<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><title type="text">Africa Is a Country</title><id>https://africasacountry.com</id><updated>2026-05-08T04:07:23.342995Z</updated><link href="https://africasacountry.com"/><logo>https://africasacountry.com/static/img/logo/logo-type.png</logo><subtitle type="text">Not the continent with 55 countries</subtitle><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/05/the-inner-life-of-a-revolutionary</id><title type="text">The inner life of a revolutionary</title><updated>2026-05-08T04:07:23.342995Z</updated><author><name>Miguel Eek</name></author><author><name>Feven Merid</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>Guinea-Bissau is a beautiful place — so much so that more than one-quarter of the country is designated as protected. In 1952, Amilcar Cabral, a young Cape Verdean agricultural engineer, arrived in the then-Portuguese colony to conduct an agricultural census. He, too, recognized its splendor. The land was “marvelous in the sense that today’s reality projects into tomorrow’s,” he wrote in a letter to his first wife, Maria Helena. He would travel the entire country, including its archipelago, to complete the census and come to know its landscape and people intimately in the process. “Here nature invites work and infuses vitality into life,” he wrote. He would famously spend the rest of his life uniting the country’s struggle for liberation with Cape Verde, another Portuguese colony. Eight months after Cabral was assassinated, Guinea-Bissau declared independence.</p><p>How does an ordinary person turn into a successful revolutionary? Spanish filmmaker Miguel Eek attempts to answer that question in his documentary film, titled <cite>Amílcar</cite>. However, this is not a deep dive into Cabral’s politics, but rather a biographical piece that looks at the spaces in between the work. Eek abandoned the dozens of interviews he originally conducted to shape the film in favor of Cabral’s letters, poems, and other personal writings. The film sets out to display what the man whose face Eek saw etched all over Cape Verde thought about in the midst of fighting a brutal guerrilla war.</p><p>I spoke to Eek about his changing approach to Cabral’s interior and the importance of not letting him become a relic of the past.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><hr/></header><dl><dt><p>Feven Merid</p><p>What made you want to make a film about Amílcar Cabral?</p></dt><dd><p>Miguel Eek</p><p>This journey actually began 12 years ago, when I was living in Cape Verde. At that time, we had an economic crisis here in Spain, Europe in general, and I was looking for a change and went to live there. There are many sculptures of Amílcar around the country, so I just started to read about him, his biography, and then his texts. And I got fascinated by the fact that I could be so inspired by someone from a very different culture and context. He was someone who really made me believe in politics again. He was talking with a very clear voice, with a very easy language, about regular things that people have to face in their everyday life. Sometimes politicians speak so much in words that are hard to understand, and I was really impressed with how he could address people from small villages, and at the same time, he could address people at diplomatic level. So this capacity to connect with people was really incredible for me. And from there, I just started to interview people who fought with him, one of his wives, one of his sisters, his daughter. I just started without knowing so well where I was going, actually, in order to satisfy my curiosity.</p></dd><dt><p>Feven Merid</p><p>What made you decide only to use the letters as the film’s narration?</p></dt><dd><p>Miguel Eek</p><p>I did so many interviews, maybe around 40, across Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, France, Sweden, and Portugal. I started to draft a kind of first cut of a film made basically with some archives, but a lot of interviews, and I understood that this was not the best approach. I wanted to go deeper into the complexity of a character who decided to unify two countries in a fight for independence. And at that moment, it was like four years after beginning, I discovered the letters he wrote to his two wives.</p><p>It was quite a coincidence. I was just working on the film, and on one of my journeys to Portugal, I discovered that an independent editorial published the letters he wrote to his first and second wives. I discovered the emotions beyond the leader, the fragility, the vulnerability, the fear, the romanticism, many layers. It twisted the way I wanted to approach the film. I wanted to work from the first person, not the third person. I mean,I didn’t want to make a film about Amílcar Cabral from a portrait by others, but somehow embody Amílcar Cabral through his personal texts, the letters, the political texts, and his poems. So that’s why I started to explore this possibility and to create some kind of dialogue with archives.</p><p>I decided to go to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde to shoot with the 16-millimeter cameras that these filmmakers [of the archival footage] of the ‘60s and ‘70s were using. I was trying to create the same texture of images and trying to shoot as an amateur, you know. I wasn’t trying to make super beautiful shots; I was trying to make very human shots.</p><figure><img alt="Man in ocean with head above water. " height="1080" loading="lazy" src="https://media.africasacountry.com/images/2026/5/668305223248.png" width="1920"/><figcaption>Still from <cite>Amílcar</cite>.</figcaption></figure></dd><dt><p>Feven Merid</p><p>What did you learn about him in the letters that was new from what you learned about him through the interviews? Did anything surprise you?</p></dt><dd><p>Miguel Eek</p><p>I discovered someone very sensitive to images. He was great at describing things poetically and beautifully. For instance, there are postcards of a camel or some flowers he sent to his second wife, and he was really exploring the poetry of life in the postcard pictures and in the things he was watching. So this helped me reconstruct, somehow, his gaze, or at least, inspire me in this reconstruction. He did not shoot film, but he took some pictures, and with this material and the descriptions in the letters, I discovered this visual sensitivity. Another thing that I discovered was the fact that you can chart such a complex path, in terms of revolution, in terms of war, of international diplomacy, and you don’t lose your curiosity for children, for nature. He was an agricultural engineer, and his gaze toward plants, flowers, and the forest was very present in these letters.</p></dd><dt><p>Feven Merid</p><p>What do you think the role of a documentary about a revolutionary is today, in the current moment, amid the many oppressive structures that people like Amílcar were fighting?</p></dt><dd><p>Miguel Eek</p><p>When I started this film, as with all the films I do, I didn’t think so much about what the mission of the film is or what I want to achieve with the film. All the films, for me, start as the answer to questions and to curiosity, to know more and understand more about someone or about a period of time. What touched me when I was reading Amílcar Cabral 12 years ago is the fact that he’s telling us about things that nowadays are still unanswered questions; of the many challenges of imperialism or colonialism, and the way they transform societies. So I guess a film like this could make us think about how each generation needs to explore. It’s not enough that one generation got some human rights or fought because the success of one generation can disappear if the new generation can’t fight for that.</p></dd><dt><p>Feven Merid</p><p>You spent so much time working on this film, interviewing dozens of people, getting into Amílcar’s personal letters. How has spending so much time with a person’s life affected you?</p></dt><dd><p>Miguel Eek</p><p>It has changed me so much. First in my political engagement, now I feel much more connected with the need to engage myself and others in the questions that are in my hands. I mean, I won’t become a politician after this, but I know that in my hands, there are many things and many responsibilities that, in making films, I must be aware of.</p><p>I spent the same time that Amílcar fought the war, making this film, so 10 years of war for Amílcar, 10 years of war for me to make the film. There is some kind of magic in Amílcar Cabral or my connection with Amílcar Cabral because I could not imagine that I would be so committed to this long process of the film. The easy way was to finish the film earlier with the interviews.</p><figure><img alt="A young woman points a gun." height="506" loading="lazy" src="https://media.africasacountry.com/images/2026/5/370305319612-medium.png" width="900"/><figcaption>Still from <cite>Amílcar</cite>.</figcaption></figure><p>I did 40 interviews in seven countries without a budget. I was just using my personal budget to fly to different places with a small camera and a mic, interviewing people. This was still very important, to get the commitment in others and in myself to do it, because otherwise it would be much more superficial, or maybe I wouldn’t have been strong enough to face the complexity and the responsibility of making a film about someone like Amílcar Cabral. Even though sometimes I had my doubts about my own capacity to do this film, I thought that it was worth doing, even if the result was not the best. I hope new films about Amílcar will appear, and some other filmmakers from Guinea, from Cape Verde will explore from their perspective.</p><p>I decided to take the hardest, most complex path to do this film. I started when I was 33, and now I’m 43. I’ve grown so much as a filmmaker and enjoyed learning how to make a film completely different from my previous films. I had to unlearn so many things to make this film. It is a kind of gift for a filmmaker to have the opportunity to explore a different approach.</p></dd><dt><p>Feven Merid</p><p>Now that the film is complete, how do you feel about it?</p></dt><dd><p>Miguel Eek</p><p>I did my best with my resources, with my team, and with my skills, but I know that someone like Amílcar Cabral deserves the best film possible. Yet there is still the moment where you have to decide to stop and to deliver a film. The fact that I’m not an African filmmaker puts me in a position of privilege that is somewhat problematic, because I know that my vision is the vision of a European. It’s a vision from someone from the colonial perspective, even though I am against colonialism. I know that I don’t have an African gaze. I’m making a film from the privilege of a country where I can access finances, and I have a particular vision that is not one of Amílcar’s. This is something that I’m still dealing with. The film is there, I’m happy with it, and. I hope it can create a discussion about Amílcar.</p></dd></dl></section></article></content><published>2026-05-08T04:07:23.342995Z</published><summary type="text">Drawing on letters to his wives, a decade-long film project seeks to move beyond iconography and return Amílcar Cabral to the realm of the human, the fragile, and the unfinished.