/><figcaption>Thousands were displaced just days before Christmas.</figcaption></figure><p>The official justification followed a familiar script: environmental concerns, urban renewal, the language of progress. But beneath the bureaucratic vocabulary, what it produced was displacement, lives dissolved into the water. In this context, the long-term abandonment of these spaces reads as an intentional pattern of uneven urgency. The government grants itself unlimited leniency regarding its own monumental dereliction, while displaying a ruthless impatience for the expedient improvisations of the people it has abandoned.</p><p>Deracination has shaped Lagos’s socio-economic fabric for generations, and the map of the city can serve as a historical record of state-led displacement. Take Obalende, whose name translates to “the [British] king chased us here” — an etymology the historian K. Dike traced, in a 1997 <cite>Guardian</cite> essay, to the colonial army’s expansion into the area. Today, it is a bustling hub bordering Lagos Island, but its origins trace back to the colonial era, when the British crown displaced the local population in favor of expanding an army base. This is a foundational precedent of spatial injustice that outlived the empire. Instead of dismantling this colonial architecture of exclusion, the modern Nigerian state has embraced and optimized it, expressing its sovereign authority through the violence of forcible land clearance rather than the duty of housing its most vulnerable communities.</p><p>The message to the average Lagosian is clear: Space is scarce when it belongs to the poor, expendable when it belongs to the state, and available to those with enough clout to bend the city to their will. When there is corporate capital to secure or elite enclaves to engineer, the state magically rediscovers its capacity for urban planning. Ultimately, the rotting high-rises of the Marina and the demolished stilt-houses of Makoko are symptoms of the same institutional disease. They represent a state that has fundamentally abdicated its social contract, leaving behind a city that is simultaneously starved for public life and choked by avarice.</p><p>For those tasked with shaping the built environment, this landscape of sovereign rot poses a sharp ethical challenge. We are trained to obsess over the new, chasing the next “smart city.” But what does it mean to design for the future in a city where the most basic act of care — maintenance — has been undervalued by those meant to uphold it the most?</p><p>To answer this is to confront a notoriously wicked problem, an entangled crisis in which the professional domains of the architect, the policymaker, and the developer are all implicated. In <cite>Braiding Sweetgrass</cite>, Robin Wall Kimmerer notes a sobering truth: “As the land becomes impoverished, so too does the scope of [our] vision.” Lagos, and indeed much of Nigeria, suffers acutely from this exact starvation of perspective. On paper, the mechanics of urban revitalization are not rocket science. However, the unchecked greed permitted to fester across the country has corroded the foundations of every civic institution and shriveled the imagination of our city-makers.</p><p>When presented with decades of water-adapted vernacular literacy in Makoko, or the complex maritime history of Tarkwa Bay, the developer’s only legible response is demolition — flattening centuries of ecological resilience to install a yacht club or a generic “luxury” tower. This impoverished vision can only copy; it cannot synthesize. It views indigenous knowledge as a blight to be cleared and abandoned structures as dead weight, all while funding exclusive archipelagos reclaimed from the sea. Eko Atlantic stands as the ultimate expression of this hubris: a private enclave engineered for the few, rising from the ocean while the waterfront communities of the many are erased to make room for the supply chain of exclusivity.</p><p>By chasing the illusion of the “blank slate,” the architect becomes the aesthetic enforcement arm of this system, providing the glossy renders that legitimize spatial violence long before the bulldozers arrive. The policymaker completes the triangle. It is the state that issues the demolition orders, absorbs the legal challenges, and quietly steps aside for the developer. <a href="https://peoplesdispatch.org/2026/02/09/lagos-waterfront-community-targeted-by-demolition-drive-to-make-way-for-real-estate-investors/">The FBT Coral Estate agreement</a>, in which the Lagos State Government negotiated a 25 percent stake in the “luxury” development designed to replace Makoko, exemplifies this arrangement explicitly. Everything is transactional.</p><p>By trading the social contract for a real estate ledger, the state has rendered its own history meaningless and its people invisible. Lagos continues to rise, but it rises against itself.</p><p>The abandoned Secretariat and the state-sanctioned displacement are evidence of a system functioning exactly as those who benefit from it intend. “Smart city” rhetoric and urban renewal frameworks create the assumption of a state that has lost its way, merely requiring the right policy intervention to find its footing again. But a government that can mobilize armed demolition teams against impoverished communities two days before Christmas, while its own civic infrastructure crumbles unremarked across the city, has not lost its way. It has chosen one.