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/05/on-the-somalia-pavillion</id><title type="text">On the Somalia Pavillion</title><updated>2026-05-07T13:44:04.746717Z</updated><author><name>Warbixinta Cidda</name></author><author><name>Yasmin Dualeh</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>At this year’s Biennale di Venezia, one of the most prestigious and celebrated international cultural events, Somalia was selected to establish its inaugural pavilion. Commissioned by Somalia’s government, it marks an important opportunity to present the beauty and richness of Somali culture, particularly at a time in which Somali people have been under attack by the president of the world’s leading superpower, Donald Trump. It also offers a chance to transcend the entrenched divisions within the Somali territories, which reached a boiling point via the Israeli–Somaliland recognition agreement in December 2025, calling into question matters of Somali sovereignties territorial boundaries, and neocolonialism in the Horn.</p><p>The Somalia pavilion thematic motif is <cite><a href="https://www.somaliapavilion.so/">Saddaxleey</a></cite>, the triadic form of <a href="https://www.somaliapavilion.so/">Somali poetry and proverbs</a> — <a href="https://www.somaliapavilion.so/">utilizing scent, sound, and vision</a>. It focuses on three strands of art: first, textiles, painting, and materials (illustrated by Somali Swedish artist Ayan Farah); second, film and performance (represented by UK-based Somali Danish multidisciplinary artist Asmaa Jama); and third, poetry and the oral tradition (helmed by renowned poet Somali British Warsan Shire). What seems progressive on its surface — the selection of women artists as embodiments of Somali artistry — conceals significant oversights by the pavilion’s curatorial team.</p><p>On Thursday, April 9, 2026, Warbixinta Cidda, a collective of queer Somali artists, curators, and culture workers, in conjunction with artists operating in the Somali territories and diaspora, <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/DXFTja9CJ59">leveled a robust critique</a> of the pavilion as a purported representation of Somali culture. They released a public statement detailing their objections to the pavilion, which include: the overrepresentation of the Somali diaspora, who constitute the featured artists and the sole Somali curator (Stockholm-based Mohamed Mire); the advisory board composed entirely of Somali men; and perhaps most egregiously, the selection of an Italian cocurator of the pavilion, instead of the numerous Somali curators whose expertise could have been showcased.</p><p>Ahead of the Somalia pavilion’s opening on May 9, I spoke to Warbixinta Cidda about their critique and the ethical responsibility artists and culture workers have when claiming to represent their national culture on the world stage.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><hr/></header><dl><dt><p>Yasmin Dualeh</p><p>What is it about the Somalia pavilion that specifically led to the mobilization of the collective of fellow artists and their statement?</p></dt><dd><p>Warbixinta Cidda</p><p>walaal/geeddow from Wabixinta Cidda saw the pavilion being announced on March 20th and was surprised. He assumed that there was a boycott of the event, as the genocidal settler-colonial apartheid state is platformed with their pavilion; there was not, but people were protesting the “Israeli” pavilion. Additionally, they shared the shocking revelation of the Somali curator, Maxamed Mire, inviting an Italian colonizer as a cocurator, so this what initially sparked the mobilization. As soon as we shared this news with fellow artists, one of them, namely Dahab, rightfully pointed out the lack of artists based in the Somali regions, and another fellow artist mentioned that the people in decision-making positions including the cultural advisors are all men.</p></dd><dt><p>Yasmin Dualeh</p><p>The presence of the Somalia pavilion taking place on Italian soil required the authorization of the festival’s management board to participate. The Biennale’s current president, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2023/nov/18/venice-biennale-rightwing-director-pietrangelo-buttafuoco">Pietrangelo Buttofuoco, has had a long-standing strong relationship to the Italian far-right</a> and neo-fascist movements, including to Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. How do we reconcile the establishment of a Somalia pavilion, in light of the Horn of Africa’s history of Italian colonialism and the festival’s current leadership?</p></dt><dd><p>Warbixinta Cidda</p><p>One of the reasons we were unsettled by the announcement was the fact that this exhibition is taking place in a country that indeed caused our people so much suffering and violence. We don’t believe in representation for representation’s sake. Moreover, in this case it would actually obfuscate both Italy’s violent history and the current iteration of it, which as you mentioned, the current far-right and neo-fascist government is a big part of. We all know the deadly “<a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-06-02/reconstruction-of-a-shipwreck-how-italy-and-frontex-could-have-prevented-over-90-deaths-in-cutro.html">border protection” work that Frontex does</a> with support of European governments, which has caused so many Afrikans, especially Black Afrikans, their lives. And the Italian government will surely flaunt this so-called global inclusion, while denying the violent past. Enabling them to benefit from the same history of colonial subjugation they refuse to be held accountable for.</p></dd><dt><p>Yasmin Dualeh</p><p>In your statement, you raise the matter of the inclusion of Fabio Scrivanti, a former project manager for Venice Art Factory, as one of the two curators for the pavilion. You note that the selection of Scrivanti is affront to Somali curatorial expertise, squandering a great opportunity to promote the myriad of Somalis doing this work at home and in diaspora. Would you like to speak to the implications of this selection?</p></dt><dd><p>Warbixinta Cidda</p><p>It is already bad enough when Black Afrikans are forced to work with white colonizers because white art institutions demand it. It is so much worse when a Black person goes out of their way to not only include a colonizer, but give them curatorial credit.</p><p>We don’t want to get into “proving” that we indeed have capable curators. This is not the first time that Maxamed Mire did this; there is an exhibition called <cite><a href="https://www.instagram.com/hoyexhibition/">HOY</a></cite> which was the first contemporary art exhibition held at the National Museum of Somali in Xamar (Mogadishu) since the civil war. The same colonizer was credited as a cocurator at this exhibition as well — so Maxamed Mire has been actively supporting this colonizer’s shift into curation on the backs of <em>fankeena iyo farshaxankeena</em> (oral artistry, writing, visual artistry, and crafts) which this <em>cadaan</em> does not know anything about.</p></dd><dt><p>Yasmin Dualeh</p><p>As a Somali group of artists, cultural workers, and organizers collective bridging the gulf between diaspora and <em>dalkeena</em> (our homeland), you highlighted the absence of Somalis working and building the artistic landscape in the Somali territories in the pavilion’s featured artists and curatorial team. What is lost via this absence, and what does a diasporic care ethic look like within artistic production, particularly for Somalis?</p></dt><dd><p>Warbixinta Cidda</p><p>We would like everyone to go read the very powerful statement from a group of artists, cultural workers, and independent arts institutions based in the Somali regions, which was published on <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/DXFTja9CJ59">Monday, April 13</a>. They lay out very clearly how they were sidelined in every aspect, while the exhibition claims to be representative of Somali artistry and artistic forms. Since the release of their statement, they have been subject to <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/DXR7PrciIBK/?igsh=cDA1ZzA4NmVobmhr">intimidation and coercion</a>, which they addressed in their most recent communication.</p><p>When it comes to the role us Somalis in the diaspora should play, we would argue that it is essential to not reproduce the extractive and exclusionary practice that the colonizers engaged in and still do when it comes to our people back home. Instead we must actually engage and center the work of the Somali artists back home. We absolutely do not have enough knowledge of what is actually relevant to the artists creating art back home and how their artistic practice has developed and been nourished.</p></dd><dt><p>Yasmin Dualeh</p><p>The lack of a transparent call for participation or consultancy of Somali artists and artistic collectives leaves the pavilion’s team open to charges of cronyism and casts doubt over whether it can truly be considered a form of national representation. What lessons can be learnt from the pavilion? Can you suggest core principles that can guide future efforts to represent Somali art and culture internationally?</p></dt><dd><p>Warbixinta Cidda</p><p>The incident surrounding this <em>qashin</em> (trash) pavilion and the pattern that has led up to it has shown the necessity of having a robust ethic as diaspora artists, collectives, and organizers as a proactive practice. We will be publishing a manifesto of points in the near future, with the idea that other Black people are free to use it for their artistic practices.</p><p>A few things that are very important to us in our practices [are as follows]:</p><blockquote><p>● not working with colonial institutions and <em>cadaan</em> (whites/Europeans)</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>● not allowing our work to be used to artwash genocide and other atrocities</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>● being critical of those engaged in <em>cadaan raac</em> (deferral to whiteness) that want to represent the Black experience</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>● making sure that we always strive for creating spaces that not only center Black people but are Black and exclusively Black</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>● enfranchising artists of African ancestry in artistic spaces so that we have greater autonomy to produce and exhibit our art</p></blockquote></dd><dt><p>Yasmin Dualeh</p><p>What has the response to your statement been from Somalis interested in and involved in the art world?</p></dt><dd><p>Warbixinta Cidda</p><p>We have not received any response from the organizers of the pavilion, and they have not engaged with our public statement. However, they have been trying their best to vilify and discredit everyone involved in writing this statement. More specifically, they have even tried to use the fact that Warbixinta Cidda is a queer Somali collective against us, in an attempt to deny our right to our artistic heritage. With this, the organizers of the pavilion are reinforcing and reproducing colonial violence. We believe that the three artists who are centered in this exhibition — namely, Ayan Farah, Asmaa Jama, and Warsan Shire — have a huge responsibility to address the critiques publicly and to be transparent about how much of the unethical practices of the organizers they have been aware of.</p></dd><dt><p>Yasmin Dualeh</p><p>What has the response been from the broader Somali artistic community in the aftermath of your statement?</p></dt><dd><p>Warbixinta Cidda</p><p>It has been disheartening and enraging to see the majority of Somali artists in the diaspora either be silent or actively defend this colonizer and the other unethical practices of the people behind the pavilion. The harsh responses to our public critique were, mostly, if not entirely, by Somali artists based in the diaspora. They accused us of creating division, foul tactics, and engaging in critique for the sake of critique. They reduced valid critique to jealousy and regurgitated talking points based on scarcity. We saw artists that immediately identify with and have sympathy for the three artists that are centered in this exhibition. We have heard people say — publicly and privately — that it is important and necessary to make concessions.</p><p>It is an insult to our anticolonial ancestors. Somali artists have historically been critical of those in power and used their art as resistance, even when they were subjected to imprisonment and torture. We recall the historic Somali artists who produced powerful work under violent colonial occupation, such as Timiro Cukaash, Makaay Garaare, Xaawa Jibril and Maymuuna Biyow, who is famous for the <cite><a href="https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.academia.edu%2F34004738%2FThe_Brief_History_of_Maymuna_Hassan_Biyow_Her_Life_and_Literay_Work&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cyd293%40cam.ac.uk%7C77bde653de484848ab9408de9efa8d7c%7C49a50445bdfa4b79ade3547b4f3986e9%7C1%7C0%7C639122996126925614%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=GvzEVgR0GnIWhQZh9xYmz4HaKLRMbH23MavtXqUL9Nk%3D&amp;reserved=0">Saddaxleey</a></cite> (the three-part Somali form that is used in Somali poetry), from which this pavilion has the audacity to choose as its title. And in more recent history, artists like Saado Cali Warsame, who was imprisoned and gave birth to her daughter Xuriyo (freedom), because she took part in the poetry chain <cite><a href="https://www.mixcloud.com/RedLightRadio/xusuus-pt1-red-light-radio-01-05-2019/">Silsiladii Deeley</a></cite>. May they all rest in peace, love, and power.</p><p>All artists that have been or will be invited to engage with this pavilion should follow <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/DXGQDDJjNvT/">Ladan Osman’s example</a> by declining the invitation and sharing this publicly.We call on Somali artists in the diaspora to reject <em>caddaannimo</em> (whiteness) and cowardice practice and instead to tap into their ancestors’ courage.</p><p>We end by invoking the righteous words of Maymuuna Biyow:</p><p><em>“gaal manoo islaam wadin nama soo galeen”</em></p><p>(the colonizer would not be in our midst if he wasn’t accompanied by one of us)</p></dd></dl></section></article></content><published>2026-05-07T13:44:04.746717Z</published><summary type="text">As Somalia makes its first appearance at the Venice Biennale, some Somali artists are questioning who gets to represent the nation — and on whose terms.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/05/the-new-scramble-for-congo</id><title type="text">The new scramble for Congo</title><updated>2026-05-07T16:23:24.959806Z</updated><author><name>Harrison Stetler</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>The decapitation of Venezuela’s government. Saber-rattling over the annexation of Greenland. The US and Israeli war of choice against Iran. The opening months of 2026 have seen a dramatic escalation in Donald Trump’s bellicose militarism. And if much separates the three crises, what they share is the US president’s quest for American control over strategic flows of raw materials, whether that’s China’s oil and gas partners in Caracas and Tehran, or the more distant prospect of Arctic mineral wealth.</p><p>Elsewhere, the US resource offensive is playing out with far less bombast. Take the relatively quieter push to carve out an American sphere of influence in a country that once seemed peripheral to US designs: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A sprawling country in the heart of equatorial Africa, the DRC boasts considerable resource reserves, including copper, cobalt, and lithium. Metals like these are key for high technology applications such as microchips, electric vehicle batteries, and the most sophisticated weapons systems.</p><p>Already underway during Joe Biden’s administration, the US rapprochement with the DRC picked up speed with Trump’s return to the White House, when authorities in the capital, Kinshasa, purportedly approached the incoming US president to seek support in their protracted battle with breakaway militia groups in the eastern Kivu and Katanga regions. It was capped off this past December with the signing at the White House of a strategic partnership between the United States and the DRC.</p><p>Providing for special US access to the DRC’s mineral wealth, that accord followed up on last summer’s much-touted peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, a country that supports the March 23 Movement (M23) paramilitaries in their devastating civil war with Kinshasa. Despite the White House’s claims to have ushered in a new era of peace in the DRC, fighting persists to this day. On March 2, the United States slapped sanctions on the <a href="https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/03/sanctioning-rwandan-violators-of-the-washington-accords-for-peace-and-prosperity">Rwandan military</a> for its continued support of anti-Kinshasa militia groups.</p><p>To some observers, Trump’s warming to Kinshasa builds on the minerals-for-protection approach first concocted in the spring 2025 minerals agreement with Ukraine. For now, the US government’s direct engagement with the DRC is largely limited to support for president Félix Tshisekedi — whom Trump praised as a “brave man” at the February 5 national prayer breakfast in Washington — and diplomatic advocacy for US investors. Yet American defense contractors, such as former Blackwater chief Erik Prince, are openly pining for closer security ties. Agents of Vectus Global, a new Prince-owned security company, were reportedly <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-centrale/2026/02/02/le-role-discret-des-hommes-d-erik-prince-dans-les-operations-militaires-a-uvira,110616821-art">involved</a> alongside forces of the central government in the early January battle for Uvira, an eastern DRC city abutting Lake Tanganyika.</p><p>Viewed from Congolese civil society, there is little doubt that the US push is about anything more than business. Without more democratic control of the country’s mineral wealth, the fear is that the people of the DRC could once again be left with a minimal share of the benefits as US capital embarks on an investment spree that seems most of all primed to grease the wheels of corrupt governance — and the balance sheets of foreign corporations. “Anti-corruption has been totally thrown aside by the American administration,” said Jean-Claude Mputu, a spokesperson for the <em>Congo n’est pas à vendre</em> (CNPAV, “Congo Is Not for Sale”) collective. “The Congolese population lives atop vast mineral wealth, but they don’t benefit from it because money is siphoned off by local elites, and because the foreign corporations that poison our soil pay off our political leaders so that they don’t face legal pursuits.”</p><p>The Trump administration’s attempt to carve out a foothold in the DRC is not without obstacles. The country is already under the sway of US rivals like China, whose companies are currently estimated to control some 80 percent of the DRC’s mineral wealth, including many of its prime, most secure assets. Tshisekedi, for his part, has opened the door to a surge in US investment, but seems just as keen to play competing foreign interests off each other. US industry insiders hope that Washington’s offer of a more proactive partnership, in contrast to Beijing’s hands-off approach, can level the playing field. But there are a few signs that China looks unsettled. On March 26, the DRC and China <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-china-deepen-mining-ties-us-pushes-rival-minerals-pact-2026-03-27/">strengthened</a> their ties with a new minerals cooperation agreement, which includes provisions for greater local processing of metals.</p><p>Leading the US counteroffensive are a new roster of investment funds, mining consortiums, and exploratory mining start-ups, all backed with critical US diplomatic support and public funding. Since Trump’s return to the White House, they have been laying the groundwork for a revived US sphere of influence in the DRC.</p><p>One actor to emerge in the US resource push is a relatively obscure company called Orion Resource Partners, which manages some $8.6 billion worth of global mining investments. It is now plying its entry into the Congolese market, having already established a foothold in places like Guinea and Namibia, where it harvests bauxite, iron, and lithium. With financial backing from the US government, last October Orion founded the Orion Critical Minerals Consortium (Orion CMC), a combined investment vehicle that raised $4 billion in capital.</p><p>In February, Orion CMC announced a partnership with Anglo-Swiss mining major Glencore, which ceded a 40 percent stake in its DRC operations to the US-led consortium in a deal valued at $9 billion. The partnership will give Orion CMC and its investors, including the US government, control over a share of the output from Glencore’s DRC copper and cobalt mines. In March, Orion CMC likewise provided financing for US-based venture Virtus Minerals’ acquisition of Chemaf, a Dubai-based mining corporation active in the DRC since the early 2000s.</p><p>Under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the US government has been closely implicated in these maneuvers. In 2024, the Biden administration pressured the Congolese government to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7210159b-8243-46a3-b58f-9124fd92c743?syn-25a6b1a6=1">block the sale</a> of Chemaf to the Chinese firm Norinco. The Trump administration has lobbied Kinshasa to sideline executives at the state-owned mining group <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1768422/economie-entreprises/la-gecamines-ajuste-sa-direction-en-pleine-negociation-avec-ladministration-trump/">Gécamines</a> who opposed the handover of Chemaf to US investors.</p><p>Another critical gauge of support is the financial backstop provided by the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which is propping up the private companies leading the US offensive. Founded in 2019 during Trump’s first term, the DFC is chartered to facilitate the projection of US economic interests abroad, providing seed capital for investments in external raw material supply chains. In December 2024, the Biden-era DFC provided over <a href="https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-announces-investments-supporting-development-along-lobito-corridor">$500 million</a> in backing for the construction of the Lobito Corridor railway designed to facilitate the extraction of minerals toward the Atlantic coast of Angola from landlocked Zambia and the southeastern DRC. The DFC’s $600 million investment in Orion CMC last fall is being billed as its largest capital injection to date, speaking to its strategic importance in Trump’s African mining push.</p><p>Then there’s the US tech sector. Silicon Valley is also carving out a direct stake in African mining, with its all-hands-on-deck bet on artificial intelligence feeding expectations of a surge in demand for critical minerals in the coming years. In the early 2020s, Tesla CEO Elon Musk was even <a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/tesla-stock-mining-giant-glencore-51667228928">rumored</a> to be considering an acquisition of Glencore, the world’s largest mining conglomerate in terms of annual revenue.