</p></div></content><published>2026-08-03T07:30:37.786Z</published><summary type="text">From Eko Atlantic to the Niger Delta, elite enclaves have become the defining spatial expression of Nigeria’s political order.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/07/had-he-been-buried</id><title type="text">Had he been buried</title><updated>2026-07-30T17:13:39.797626Z</updated><author><name>Njuki Githethwa</name></author><category label="Ancestors" term="Ancestors"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>They came seeking solitude in a private family graveyard in our common neighborhood in Riruta, a suburb of Nairobi City, around mid-morning towards the end of September 2018. I was already there. My weakening eyesight could make out only images of two adults.</p><p>This is private land. <em>They could be the owners of the land</em>, I thought to myself.</p><p>I waved at them rapidly. They both waved back. I walked towards them.</p><p>“Oooh! So it’s you!” I exclaimed. These were not the owners of the land and the graveyard after all. It was Binyavanga Wainaina and his helper.</p><p>“You two know each other?” his helper asked.</p><p>“Of course!” I replied.</p><p>Binyavanga had changed a great deal since I had last seen him. The multiple strokes had severely incapacitated him. His speech came out in an agonizing slur. I tried to ease his discomfort by speaking more, compensating for his forced silence.</p><p>“Such vast private lands are uncommon in this city,” I observed. “In fact, they are abominable and unjustifiable in a metropolis like Nairobi bursting with deprived humanity.”</p><p>He nodded repeatedly in agreement.</p><p>There was a huge fig tree on the land. In African spirituality, the fig tree is sacred. Among the Agikuyu people, it is known as <cite>Mugumo</cite>. Our people once worshipped and offered sacrifices beneath <cite>Mugumo</cite> trees. We walked closer to it. Its enormous trunk was hollow, forming something like a passageway through the middle. I walked in and out of the trunk the way we used to do in our childhood among the giant podo trees along River Nanyuki. This particular <cite>Mugumo</cite> was immense, tall, wide, and commanding. Its huge branches spread outward like a canopy over a vast area.</p><p>“A <cite>Mugumo</cite> is never pruned,” one of the owners of that land had once told me casually. “Cutting it is sacrilegious and cursed.”</p><p>Such a sacred tree was best left alone, I thought to myself. It was an abode of ancestral spirits. But wait — as children, we had been warned never to walk seven times around a <cite>Mugumo</cite>. Boys, we were told, would turn into girls, and girls into boys. We did. Nothing happened. It was a myth, an old tale that could not contain the free and wandering spirits of our childhood. I had walked several times around this particular <cite>Mugumo</cite> in the neighborhood and I remained who I was. I felt only solace and solitude as I escaped into my inner self.</p><p>We held animated conversations beside the <cite>Mugumo</cite> for a long while, hardly noticing the passage of time. We spoke about literature, religion, politics, creative writing, African liberation, Mau Mau, Mwakenya, <cite>Kwani</cite>?, dreams, life, survival of artists, hope, and much more. Mwakenya was the underground socialist movement of the 1980s in Kenya whose members and supporters were brutally suppressed by the Moi–KANU dictatorship. <cite>Kwani</cite>? is the literary magazine Binyavanga co-founded in 2003 with his Caine Prize winnings, which became the crucible of a new generation of Kenyan and African writing.</p><p>Binyavanga barely spoke, his words still slurred, yet he nodded excitedly and often in agreement. His helper listened attentively. Meanwhile, I spoke endlessly, releasing words like a newly activated word processor.</p><p>*</p><p>I first met Binyavanga Wainaina in 2002 at a shopping mall in Nairobi during the Nairobi International Book Fair. He had just won the Caine Prize for African Writing. Literary excitement was palpable among the country’s literati. Fresh literary flowers had sprouted, blossoming with beauty and releasing a sweet fragrance, new expressions, new voices; a generation emerging from relative obscurity, as Frantz Fanon had prophesied, either to fulfill its mission or betray it.</p><p>Binyavanga was one of the key speakers at the opening ceremony of the book fair. He spoke eloquently about new and vibrant literary horizons and renewed hope in the country. Names such as Nameless, Kalamashaka, Ukoo Flani Mau Mau, some of the hip hop artists then dominating the musical airwaves, rolled effortlessly from his tongue like a staccato burst from a machine gun. In many ways, he himself was a literary machine gun.</p><p>“Why are we still trapped in old narratives about the past glory of African literature as if nothing new is happening?” he asked.</p><p><cite>Why Are We So Blest</cite>? I recalled in the same breath the title of the novel by Ayi Kwei Armah.</p><p>Loud applause followed his speech, just as it was echoing across other literary and artistic spaces and sites in the country: Kenya National Theatre, Club Soundd, the GoDown Arts Centre, Sarakasi Dome, Kuona Trust, Kwani LitFest, a lot more.</p><p>We met again in 2004 at Jeevanjee Gardens in Nairobi during the Kenya Social Forum. He lingered at the back of the largely activist crowd. I thought he cut a somewhat forlorn figure.