</p><p>KoBold Metals, a mining company founded in 2018, claims to use artificial intelligence and advanced research methods to chart out unexploited deposits of mineral wealth. The company counts among its investors Breakthrough Energy Ventures, a fund founded in 2016 by Bill Gates and whose stakeholders include Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezos, and Michael Bloomberg. In an agreement signed last summer with the DRC government, KoBold was granted seven exploratory permits for lithium, coltan, and rare earth deposits across 1,600 square kilometers of territory.</p><p>When US mining major Freeport-McMoRan moved to sell its DRC assets to Chinese firms in the mid-2010s, it looked like American capital was throwing in the towel. Faced with the steep costs of mining in a region riven by instability — and the litigation risks inherent to working in a business climate plagued by endemic corruption — US companies seemed at a structural disadvantage to the state-backed behemoths of the Chinese mining sector.</p><p>Ten years later, a new generation of US corporations is back and ready to get their hands dirty. They can also expect a long leash from a US administration that wholly assumes the transactional nature of its resource offensive in the DRC.</p><p>A 2025 <a href="https://www.pplaaf.org/cases/pollution-suspected-corruption-and-fraud-in-guinea.html">investigation</a> into Orion’s activities in Guinea from the Platform to Protect Whistleblowers in Africa (PPLAAF) uncovered evidence of bribes to Guinean officials to expedite mineral exportation, alongside other environmental and due diligence abuses. A 2023 industrial accident by an Orion subsidiary resulted in the spilling of some 7,500 tons of bauxite — an incident that the group’s executives sought to cover up. Internal sources told PPLAAF that the firm has yet to commit $15 million in pledged community investment contributions, as the profits of the country’s minerals systematically avoid the grasp of local populations.</p><p>“What is particularly worrying about Orion’s conduct in Guinea is the overall mismanagement and the fact that their sole and immediate interest is profit, regardless of working conditions and the effects on local communities,” said PPLAAF Executive Director Jimmy Kande. “This sets a precedent that should have alerted the DFC and prevented it from backing Orion as its operational arm on the continent, given the corruption allegations and environmental crimes that have been investigated, including by Guinean authorities, and which remain subject to ongoing proceedings.”</p><p>Orion CMC’s deal with Glencore also has the US government-backed entity potentially entangled in one of the more sordid corruption cases in the recent history of DRC mining. The deal brings the group — and its investors, including the DFC — into implicit partnership with Israeli mining billionaire Dan Gertler, who has been under sanction by the US Treasury Department since 2017. In its decision to sanction Gertler under the 2012 Magnitsky Act, the Treasury <a href="https://2017-2021-translations.state.gov/2018/06/15/treasury-sanctions-fourteen-entities-affiliated-with-corrupt-businessman-dan-gertler-under-global-magnitsky/">deemed</a> that the Israeli mining magnate had amassed his fortune through hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of opaque and corrupt mining and oil deals in the DRC. Thanks to a scheme to pay Gertler’s mining royalties in euros and not in dollars, Gertler has continued to skim off wealth from his partnerships with Glencore.</p><p>In 2017, the US Treasury estimated that the shortfall for the DRC’s budget, resulting from those dealings, amounted to some $1.3 billion. Musk has denied vying for the full acquisition of Glencore, but <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/fr/derni%C3%A8res-actualit%C3%A9s/tesla-cobalt-deal-with-glencore-allegedly-benefits-sanctioned-billionaire-at-the-center-of-corruption-scandal-in-drc/">one study</a> suggests that Tesla’s agreement to purchase six thousand tons of cobalt per year from the Anglo-Swiss firm results in $4–$5 million of annual royalties for the Israeli billionaire.</p><p>“Dan Gertler is perhaps the individual who has most profited from Congo’s mineral wealth. He built a massive system of corruption that was sanctioned by the US government, but which has been skirted with the complicity of Glencore,” said Mputu, of the CNPAV collective. “Everyone seems to have made their peace with this situation. With Trump’s return to power, one of our concerns now is that those sanctions get lifted to allow Orion to work with Glencore.”</p><p>The DFC and Orion did not respond to a request for comment.</p><p>But there can be little doubt that other priorities are taking center stage as the US returns to the DRC resource race. Trump, for his part, did not mince his words when he celebrated last December’s deal from the White House: “We’re going to take out some of the rare earth, take out some of the assets and pay. Everybody is going to make a lot of money.”</p></div></article></content><published>2026-05-06T13:16:48.593Z</published><summary type="text">Backed by the Trump administration, US mining firms, financiers, and tech investors are mounting an aggressive push into the DRC’s mineral sector, reviving an old imperial logic under the language of strategic competition.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/05/the-return-of-mwalimu</id><title type="text">The return of Mwalimu</title><updated>2026-05-05T02:35:15.814481Z</updated><author><name>​​Muzan Alneel</name></author><author><name>Gussai H. Sheikheldin </name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>Throughout the past century the nations of the Global South have grappled with the persistent and evolving challenges of development. Forged in a shared crucible of colonial, imperialist, and neocolonial exploitation, these states, since the early years of their political independence (1950s and 1960s), have faced challenges securing material well-being for their populations and establishing the economic foundation for genuine political sovereignty. The late African scholar of development and heterodox economist <a href="https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1151&amp;context=macintl">Thandika Mkandawire outlined five “historical tasks” for the governments of newly independent African states: “complete decolonization of the continent, nation-building, economic and social development, democratization, and regional cooperation</a>.”</p><p>Since attaining political independence, the contours of these developmental challenges were shaped by the exigencies of each distinct historical period. This started with an urgent need to generate revenue for development, followed by the volatility of the global commodity markets and then to the coercive pressures of the international financial institutions (IFIs). The respective responses came in shifts of strategic paradigms. We saw the years of extractive and primary commodity dependency followed by a wave of state-led industrialization and public investments during the early post-independence years of the 1960s and 1970s. This was then systematically dismantled by the Washington Consensus in the 1980s and 1990s, which imposed liberalization and market fundamentalism with catastrophic consequences. The profound failures of the neoliberal project has in turn revitalized discussion around strategic state interventions and South–South economic collaborations. In the wake of these changes, there is <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/36714">renewed engagement with industrial policy</a>, a concept once considered heretical under <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5605/chapter/148583258">neoliberal orthodoxy</a>.</p><p>Industrial policy is now vindicated by the meteoric economic transformations of countries like China, South Korea, and Brazil. Nevertheless, it is clear that contemporary industrial policies now navigate complex terrain, shaped by the existential challenge of decarbonization, the debilitating weight of sovereign debt, and the relentless, frequent crises inherent in a global capitalist system. These compounding challenges make a critical reexamination of the historical experiments in autonomous development valuable and overdue.</p><p>In this political and intellectual context, this article revisits the industrial vision of Julius K. Nyerere, the national liberation leader, revolutionary intellectual, and first president of independent Tanganyika and Tanzania. We do not posit his project as a rigid blueprint — as it also had flaws worth learning from — but rather as a rich, educative experience, brimming with lessons that can inform urgent debates in the contemporary Global South.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Who was Nyerere?</h2></header><div><p>Tanzania’s enduring political stability and unifying national narrative are manifestations of the statesmanship of Julius Kambarage Nyerere. They are extensions of a political project that he initiated before assuming the presidency of the country. His political trajectory began in 1954 with the founding of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), an organization which was dedicated from its inception to the ideals of national self-governance. In pursuit of this goal, Nyerere masterfully wielded the tools of the colonial order against that same order when he presented <a href="https://www.juliusnyerere.org/uploads/nyerere_lifetime_legacy_pius_msekwa.pdf">Tanganyika’s case before the UN Trusteeship Council in March 1955</a>, and then again in November 1956. There he compellingly argued that the British administration was failing its mandate to prepare the country for self-rule. This successfully applied international pressure on the colonizer.</p><p>The attempt by the British colonial government to limit Nyerere’s political ambitions came as it forced him to choose between his teaching career (from which he inherited his title “Mwalimu”) and political activism. The leadership of St. Francis College, near Dar es Salaam, where he was a teacher, gave <a href="https://www.ascleiden.nl/content/library-highlights/development-rebellion-biography-julius-nyerere">Nyerere</a> an ultimatum: stop his political involvement or lose his teaching job. The move backfired as Nyerere’s conscious decision to relinquish his secure profession became a powerful public demonstration of commitment, transforming him into a full-time mobilizer. This allowed Nyerere to embark on a nationwide campaign articulating a vision of freedom and independence across Tanganyika culminating in TANU’s overwhelming electoral victory in the 1958–59 elections. This mandate positioned Nyerere to negotiate a transition to independence by 1961. He became the first prime minister, and later president, of an independent Tanganyika.</p><p>This same strategic wisdom guided his handling of the post-independence period and the formation of a unified Tanzania in 1964. As the principal architect of the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar — the two constituent parts of modern Tanzania — <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23145890">Nyerere proactively constructed a cohesive national narrative</a>, upon which a common identity for Tanzanians stands. This was achieved through a number of sociopolitical tools, including the promotion of Kiswahili as a national language. The Tanzanian model of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23145889?seq=1">civilian and nonviolent governance forged by Nyerere</a> has proven remarkably resilient for decades. It stands in stark contrast to the coups, counter-coups, and civil wars that plagued other postcolonial African states. In any postcolonial society, long-term political stability is no historical accident, but rather an outcome of careful leadership and visionary political projects.</p><p>Nyerere’s project transcended political cohesion to deliver profound material services and expand the social wage for the Tanzanian populace. Upon independence, he became the president of a profoundly underdeveloped nation possessing no more than 12 fully qualified doctors at a staggering ratio of <a href="https://archive.org/details/legaciesofjulius0000unse">one physician for every 870,000 citizens</a>. By the end of his presidency, in 1985, this landscape was transformed. All urban centers and a third of villages had established medical dispensaries. <a href="https://www.juliusnyerere.org/resources/view/political-economic_issues_in_tanzania_the_nyerere_years_1965-1985">More than 60 percent of the country’s 8,000 villages</a> had access to clean water, and the state provided free health care and education, even covering student transport to schools. Though Tanzania’s economic policies under Nyerere meant neighboring states like Kenya often registered higher export revenues, Tanzanian’s developmental path yielded a more robust foundation of public welfare for its people, defining a different, socially-oriented metric of progress.</p><p>Just as significant as his domestic achievements, Nyerere’s international legacy stands as a formidable pillar of his political biography. He was distinguishable not only as one of the most original political philosophers of African independence, forging a project that is consciously tailored to the continent’s historical realities and needs, but also a prominent moral and strategic voice on the global stage. Under Nyerere’s leadership, Tanzania became the primary sanctuary and logistics hub of Southern Africa’s liberation movements. Organizations like the ANC (African National Congress) and the PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress) of South Africa, FRELIMO (Mozambican Liberation Front), ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union), and SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organization) of Namibia, all maintained headquarters in Dar es Salaam. This cemented Tanzania’s status as an epicenter of regional anticolonial struggle. In Tanzania, anti-imperialist solidarity also manifested itself in hosting one of <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200605-palestine-julius-nyerere-and-international-solidarity/">the earliest Palestinian embassies in Africa</a>, opened in 1973 (at the time it was an embassy/office of the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO]), staying consistent with the early Pan-Africanist stance of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-review-of-social-history/article/frontline-citizens-liberation-movements-transnational-solidarity-and-the-making-of-antiimperialist-citizenship-in-tanzania/615A50A478C67919AE758968EE1C8278">The global anti-imperialist stance of Tanzania</a> also manifested in various forms of solidarity with Vietnam, Cuba and China since the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, at governmental levels and at levels of student activism in the country.</p><p>In these ways, Nyerere emerged as an intellectual anchor of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), articulating a vision of nonalignment that is not based on passive neutrality, but active principled commitment to self-determination, anti-imperialism, and a radical restructuring of an unjust global economic order. His distinguished stature was acknowledged globally when he was chosen to chair the South Commission in 1987. This assembly of intellectuals and statesmen from across the Global South was a direct response to a global order rigged against their states and nations. Nyerere’s leadership of this initiative confirmed his role as a foundational thinker for Global South solidarity, self-determination, and development. More recently, in the year 2009, <a href="https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/social/intldays/IntlJustice/launch10Feb09/PGA.pdf">the UN General Assembly posthumously awarded Nyerere the title of “world hero of social justice”</a> noting that he “helped lead all of Africa out of colonialism, and into a social and economic system that placed human beings rather than maximization of profit at the center of all economic endeavor.”</p><p>While Nyerere’s international, regional and national legacy is vast, this article focuses on the insights embedded in Nyerere’s industrial and developmental thinking. The subsequent analysis interrogates the economic dimensions of his Ujamaa philosophy, his regional approach to industrialization, and the critical nexus of sovereignty, development, and import substitution in his policy frameworks. Following this excavation, the article critically examines the reasons behind the marginalization of Nyerere’s intellectual legacy in contemporary developmental discourse, before concluding with an exploration of how his recovered insights can inform and advance urgent debates in industrial policy in the contemporary Global South.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Building from the ground up: Ujamaa and industrial policy</h2></header><div><p>Ujamaa, a Kiswahili term denoting communality and familyhood, became synonyms for Nyerere’s sociopolitical philosophy and his distinct articulation of African socialism. This was not a mere ideological stance but a comprehensive political project aimed at building national self-reliance. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352800239_Ujamaa_Planning_and_Managing_Development_Schemes_in_Africa_Tanzania_as_a_Case_Study">Its mechanisms</a> were based on state leadership and technical support for rural cooperatives and the formation of self-managed agricultural communities, all oriented towards transforming agricultural production. At its core, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/030437547900400308">Ujamaa sought to harmonize the twin objectives of equity and productivity</a>, pioneering concepts of appropriate technology and participatory development that remain subject of global academic interests today. One of the major attractions of Nyerere’s legacy is that it was one of the few incidents in history where such concepts were implemented statewide, thereby revealing their real-world potential, challenges and policy requirements.</p><p>Nyerere’s vision for a socialist organization of labor in Africa, and more specifically Tanzania, was predicated on two foundational principles. First, the objective centrality of the rural economy, which engaged the vast majority of the population and generated most of the revenue for the state. Second, a profound valuation of historical African ways of social organizing, particularly the extended family unit and its tradition of communal ownership. This was coupled with an explicit rejection of a universal one-size-fits-all socialist model. Nyerere argued consistently that the historical trajectory of Europe, catalyzed by its industrial revolution, was fundamentally different from that of Africa. Therefore, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Socialism-rural-development-Julius-Nyerere/dp/B0006BY09U/ref=sr_1_50?dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.wf7vm-kDq-q1ekMEKVSj8hQZTF5PZSsj8_jPRPDaXXBEtQqAfqwxVd9Zmlco70HSmYEw5Sk2pi12zHweJ7pcVAke920gj_azN7v3mpywHlKm9PyfDRdgV1QoBcUp-cI1CSCTb2zcABkGMAOnmAGzd8dGAOX1TKfjb6kWWXPVcMTFQiqS8TyiPfmgi3F6_MRA.qKfVgzFmqqUIBXixM7_Hrat-5izZze9ikxVyaMS_vxs&amp;dib_tag=se&amp;qid=1776184472&amp;refinements=p_27%3AJulius+Nyerere&amp;s=books&amp;sr=1-50">Africa’s path to socialism could not be a mere imitation of foreign blueprints</a>. He was <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239799840_Nationalism_and_Pan-Africanism_Decisive_Moments_in_Nyerere's_Intellectual_and_Political_Thought'">quoted as saying</a>, “If Marx had been born in Sumbawanga [a locality in Tanzania], he would have come up with the Arusha Declaration instead of Das Kapital.”</p><p>Building on this foundation, Nyerere theorized that Tanzania’s route to equity and socialism must be an agrarian one, built on the continent’s primary assets: land, labor, and preexisting communal values. He justified this approach on both pragmatic and sovereign grounds. First, Tanzania lacked the necessary immense capital and specialized expertise to launch its development with large-scale heavy industry. He also contended that relying on external sources for these resources would inevitably compromise the nation’s hard-won political sovereignty and create new forms of dependency. Second, and within the options for organizing agriculture itself, the high cost of modern agricultural tools made individual ownership unattainable for the vast majority of people. Therefore, achieving efficient production that puts all the country’s resources to work necessitated communal ownership of these means of production, regulated and supported by a state that represents its citizenry through action and not just rhetoric.</p><p>These arguments were repeated in Nyerere’s speeches to the public throughout the 1960s. They were richly illustrated with references to African transition and the importance of political and developmental projects that suit the African context. And it was these arguments that formed the ideological bedrock for the Ujamaa villagization project. Ujamaa villages were conceived as integrated residential and agricultural production units, farmed collectively utilizing state services, with tasks and profits distributed via democratic and cooperative methods. <a href="https://kalamkopi.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/utsa-patnaik-the-agrarian-question-in-the-neoliberal-era.pdf">The creation of these villages</a> followed the nationalization of colonially alienated lands and the creation of state-derived leasehold land-tenure systems on the remaining estates. In its initial phase from 1968 to 1973, the project was met with significant popular enthusiasm. <a href="https://d.lib.msu.edu/ajps/137?__goaway_challenge=header-refresh&amp;__goaway_id=79afe44c27ecff6460048e943ee7d5aa&amp;__goaway_referer=https%3A%2F%2Fd.lib.msu.edu%2F">Agricultural revenue to the state surged in the first year</a>, outperforming the unreliable and often diminished inflows of foreign grants. However, this momentum proved difficult to sustain. There was a slowdown in voluntary participation, largely attributed to the lack of direct financial incentives for individual farmers. This led to a policy shift. By 1973, Nyerere reversed course from voluntary and incentivized villagization he emphasized previously and made it compulsory for all rural populations to live in villages.</p><p>The imperative to boost productivity within <a href="https://dokumen.pub/ujamaa-essays-on-socialism-1nbsped-9780195014747.html">the Ujamaa framework took Nyerere’s policies beyond agriculture</a>. He highlighted that rural women worked the longest hours, while other segments of the population maintained work schedules that were inadequate for the nation’s developmental urgency. He also advocated for a radical rethinking of education, urging that curricula and structures — including age of enrollment — be redesigned to produce individuals equipped to serve and sustain their communities, rather than offering advancement to a privileged few.