</p><p>“Another Kenya Is Possible” was the theme of the forum, attuned to the global call of the World Social Forum: “Another World Is Possible.” The local and global processes of the World Social Forum sought to locate and connect people’s struggles for a just world. Politics, we argued, must secure livelihoods. We spoke of climate justice, not merely the language of climate change. We spoke about struggles for food sovereignty, not simply food security. The earth was being decimated by capitalist greed. Soulless corporations, placing profits before people’s welfare, were driving the world towards the brink of extinction. Our world was dying. Progressive forces everywhere needed urgently to coalesce.</p><p>Binyavanga at some point later on wrote a post on how hard he had tried to be socialist “as a person of good conscience.” He observed that to many people, “progressive” meant being a socialist. He wanted to be “progressive,” but also believed that the fall of the left globally was real and that the left was fatally flawed. He believed we are in the era of the perfection of capitalism and that capitalism was the best way out for what he considered to be Africa’s century.</p><p>I differed with him on his faith in capitalism. I believe capitalism is a mortal disaster for humankind, and that socialism remains the alternative.</p><p>But we agreed on the centrality of literature. Literature does not merely fuel struggle; it is itself a vehicle of people’s struggles for freedoms and liberation. That was why we were at the event of the Kenya Social Forum — to locate literature within progressive awakenings, away from the cacophony of tribal politics in the country and the wastelands of art for art’s sake.</p><p>We exchanged contacts.</p><p>“I will send you the manuscript of my novel,” I promised.</p><p>“<cite>Sawa</cite>!” he said excitedly.</p><p>He left shortly afterwards. I remained. The Kenya Social Forum would continue for three more days, and I would stay throughout to help coordinate the event. I was happy to witness sites and spaces of people’s struggles for emancipation taking shape and getting grounded. The arts are the high priests of people’s struggles. Literature is their bishop.</p><p>I truly wanted to share with Binyavanga the manuscript of my novel. I never did. My life, like his, was then like a flickering candle in the wind.</p><p>We walked to the private family graveyard near the <cite>Mugumo</cite> tree. Graves of several members of the family that owned the land were located there. Binyavanga stood transfixed before one grave in particular. It belonged to a senior colonial chief who had once ruled this area on behalf of the colonial regime. The tragedy of the chief’s betrayal and treachery had finally come to this: a grave covered by mounds of soil and concrete.</p><p>I tried to read his gaze in my mind. The chief’s true legacy, I thought, was one of servitude to colonial masters and betrayal of his own people. I nodded inwardly. Traitors who sold their souls in pursuit of hollow glory, passing comforts, and obscene wealth. The tragedy of colonial betrayal still haunts this country and many other neocolonial states. But death remains the great equalizer for us all.</p><p>Binyavanga kept his eyes fixed on the graves for a long while. I wondered whether his mind was wandering as deeply as mine. Our gazes seemed both psychic and spiritual. My thoughts admonished me: So this is what most lives are finally reduced to — skeletons beneath the pride of flesh, memorial plaques bearing dates of birth and death, reminders of the vanity of human existence.</p><p>“Vanity of vanities; all is vanity,” says the Preacher in the Bible. “It is like chasing after the wind.”</p><p>For most of us, the graveyard is the final destination. Death humbles life. Death should compel us to reflect continually on the meaning and purpose of our existence. In the end, the memory of our lives either fades like passing clouds or endures like seeds that nourish future generations. Such is karma.</p><p>The mortal remains of the colonial chief lay in that graveyard discarded and reviled by many. His memory and that of his kind in the betrayal and treachery to the people only helps to fuel people’s struggles for a just society. The generational wealth and privilege inherited from colonial treachery may have survived him, but they too shall one day pass away.</p><p>Soon.</p><p>I later invited him and his helper to our apartment nearby. He touched the books on the bookshelf as though they were living spirits. In a real sense, books are the abodes of their writers, spirits in themselves, words made flesh and memory. I pulled from the bookshelf several of his works, one after another: <cite>Discovering Home</cite>; <cite>How to Write About Africa</cite>; <cite>One Day I Will Write About This Place</cite>; <cite>Beyond River Yei</cite>.</p><p>His face lit up instantly. His eyes moved, mesmerized, from the books to the bookshelf and back again. I could see his joy, his calmness, his deep sense of comfort. His eyes seemed to say aloud: There lies my literary legacy.</p><p>We later walked to his apartment along the main road. We lived in a working-class suburb. Nearby was a sprawling slum.</p><p>“I like it here more than anywhere else I have lived,” he told me as we entered his apartment.