</p><p>Crucially, Ujamaa’s agrarian focus was in no way an outright rejection of industrialization, but a proposal for a complementary-phase model. The philosophy framed the anticipated increase in agricultural productivity as an essential prerequisite for creating the surplus capital needed to fund industrial expansion. Meanwhile, the model explicitly incorporated co-operatively managed, small-scale industries for processing agricultural produce. These small industries were envisioned and designed not as massive factories, but as decentralized cottage industries that leveraged local labor and raw materials without demanding prohibitive capital investment. As for larger strategic industrial facilities intended to serve the national market, like the Chinese-supported Friendship Textile Mill, Nyerere prioritized logistical efficiency, locating them in urban centers where existing infrastructure minimized additional costs. Thus, Ujamaa envisioned a dialectical progression where the transformed agrarian sector would lay the material and social foundation for a uniquely Tanzanian decentralized path to industrial development. A major shortcoming of the model was that it <a href="https://fenix.ics.ulisboa.pt/downloadFile/844553779150933/Shivji%20Class%20Struggles%20in%20Tanzania.pdf">overlooked class struggle within Tanzanian society</a>, thus allowing wealthier peasants to use villages to further their own interests.</p><p>Like every facet of his political project, Nyerere’s industrial policy was fundamentally geared towards the overarching objectives of achieving self-reliance for Tanzania and securing freedom and development for its people. The intrinsic link between freedom and development is one of Nyerere’s major intellectual contributions. He articulated this at a time when mainstream discourse treated them as separate concerns. In his philosophy, freedom — including national sovereignty, freedom from hunger and poverty and individual freedoms — was contingent upon a material and intellectual foundation. It depended on increasing the wealth and knowledge available to the community; in other words, upon development. Conversely, <a href="https://books.google.com.qa/books?id=9q8aAAAAMAAJ">he argued</a> that true development can only be achieved when directed by free people and sovereign states capable of pursuing their own interests free from external subordination. This dialectical framework shaped his industrial strategy, as evident in his rationale for import substitution industries, which he justified as essential for liberating the nation from the vulnerabilities and dependencies resulting from the chronic need for foreign exchange.</p><p>To a great extent, the Arusha Declaration of 1967 was the foundational blueprint of this agenda. The TANU document penned by Nyerere explicitly links the ownership of the means of production to the goals of self-reliance and national industrial needs. The declaration mandates state ownership over a relatively large range of strategic assets including “land, forests, minerals, water, oil and electricity, news media, communications, banks; insurance; import and export trade; wholesale trade; iron and steel, machine-tools, arms, motor-cars, cement, fertilizers, and textile industries; and any big factory on which a large section of the people depend for their living, or which provides essential components of other industries; large plantations, and especially those which provide raw materials essential to important industries.” In a <a href="https://books.google.com.qa/books?id=9q8aAAAAMAAJ">catalyzing article</a> published about a month after the publication of the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere elaborated that certain sectors were to be exclusively state owned. He described these sectors as major means of production and exchange, and they included minerals, electricity, communication, fertilizers and sectors that provide raw material required for essential industries. He also added the arms industry, mentioning that no private investors should have a share in tools of death. While other sectors could include private investors, the state must retain control over majority shares. These principles were rapidly operationalized via an extensive program of nationalization and state-led investment. The policy was further radicalized in the 1968 pamphlet <cite><a href="https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/973341">Socialism and Rural Development</a></cite>, which proposed that public shares in joint enterprises should — whenever possible — be owned by worker cooperatives, further deepening the model of citizen ownership. In the same article, Nyerere also emphasized the importance of utilizing the profits of publicly owned companies (or, as they are called today, state-owned enterprises [SOEs]) in national development and welfare.</p><p>This framework gave rise to a number of SOEs designed to command the heights of the economy, including the Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) and the flagship National Development Corporation, a holding company of state ventures in cement, textile, beer, and other consumer goods. Nyerere complimented this ownership structure with progressive labor policies, which included a national minimum wage. His approach to market regulation was also relatively pragmatic. In a <a href="https://www.maktaba.org/download/file/1237/Ujamaa_Julius_kambarage_nyerere.pdf">presidential address in 1967</a> he debated the complexities of price control, arguing that unified national prices are only feasible if the state was to subsidize transportation to equalize base cost for sellers. He used this example to caution against dogmatic, hastily implemented controls that ignored regional economic disparities across the country. His solution for mitigating the complexities of price control was the creation of a national council for the matter.</p><p>In 1970, Nyerere issued a presidential circular decreeing workers participation in public corporations. This established workers’ councils composed of representatives of workers and top management working as an advisory body to corporate boards. The initiative was designed to reduce industrial conflict, address workers’ alienation and enhance productivity by fostering collective ownership. However, the following period from 1971 to 1976 witnessed a surge in industrial disputes and strikes. <a href="https://books.google.tn/books/about/Development_as_Rebellion.html?id=s_eazQEACAAJ&amp;redir_esc=y">Researchers attribute</a> this to the policy of retaining pre-nationalization management personnel and entering into management agreements with the same multinational corporations whose assets were nationalized. This generated a stark and unregulated class conflict between workers, on one hand, and management and foreign capital on the other. The blind spot to class struggle appeared with its negative implications within the realm of industry as it did with agriculture.</p><p>Nyerere’s prioritization of sectors that facilitated self-reliance, via the substitution of simple imports and the processing of agricultural produce, did not preclude ambitious efforts to pursue new technology. But the application of technology was deliberately strategic. For example, <a href="https://www.maktaba.org/download/file/1237/Ujamaa_Julius_kambarage_nyerere.pdf">Nyerere clearly emphasized</a> that the immediate goal was not to adopt the world’s most advanced machinery but to utilize technology appropriately and within the skill level of the domestic labor force, thereby avoiding new dependencies on foreign expertise. On the other hand, Tanzania also invested in strategic, ambitious projects to push the evolution of its national technological capabilities. One quintessential example was the local reverse engineering of automotive engines. Led by the Tanzanian research and technology organizations (referred to as RTOs; also called R&amp;amp;D parastatals) including the Tanzania Automotive Technology Center (TATC) and the Tanzania Engineering and Manufacturing Design Organization (TEMDO), a strategic, publicly funded project successfully reverse engineered a complex internal combustion engine. The project, which began while Nyerere was still in power and was completed in the early 1990s after he was no longer in power, demonstrated high local capacity for advanced manufacturing and trained a generation of Tanzanian engineers and technicians. Ultimately, the engine prototype was not commercialized as a result of the subsequent political retreat and structural adjustment pressure after the Nyerere era (1961–1985). Still, the project stands as a powerful testament to the technical and institutional infrastructure forged under Nyerere’s industrial, economic and educational policies. This shows that while Nyerere’s industrial policy is not without flaws and room for improvement, it nevertheless leaves a legacy with significant successes worthy of learning from. This is the case particularly for nations of the Global South that are currently facing the resonant challenges and that share aspirations for self-reliance, freedom, and development.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Beyond borders: collective sovereignty and South-South cooperation</h2></header><div><p>In articulations of his philosophy of self-reliance, Nyerere consistently clarified that it was not a prescription for isolation, but a prerequisite of a more equitable form of international cooperation. His vision presented self-reliance as an essential foundation for collective sovereignty, where nations freed from dependency could engage as genuine partners. His famous analogy about steel manufacturing powerfully illustrated this principle. Here, Nyerere argues that a single capital-poor nation could never afford its own steel mill, a cornerstone of modern development and industry. However, by sharing investments and pooling resources among neighboring countries, such a project becomes economically viable. This model does not only minimize individual costs but also guarantees large integrated markets for the factory’s output, thereby transforming an impossible national dream into an achievable regional imperative.</p><p>Nyerere argued that political alliances must be supported by economic unity. <a href="https://books.google.com.qa/books?id=nMByAAAAMAAJ">This idea</a> was central in his opening address to the 1970 preparatory meeting of the NAM Conference in Dar es Salaam. He framed the core message of nonalignment as “asserting the right of small or militarily weaker nations to determine their own policies in their own interests.” He insisted that this political right was hollow without economic backing and argued that economic weakness is what allows the Big Powers to impose their will on weaker nations, even without using military power. He identified common deficits of capital and technical expertise across the Global South that are hindering its ability to break from economic weakness. Accordingly, Nyerere contended that NAM must become an economic alliance as well. He envisioned practical examples of shared industrial investments, joint infrastructural projects and preferential trade agreements designed to build productive capacities and create mutually beneficial markets to fuel the NAM’s original commitment to genuine political independence.</p><p>This vision was further studied and detailed through the South Commission, a high-level 1987 initiative comprising prominent leaders and intellectuals from across the Global South that was founded by NAM and chaired by Nyerere himself. The commission’s landmark report, “<a href="https://books.google.com.qa/books?id=UZiRAAAAIAAJ">The Challenge of the South</a>,” was published in 1990 and presented an intellectual and policy framework for South-South collaboration on major development imperatives. The report outlined — among a number of other outputs — arrangements for global trade and collective action, as well as possibilities for regional integration on industrial and technological fronts, that were qualitatively distinct from the prevailing neocolonial and neoliberal models, while championing self-reliant development pathways that are forged through southern solidarity.