</p><p>The living room was furnished with antique pieces that gave the space both a traditional and modern feel. His MacBook laptop appeared to be the most modern treasure in the room. He strained his eyes while reading and typing; his eyesight was weakening. So was mine. I can no longer see distant objects clearly without glasses. I was not sure whether he owned a pair of reading glasses.</p><p>He showed me his bedroom. It was a tidy mess. Books lay everywhere, exciting titles, mostly fiction and creative nonfiction. Some had been gifts from friends.</p><p>“Pick any you may want,” he told me.</p><p>I was tempted to take <cite>A Brief History of Seven Killings</cite> by Marlon James. But I did not. I thought I would pick it later. I did not even pick it up when we returned afterwards. Some books carry spirits better left to haunt their authors and owners.</p><p>We then headed for a rendezvous at Dagoretti Corner. We partook of lots of <em>nyama choma</em> and <em>mutura</em>, washed down with drinks and laughter wrapped in silence. Nyama choma is grilled meat, and mutura is a Kenyan sausage; both are staples of Nairobi’s social eating. We spoke nothing there of our pet talks on literature, African liberation, African spirituality, and such heavy topics, choosing instead to relish our food and drinks in measured quietness. Outside, along the main road beyond the restaurant, weary laboring masses trudged home from the daily drudgery of sustaining this unequal country and materialist society.</p><p>As evening reached its climax and darkness descended, we moved to Dagoz Artists Bar close by for a night of live music. The space was tiny and intimate. The artists performing on the main stage were as much part of the revelry as the audience itself. Anyone with a voice could burst into song, however coarse or unpolished. The main stage was within reach of everyone inside, part of the collective repertoire. Our table, like the others nearby, seemed almost an extension of the stage itself.</p><p>We bellowed out the words of our favorite songs alongside the performers, shouting ourselves hoarse in the attempt. The din of drunken voices and clashing sounds was an exercise in glorious discordance. Loud talk and shouting seemed the only acceptable means of communication there; quiet conversations were out of place. The cacophony of voices and sounds beat like a riot of sound, yet somehow it grounded our solitude and tethered our restless artistic spirits to a sense of order.</p><p>The music went on even after the session artists had left the stage. We could still hear it from outside as we departed singing along. We drove back with the rhythms and voices still drumming through our minds, soothing us into the calm of the night and into deep sleep.</p><p>*</p><p>Binyavanga returned another day to the private family graveyard, this time alone. From a distance, I saw him standing transfixed, staring at the grave of the colonial chief. I thought perhaps his spirituality was reawakening in ways he himself could no longer clearly express in his condition. He had once written about his spiritual <cite>Sangoma</cite> in South Africa who had advised him to return home and honor his rich ancestral lineage.</p><p>He called it African spirituality. I understood it, too, as a return to the roots of African civilization — back to narratives of African victories, not merely of conquest and defeat; back to multiple African narratives. Narratives of order, dignity, and peace before slavery and colonialism. Narratives that ask difficult questions: Why were we enslaved? Why were we colonized? Why do we continue allowing ourselves to be recolonized?</p><p>No wonder the <cite>Mugumo</cite> tree occupies such sacred importance in the spirituality of the Agikuyu people. It defies both time and territory. It is said that the <cite>Mugumo</cite> under which Dedan Kimathi worshipped in the forest while leading the Mau Mau war for independence in Kenya fell soon after his capture by colonial forces. Dedan Kimathi was the field marshal of the Kenya Land and Freedom Army popularly known as Mau Mau. He was captured in 1956 and executed by the British colonial regime in 1957. Indigenous trees are living connections to our spirituality, to our ways of being, to memory and identity.</p><p>Wangari Maathai came to mind, embracing a huge tree in her struggle for ecological justice. The graveyard, too, spoke of return, going back to the soil, forever nourishing Mother Earth.</p><p>“For dust you are, and to dust you shall return,” the priest at the Catholic church across the main road often intoned from the Bible at the beginning of the Lenten season.</p><p>African spirituality converges with the sanctity of the soil, replenishing our lives. Our existence moving endlessly in cycles of birth and death; birth and death again, the eternal rhythms of earthly life. Why trouble yourself? Why worry? I thought Binyavanga’s <cite>Sangoma</cite> would have rejoiced.</p><p>*</p><p>I walked back with Binyavanga to his apartment, somehow feeling revitalized. He too seemed renewed, especially in the way we both jovially greeted folks in our neighborhood, most of them only casual acquaintances. His generosity and capacity for love were legendary in many ways. The doors of his heart were wide open to anyone capable of being loved. “Could you be loved,” Bob Marley would sing of such spirits. Binyavanga’s helper could attest to this.