</p><p>Nyerere’s commitment to regional integration is confirmed not just by his intellectual efforts but by his practical political efforts towards unifying African nations such as the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa. These intellectual and political endeavors were not peripheral to Nyerere’s project, but logical extensions. They were part of a deliberate strategy to construct a regional economic base that is robust enough to withstand the pressures of a hostile global order and secure a future defined by collective sovereignty.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>Reckoning with the record: blind spots and enduring lessons</h2></header><div><p>Any appreciative lens of the Nyerere legacy also should be critical. This is a way of building upon the positive insights and successes while revising the theoretical and practical shortcomings. In this section, we briefly highlight some main points of critical engagement with Nyerere’s legacy.</p><p>One of the main theoretical and strategic blind spots in Nyerere’s philosophical foundations was the early failure to recognize class conflict within independent Tanzania. In his foundational writings, like the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere treated newly independent Tanzania as a class-conflict-free zone that remained unpolluted by the emergence of conflicting classes in postcolonial societies. Nyerere saw an opportunity to restructure before capitalist relations of production emerged. However, several sincere <a href="https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/rodney-walter/works/ujamaaandscientificsocialism.htm">scholars of Nyerere’s legacy consider this</a> to be one of the main problematic aspects of his theoretical work, given that Tanganyikan/Tanzanian society already demonstrated the emergence of postcolonial class contradictions. Such theoretical and strategic shortcomings were surely reflected in planning and decision-making.</p><p>Additionally, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40402296">the forced villagization phase of Ujamaa</a> — discussed earlier in this article — has been the foremost target of criticism of the Ujamaa project and the entire Nyerere legacy. While the forced villagization phase proved <a href="https://dokumen.pub/beyond-ujamaa-in-tanzania-reprint-2020nbsped-9780520312593.html">a serious inconsistency in the praxis of Ujamaa</a>, and for that reason deserves criticism, there are studies that give a balanced account of the Ujamaa project in general. Here there are two important aspects to highlight. The first is that forced villagization has recorded successes in other countries — achieving what it set out to do, which is to have the rural peasants produce a high surplus that the state can then use to invest in economic transformation and industrialization in ways that allow for the provision of public services and development of infrastructure. <a href="https://books.google.tn/books/about/The_Socialist_Offensive.html?id=ibbCAQAACAAJ&amp;redir_esc=y">Collectivization in the USSR</a> and China succeeded in that sense — i.e., achieved the goals behind their design — and exercised more coercion than the forced villagization phase of Ujamaa. In that sense, forced villagization itself cannot be described as the reason for the failure of Ujamaa. The second aspect is that the Ujamaa scheme began with voluntary villagization, with relative success. However, studies by Freyhold<em> </em>(1979), Hyden (1980), and others highlighted various external factors — including an unexpected long drought period in Tanzania and problematic interventions by agencies like the World Bank — that contributed to increased pressure. Additional factors included the slowing down of the rate of voluntary villagization (contrary to the early phase of Ujamaa). Eventually, and after that initial success, the Ujamaa scheme struggled. Forced villagization was a rescue attempt that did not provide the desired effect, but nor was not the reason for the failure itself. In this context, the relative success achieved by Ujamaa still carries as many lessons as the eventual failure.</p><p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352800239_Ujamaa_Planning_and_Managing_Development_Schemes_in_Africa_Tanzania_as_a_Case_Study">Some studies</a> highlight the dissonance between strategy and management in Ujamaa as another shortcoming of the Nyerere legacy. This argument points to technical and managerial shortcomings. Indeed, some of these same technical/managerial shortcomings were even highlighted by Nyerere himself. These include his own reflections on the hastiness of nationalizing some industries before making sure that the Tanzanian public sector has the human and institutional capabilities to nationalize them. This also opened a back door for the foreign companies that previously owned these industrial enterprises to return via management contracts.</p><p>Another general criticism is that, despite Nyerere’s preoccupation with combating conditions that foster corruption and compromised political leadership, he ultimately did not succeed in reproducing high caliber strategic and moral leadership within the ruling elite. As some scholars highlight, it was quite telling that by the time Nyerere stepped down from the country’s presidency, no one from the ruling party’s high ranks was willing to openly defend his project. In his later days, Nyerere became more aware of the need for transformations within the state apparatus and ruling elite, as well as in the overall sociopolitical and socioeconomic landscapes. <a href="https://youtu.be/cJg8bwg2ZX8?si=gUgrJYFTIEgLh3Ir">In 1995, in a general meeting of the ruling party (CCM)</a>, he famously said, “Watanzania wanataka Mabadiliko; Wasipoyapata ndani ya CCM, watayatafuta nje ya CCM” (which translates roughly to “Tanzanians want change, and if they don’t find it within CCM, they will seek it outside CCM”).</p><p>Overall, Nyerere’s blind spots are themselves profoundly instructive. They teach us that any economically progressive policy must be designed with a clear-eyed analysis of national power structures to avoid being co-opted by comprador bourgeoisie and rentier classes, or by a version of “development” actively promoted by neoliberal institutions and powers. Additionally, even when theory is sound, without a good strategy the theory cannot prove itself. Furthermore, without effective implementation, and building capabilities for implementation, no strategy can prevail. In dealing with Nyerere’s legacy, and the legacies of other important visionaries from our past, we do well to remember the broad guideline: “<a href="https://dokumen.pub/pan-africanism-or-pragmatism-lessons-of-the-tanganyika-zanzibar-union-1nbsped-9789987081059-9789987449996.html">Vision inspires, practice teaches</a>.”</p><p>When the South Commission report was published in 1990, the UN General Assembly requested that all UN agencies study and take note of its recommendations. This same year, the first Human Development Report, supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), was published. By that time, and since the late 1960s, Nyerere had published several books with Oxford University Press, some of which had received significant praise from reviewers. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Nyerere’s name was well-known in circles concerned with governance and development in the South, including the relevant academic circles in the North. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, Nyerere was still influential in circles concerned with South-South collaboration. However, starting in the mid-1990s, his contributions became less known, largely fading by the turn of the millennium. This coincided with the era by which the neoliberal offensive had consolidated its stranglehold on African politics and in scholarly circles of development studies, in concert with the reign of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and the dominance of development discourses promoted by the IFIs. There were, of course, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2397.2009.00629.x">small pockets of resistance</a>, in circles of development scholarship and development policymaking, that continued to produce relevant literature documenting those dark times for African development. But the overall picture was bleak.</p><p>By then, the dominant atmosphere was the antithesis of Nyerere’s anti-imperialist, Pan-Africanist, socialist stances on development that promoted the developmental state model, industrial policy, self-reliance and South-South collaboration. IFIs become more emboldened by political and economic discourses that discouraged Nyerere’s model. From time to time, Nyerere’s name and legacy were given honorary mention and ceremonial acknowledgment, but that was it. Subsequent generations of African development scholars (especially economists), African decision makers, African NGO directors and activists, and IFI consultants, barely spoke of Nyerere and his legacy. Many have not even encountered his work. Indeed, such treatment did not only target Nyerere’s legacy, but in different degrees the legacies of several African leaders of national liberation, like Amilcar Cabral, Robert Sobukwe, and others. More recently, when parts of Nyerere’s legacy are mentioned, including the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352800239_Ujamaa_Planning_and_Managing_Development_Schemes_in_Africa_Tanzania_as_a_Case_Study">Ujamaa period of Tanzania</a>, they are mostly presented as parts of negative narratives — inflating failures and undermining successes.</p><p>Only now is that period of neglect undergoing revision. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2397.2009.00629.x">Various African development scholars and policymakers</a> have begun to reconsider topics and perspectives from the national liberation era and early decades of political independence. Topics like the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341977587_African_Economic_Development_Evidence_Theory_Policy">developmental state</a>, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299599103_Transformative_Industrial_Policy_for_Africa">industrial policy</a>, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/dech.12381">African regional integration</a>, and <a href="https://suraadiq.com/en/category/publications/">South-South collaboration</a> are back on the menu. With them, Nyerere’s legacy is witnessing a revival through new, both appreciative and critical, lenses.</p><p>The structural threats that Nyerere diagnosed in the 1960s have solidified into the shackles constraining development across the Global South today. The perils of economic dependency, the failure of the neoliberal project, and the foundational link between national sovereignty and human freedom are not historical footnotes but contemporary realities. In fact, even as neoliberal discourse began to lose ground on scholarly and experiential fronts, it increased its stranglehold on political power. The debt burden of our nations has worsened, granting IFIs unprecedented leverage to dictate domestic policy. And while the unipolar moment of a single “Big Power” may be fading, the emerging multipolarity does not guarantee emancipation. Without deliberate collective strategies and renewed initiatives of collective sovereignty that learn from NAM, the South Commission, and other experiences, the Global South risks merely swapping old masters for new ones.