</p><p>At some point, Binyavanga received funds from his family’s inheritance. I accompanied him to the office of his family’s lawyer in Westlands area in Nairobi to sign documents releasing the inheritance. He had mentioned that the lawyer’s office was near a <cite>Mugumo</cite> tree in Westlands. I had never imagined that such a sacred fig tree still existed within the city. I do not know whether it is still there today.</p><p>Later, I accompanied him and his helper to his bank in the Karen area of Nairobi. I believed he transferred a decent sum of the funds to some of his close friends and a lover. Once Binyavanga’s heart and mind settled on something he wanted, he became stubbornly resistant to caution or advice.</p><p>He seemed to have got a decent amount from the inheritance. He inquired about investments in land to settle among his close friends near Nairobi National Park. He dreamed of building there a beautiful villa attuned to his tastes, blending antique elegance with modern architecture. I was of little help in matters of land investment. I could neither advise him nor claim any experience of my own in such matters.</p><p>I was not able to accompany him and his helper later that evening for dinner and an outing at a top high-end hotel in the city. They bought lots of exquisite items at the hotel that night. In a rush to please his helper, Binyavanga bought him a pair of expensive leather boots late at night. They discovered the following day that the pair of boots were mismatched. He would often give his helper his ATM card to withdraw cash for him. Many times, I was worried that his generosity might someday be taken advantage of, and that the helper might disappear on him. I suspect that this eventually happened, when his helper switched off his phone and vanished from contact altogether. I have neither seen nor heard from him ever since.</p><p>*</p><p>We shared several wishes between us. Binyavanga spoke of his desire to learn the Dholuo language.</p><p>“That might be too late now,” I said.</p><p>“Nooo!” he replied, gesturing emphatically in disagreement with my incredulity. I noticed that his calmness and joy were beginning to fade, and I quickly corrected myself in jest.</p><p>“At least for me. I have almost given up the effort of learning another language. Another of my wishes is learning to play the guitar. Another is to swim without a floater.” He giggled.</p><p>There were many unfulfilled wishes within us. Binyavanga’s age and mine were already nearing the halfway mark toward the sunset of our lives.</p><p><em>But you have achieved more for African literature in such a short time. You have truly lived your life</em>. I did not say these words aloud. I was speaking to myself. He might have mistaken them for flattery. He was often a pace-setter, bubbling with ideas and projects that others eventually fulfilled. I suppose that is how legacy and heritage are secured.</p><p>“<cite>Asante</cite>!” I told him.</p><p>He looked at me intensely, struggling to express himself.</p><p>“Thank you too,” he said, his slurred words carrying a deep inner turmoil.</p><p>I could feel his frustration at being unable to communicate effectively. It was uncharacteristic of the man who in the recent past had dazzled audiences with eloquent speeches. But I am a believer that better and brighter days are still ahead of us. I downloaded an online guidebook by the Stroke Association: <cite>Helping Someone with Communication Problems</cite> — <cite>Together We Can Conquer Stroke</cite>. I promised myself that in the days ahead I would read it carefully and learn how better to communicate with him. I never did. Another of my wishes quietly passed away.</p><p>*</p><p>I was away on work outside the city for about three weeks. Around the same time, Binyavanga had traveled to Rwanda for the burial of an uncle. When we both returned, we somehow failed to reconnect.</p><p>“He has traveled to the coast for a vacation,” his nurse told me.</p><p>He remained vibrant on social media throughout the trip. I followed him mostly on Facebook, where he posted photographs of himself and his companion strolling leisurely along the shores of the Indian Ocean, staying at one of the luxurious hotels on the Kenyan coast. The pictures showed his efforts to remain calm, joyful, and at peace with himself, living life as fully as he could despite his failing health.</p><p>I imagined the other escapades they might have engaged in at the coast. They would don safety gear before hopping onto a speedboat, floaters fastened reassuringly around them. The boat would surge into the deep sea, rising and plunging against the huge waves as they exclaimed in fear, awe, and excitement. Then a dolphin would suddenly leap out of the water in a graceful somersault. Another would follow, then another, until several dolphins were performing what seemed like a perfectly choreographed spectacle. Aware perhaps of the human gaze upon them, the creatures would intensify their display. Dolphins, it is said, are among the cleverest creatures in the sea. One would leap, then another, and another still, their performance lingering until the speedboats disappeared into the horizon.</p><p>They might also have witnessed another spectacle, this time closer to the shore. Snorkeling through the shallow waters, they would see countless small marine creatures crawling and drifting beneath the surface, dazzling in every imaginable color, shape, and pattern. The experience would have been immaculate, a refreshing bliss. We should crown such stories with a cold beer when we meet again, I wished.</p><p>But that wish, too, never came to pass. Shortly afterwards, his health deteriorated and he was hospitalized. I visited him at the hospital a few times. Access to him there remained largely a private family affair, limited to a handful of close friends. We did not see much of each other again.</p><p>I was later away in Johannesburg for a period of further studies.</p><p>“I love Johannesburg,” he had once told me during one of our conversations. “I would like to buy a house there. I love the vibe and spirit of that city, a city for free spirits.”</p><p>I often moved around in Johannesburg, or Joburg, as it is fondly called. I met friends he would have loved to meet. I saw and lived in houses and estates that would have suited his tastes. I wandered through art galleries and bookshops he would have lingered in for hours. I attended jazz sessions and absorbed the loves and contradictions of that vibrant city, perhaps much as he would have done himself. I listened to fiery discussions on African liberation politics, subjects he followed with keen interest. In more ways than I could imagine, Binyavanga accompanied my thoughts throughout my stay there.</p><p>*</p><p>Clues of the sad news first came through a missed call from Isaac, our mutual friend and one of Binyavanga’s closest companions. I called him back, but there was no answer.</p><p>I grew disturbed. Why would Isaac call so unusually early?</p><p>Shortly afterwards, I read the news. Binyavanga had passed away. He had been frail and ailing, but I had hoped he would prevail, as he had triumphed in so many other battles before. The literary world still looked forward to his boisterous spirit, his gregarious presence, and the boundless imagination that helped spark a literary renaissance in our country, across Africa, and within international literary circles. Death does not equalize such souls. His spirit had already triumphed.</p><p>“I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith.” The priest at the Catholic church across the main road in our suburb often recited this line from the Bible for souls such as his.</p><p>*</p><p>From Johannesburg, I followed online the celebration of Binyavanga’s life at the Kenya National Theatre, where family, friends, and hordes of admirers gathered not in grief alone, but in affirmation of the immense spirit he had shared with the world.</p><p>“We must free our imaginations,” he had urged in one of his final videos. “Celebrate my life. Do not mourn me,” he had also declared boldly on Facebook.</p><p>Binyavanga was cremated in a private ceremony. At the time, I did not fully grasp the significance of that final act, but over the years, I have often found myself wondering: Would he have wanted his mortal remains laid to rest in a graveyard? When he would return to the private family graveyard in our shared neighborhood and stand there for long moments, transfixed by the graves before him, was he contemplating the physical form of legacy and remembrance? Would he have preferred a gravesite where his many admirers, friends, and fans would gather to pay their respects? Perhaps. Perhaps not. His family and those closest to him knew better.</p><p>What matters most is that his spirit endures, in memory, in literature, and in the enduring company of remarkable African writers who refuse oblivion. Though his body returned to ashes, his words continue to breathe among us.</p><p>Had he been buried, I might have proposed his epitaph, borrowed from the Italian writer Oriana Fallaci:</p><blockquote><p><em>To write is to die a little less when I die, to leave the children I did not have, to make people think a little more</em>.</p></blockquote><p>*</p><p>I recently returned to our shared neighborhood. The private family graveyard is still there. The remains of the colonial chief still lies beneath his slab of concrete, his name and dates fixed into stone, reviled, unvisited, and largely forgotten, while Binyavanga, who has no grave at all. is visited every day by readers across the world who pull his books from their shelves, as I still pull them from mine. His resting place was never a graveyard. It was always language.</p><p>The <cite>Mugumo</cite> still stands, unpruned and sacred, its hollow trunk opening like a doorway between worlds, the living and the ancestral. Some spirits require no grave to mark where they rest. They live in stories, in words, and in the quiet defiance of memory.</p></div></content><published>2026-07-30T17:13:39.797626Z</published><summary type="text">Binyavanga Wainaina was cremated in a private ceremony in 2019. In his final year, the writer kept returning to a colonial chief’s grave beneath a sacred fig tree in Nairobi — as if contemplating what remains of a life.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/07/is-football-still-capable-of-scandal</id><title type="text">Is football still capable of scandal?</title><updated>2026-07-29T20:21:49.858579Z</updated><author><name>Lee Nxumalo</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns=""><p>Virginia Giuffre, Annie Farmer, Chauntae Davis, Jesse Michaels, and countless other women and girls were part of an international scandal that captured the public imagination in ways never seen before. And yet their names were barely mentioned. Earlier in the year, there was furious demand for the list of powerful men implicated in the Epstein files from all ends of the political spectrum. And the interest wasn’t just tied to the crimes themselves; it carried the hope that the exposure of the most visible and wealthy men in the world would lead to a reckoning akin to the #MeToo movement. What is implicit in this hope is that if there is accountability at the highest levels, then there would be a trickle-down effect that could assist in confronting the more quotidian and less publicized violence.</p><p>What the Epstein files made clear is that there is a distinction between society’s stated moral values and how those values are lived out.</p><p>However, that did not transpire. What did happen was the files turned into a spectacle. The anticipation for them, their release, their dissection, the jokes in between, the aftermath. And somewhere along the line, the victims were moved out of sight. Then people moved on. The focus shifted from the files to an ill-advised war against Iran, a green pool in the US capital, and the 2026 FIFA World Cup.</p><p>The period between the end of the World Cup and the start of club European football presents an opportunity to reflect on the tournament and all the events and discussions that occurred. One of the conversations that briefly captured the footballing community was the allegations of sexual misconduct against several footballers. Thomas Partey and Achraf Hakimi are facing pending criminal trials, Ryan Mendes remains under active police investigation, while players such as Junya Ito, Kaishu Sano, Andreas Schjelderup, Thiago Almada, and Cristiano Ronaldo have all seen their cases reach their legal conclusions.</p><p>These stories did not offer new revelations. But an update on the status of Hakimi’s case, as well as Canada’s refusal to approve Partey’s visa application, summoned the ghosts that have long haunted football.</p><p>FIFA, national federations, coaches, teammates, and media deferred to legality, recruiting the criminal justice system as a kind of Big Other, the final arbiter of truth, despite the awareness of its shortcomings and limitations. This is most clearly demonstrated in how the courts are tasked with providing assurances and resolving ethical questions that exceed their mandate of due process. In the interim, innocence was not only presumed; it was asserted.</p><p>And while there is a subset of the public that abides by this logic, it does not fully capture the rest of the football ecosystem. Many supporters expressed genuine anger and were vehemently advocating for the removal of these players from their teams. But as soon as the whistle blew, that indignation was muffled. And 90 minutes later, there was discourse around tactics, ref calls, VAR, substitutions, etc.</p><p>It raises the question: if there is enough consensus, why isn’t there coordination? What is it about football that allows us to know and yet continue as though we did not?</p><p>And the most curious of all, what if outrage is part of the entertainment?</p><p>Any answer has to begin with understanding the power of images. Jacques Lacan argues that human beings understand themselves and the world through the symbolic order.</p><p>Football is an image-making factory. The fancy footwork, the immaculate touches, the bicycle kicks, and the extra-time winners aren’t just about sublime technique. They become repositories through which spectators organize their ideas, desires, and fears. It is through the moments of magic in which fans come to identify with clubs, countries, and versions of themselves.</p><p>In <cite>Society of the Spectacle</cite>, Guy Debord furthers this point: ours is an age that prefers the sign to the thing itself, the copy to the original, appearance to essence — one in which, as he puts it, “truth is considered profane, and only illusion is sacred.”</p><p>So when the reality of rape accusations, FIFA’s corruption, capitalism, imperialism, racism, and labor exploitation threaten to rupture that “sacredness,” audiences respond with real moral outrage, but that rarely converts into sustained pressure. The viewer learns to live with the contradiction without allowing it to reorganize their participation. And this happens not necessarily to protect the players or FIFA per se, but to protect the enjoyment they produce.</p><p>That is how the story of Cape Verde became one of the underdog, of extraordinary heroics that transformed them into <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2026/07/what-cabo-verdes-world-cup-debut-means-for-african-football">Africa’s footballing fairytale</a>, and not one of a squad that fielded a player under investigation for rape.</p><p>That is how the story of Norway became one of history in the making, of Erling Haaland’s charisma and imaginary Viking boats rowing into the quarterfinals, and not one of a team that harbored a <a href="https://supersport.com/aquatics/news/ea987633-ed35-4f9e-8c65-cbf24678aaa0/norway-footballer-convicted-in-denmark-of-sharing-sexual-video-of-minors">convicted sex offender</a>.</p><p>That is how the story of Japan became one of model discipline and cleanliness in the stadium and in the locker room, and not the fact that they have two players accused of sexual assault.</p><p>This dynamic is not limited to sexual violence. Football has developed a remarkable capacity to move from one moral crisis to the next and absorb the scandals along the way. During this tournament, the focus shifted from the unfair treatment of the Iranian team to visa denials to the Balogun controversy and countless other flashpoints. The previous tournament revolved around Qatar’s labor exploitation, worker conditions, migrant deaths, and FIFA’s corruption. A similar pattern happens on a club level with incidents of racism, financial irregularities, and controversial sponsorships. Each issue, different in stakes and complexity, is treated the same. They command intense attention until something else happens.</p><p>But the issues themselves don’t disappear; they are temporarily suspended from collective consciousness until they get recycled again. Like the Epstein files, the condemnation they provoke becomes part of the spectacle itself. It is very predictable in its life cycle and its outcomes. Ultimately, the problems are not adequately addressed. It’s like a choreographed dance.</p><p>And when it comes to sexual crimes, audiences think of themselves as ambidextrous — that they are capable of taking the allegations seriously and enjoying the football, as if the two aren’t in conversation with one another. And unfortunately, spectacles of this nature have a tendency toward erasure. The victims are not only pushed to the background but they are almost rendered invisible. No names, no faces, and no specific stories. They are treated as placeholders and their lives are reduced to legal cases and another talking point.</p><p>MeToo was neither perfect nor immune from the dynamics of spectacle. It was introduced to the world through the experiences of famous, rich, white women, which overshadowed the grassroots work that the organization does on the ground. And because of the spectacle, it exists in the public imagination as an era and not a continuous movement that empowers victims to come forward with their stories. However, what distinguished it from a movement like Time’s Up is that it didn’t organize around what punishment perpetrators should receive; it dedicated attention to the agency and care of victims and survivors.</p><p>It did not hand over ethical responsibility to the courts, as it understood that courts are not designed to do that in the first place. Instead, moral duty was distributed across the larger social world. Sometimes convictions followed; oftentimes they did not. Some perpetrators lost their reputations while others lost their influence. Yet the movement’s ambitions never depended on those outcomes alone. It also created the conditions in which victims were no longer expected to remain invisible while institutions deliberated the fate of those who had harmed them.</p><p>The movement also offered pathways for restoration. After Megan Ganz publicly described the sexual harassment she experienced working for Dan Harmon as a writer for <cite>Community</cite>, the public discourse gave the two of them an opportunity to engage in dialogue, and Harmon responded with a sincere and <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2018/01/dan-harmon-sexual-harassment-apology-megan-ganz?srsltid=AfmBOoo00NyJRjY7lFgQzvI2Mid2XkJ1PHM2uJLWb6ImqA6iXxyAd4mh">rare apology</a> to atone for his actions.</p><p>Returning to football, if the sport has ritualized outrage and the institutions can shrug it off, then the solution cannot be found in producing more outrage. Right now, discussions circulate around the idea of whether players should be allowed to play instead of considering why that has become the only point of inquiry.</p><p>The other instinctive response is often a boycott. But boycotting isn’t always the most practical or transformative solution. Sometimes it does the reverse of what it intends, and it can offer an easy way out. As mentioned earlier, football is entangled with so many emotional and psychic investments, and therefore boycotting as a political strategy will have the mammoth task of trying to get buy-in before it can even challenge institutions.</p><p>Placing steady pressure on FIFA and federations to develop a player policy is a worthy cause. However, it is also one that lends itself to institutional failure. It is a tough ask to demand that organizations properly adjudicate the conduct of their money-makers. It’s limping before it can be put to the test.</p><p>None of these interventions should be abandoned; they just cannot be exhaustive. Any solution should consider preventative measures and a different framework of engagement rather than being narrow and reactive. In fact, any intervention will have limitations. Football is deeply embedded within patriarchal structures, and eradicating the violence it produces ultimately requires a complete overhaul of gendered and racial hierarchies. That is not happening today, nor tomorrow, and it is unlikely that it will happen in this lifetime. But it doesn’t mean that reforms are meaningless or can’t produce measurable outcomes.</p><p>So the challenge is not to create a football free of contradiction but to interrupt the rituals that allow contradictions to become ordinary. That requires asking better questions.</p><p>How can football shift its attention toward victims without reducing them to spectacle?</p><p>What would collective action among the fans look like with this in mind?</p><p>And finally, what does accountability look like beyond waiting for FIFA or the criminal justice system to act?</p></div></content><published>2026-07-29T19:12:24.175Z</published><summary type="text">From the Epstein files to a World Cup trailed by rape charges and a hush-money settlement, the public has gotten remarkably good at feeling outrage. What it hasn’t learned is what to do with it.</summary></entry></feed>