</p><p>New existential crises further compound these persisting challenges, including the escalating uncertainties of climate change, displacement caused by war and conflicts, and pandemics. Such emergencies have, in our recent history, intensified the imperative of self-reliance in strategic commodities and the necessity of robust and state-guaranteed social welfare systems.</p><p>In this complex landscape, Nyerere’s dialectical conception of freedom and development can serve as an indispensable compass for crafting industrial policy. It directs us toward people-centric models that prioritize both social and economic rights. His philosophy, guided by the overarching objective of expanding freedom, provides a critical framework for navigating the fine line between development and disenfranchisement. It challenges us to chart pathways of industrialization that do not culminate in the limitation of freedom through environmental collapse, resource wars, or inequalities in wealth distribution. Furthermore, his extensive experiments with communal ownership, workers ownership and direct democracy, even if not all successful, still provide a vital repository of practical knowledge. They offer, for instance, critical insights into our contemporary attempts to resolve the enduring questions of state intervention and democracy. As <a href="https://www.maktaba.org/download/file/1237/Ujamaa_Julius_kambarage_nyerere.pdf">Nyerere himself presciently highlighted</a>, “If the people are not involved in public ownership and cannot control the policies followed, the public ownership can lead to fascism, not socialism. If the people are not sovereign, then they can suffer under dreadful tyranny imposed in their name.”</p><p>The relevance of Nyerere’s proposals in terms of regional integration are similarly magnified in the current moment. In the age of fragile global supply chains and weaponized economic tools like sanctions and tariffs, the logic of collective self-reliance and South-South cooperation in an autonomous fashion (i.e., not subordinated to the empire) is a strategic necessity. Additionally, while Nyerere’s specific tactics of agrarian-led industrialization may not form a universal blueprint, his methodological approach to designing an industrial road map that strategically balances available resources with defined developmental goals stands as powerful evidence for the fruitfulness of appropriate, context-specific industrial policy.</p><p>There is a critical intellectual imperative to repatriating the contributions of Mwalimu J. K. Nyerere in development and industrial policy debates. His legacy is not a mere relic rendered to the archives, but a living tradition of Southern socialist philosophy, and a rich, critical, and practical resource for any project that seeks to forge a future where freedom is the tangible outcome of a just economic order.</p></div></section></article></content><published>2026-05-05T02:35:15.814481Z</published><summary type="text">As debates on industrial policy revive, Nyerere’s legacy offers a critical archive of both the promise and limits of socialist development.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/from-mubarak-to-sisi</id><title type="text">From Mubarak to Sisi</title><updated>2026-05-01T02:12:49.394651Z</updated><author><name>Hossam el-Hamalawy</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>On the night of October 8, 2000, I left my university campus in downtown Cairo and drove to Giza, where I was to meet for the first time Ahmed Fouad Negm, the legendary leftist colloquial poet whose words had inspired some of the most iconic Egyptian and Arab protest songs since the late 1960s.</p><p>Negm had heard of me and asked to meet after learning of my role in organizing the mass student protests that swept the country with the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada. As I made my way through the crowded streets, I realized I was being followed. Suddenly, two cars cut across the road, and gunmen in plain clothes dragged me from my car, blindfolded me with the Palestinian scarf I was wearing, and shoved me into the back seat of one of their vehicles. They sped off to Lazoghly Square in central Cairo, to the compound housing the Ministry of Interior and its secret police, the State Security Investigations Service (SS).</p><p>For four days, I endured a torture odyssey of beatings, sleep deprivation, and verbal abuse, blindfolded and stripped naked, threatened with rape. The final two nights were spent in a cramped underground cell with detainees labeled “jihadi” suspects. My SS interrogators believed they could intensify the pressure by locking a Marxist in with “Islamist terrorists,” hoping those hours between torture sessions would be unbearable. They would likely have been disappointed: I was treated with kindness.</p><p>The detainees shared food and tried to make space in the overcrowded cell. As we spoke, their stories emerged and were strikingly similar. None belonged to militant groups, but many had relatives who had joined one — or were simply suspected of doing so. SS arrested those relatives, then swept up all the men in their families, subjecting them to torture and indefinite detention without trial. The aim was not intelligence-gathering; the officers knew most were innocent. It was about sending a message: anyone who dared to resist the state would see not only themselves but their entire families, friends, and colleagues punished. This was Egypt’s war on terror — backed, armed, financed, and enabled by the West.</p><p>It was not my last detention. Over the next decade, as I pursued activism within the socialist movement, I remained a constant target of state violence. My political engagement began in 1996, during my sophomore year, and deepened when I joined the Revolutionary Socialists in 1998. I belonged to a generation that helped rebuild the left on university campuses after the collapse of the Third Wave of Egyptian Communism and the suppression of the 1977 bread uprising. As a student activist — and later as a journalist, photographer, and labor organizer — I regularly faced the security services, from raids, arrests, and torture to surveillance, intimidation, blacklisting, and smear campaigns. These experiences sharpened my determination to study the enemy and to deconstruct the war on terror, whose destructive impact I had witnessed both as a teenager in the 1990s and again in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution’s defeat.</p><p>Hosni Mubarak’s war on terror was long hailed as a success by local media and Western officials, providing a key rationale for sustained international support despite his failures in governance. After the suppression of the Arab revolutions (2010–13), counterrevolutionary regimes — including Abdel el-Sisi’s — revived this discourse to legitimize their rule at home and abroad.</p><p>My interest gradually shifted toward the faceless enablers of this war — the army, police, and General Intelligence Service — examining their ideology, interests, and interactions with both each other and the wider population. Together these institutions form one of the oldest and most powerful repressive apparatuses in the Middle East. Yet for decades, they remained fragmented, often competing even as they safeguarded regime survival. Understanding their internal dynamics is essential to grasping their role before, during, and after the 2011 uprisings.</p><p>Counterrevolutions are often assumed to restore the ancien régime, but Egypt’s trajectory under Sisi challenges this notion. While the counterrevolution triumphed, its leader set out to construct an entirely new order — what he called a “New Republic” or “Second Republic.” Figures from the Mubarak era may still linger, but their influence has steadily waned as they adapt to new rules in an unfamiliar political landscape.</p><p>My book <cite>Counterrevolution in Egypt: Sisi’s New Republic</cite> does not attempt a full anatomy of this order; instead, it traces its evolution through the lens of repression. I argue that Sisi, for the first time since 1952, succeeded in unifying Egypt’s coercive apparatus and empowering it to dominate the state. The result is a republic without a social contract, devoid of hegemony, locked in an existential war against its own people, and operating more like a colonial occupier than a national government.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-05-01T02:12:49.394651Z</published><summary type="text">What began as a familiar security state has hardened into something new: a unified coercive order that governs Egypt through violence, surveillance, and permanent emergency.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/when-the-peacemaker-clocks-out</id><title type="text">When the peacemaker clocks out</title><updated>2026-04-30T13:59:57.904551Z</updated><author><name>Ethan Woolf Moñino</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>At the 19th Ambassadors’ Conference in Nairobi last month, President William Ruto told Kenya’s diplomats what they are now for. <a href="https://www.ecofinagency.com/news/0104-54321-kenya-shifts-to-economic-diplomacy-to-drive-trade-and-investment">Their missions abroad must function as &amp;quot;frontline engines&amp;quot; for trade expansion and investment attraction</a>. Embassies will be evaluated on measurable economic outcomes. The language of regional stability and pan-African solidarity was present, but ornamental, a mere paragraph after the main argument. Kenya, Ruto was saying, can no longer afford to be the Horn of Africa’s conscience. It has bills to pay.</p><p>This was not a surprise to anyone who has been following Kenya’s domestic political landscape.</p><p>As of May 2025, Kenya’s debt service to revenue ratio stood at <a href="https://cytonnreport.com/topicals/review-of-kenyas-1">67.1%</a>, which stands at 37.1 percentage points above the IMF’s recommended threshold of 30% and second-highest among major African economies, behind only Nigeria, nearly four times the rate of neighboring Uganda. For every three shillings Kenya collects, two go to creditors before a single teacher is paid, a single road is built, or a single diplomat is deployed to calm a neighboring war. This is a structural condition that makes the performance of regional leadership not just expensive but also impossible under foreign debt.</p><p>Ruto arrived at the presidency in 2022 with genuine regional ambitions. He chaired the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Quartet mediating Sudan’s civil war. He launched the Tumaini Initiative in South Sudan. He deployed Kenyan troops to eastern DRC and positioned Nairobi as an alternative peacemaker in the Horn of Africa, <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/vying-regional-leadership-horn-africa">which some analysts read as an attempt to fill the vacuum left by Ethiopia’s internal collapse</a>, In May 2024, at his peak, he was at the White House as the first Kenyan head of state to receive a full state visit in 16 years, designated a major non-NATO ally, and celebrated as Africa’s indispensable partner.</p><p>Six weeks later, his parliament was on fire.</p><p>The finance bill that triggered the Gen-Z protests was not a policy error. It was a debt repayment instrument. The IMF publicly endorsed it as “an important step in correcting course,” the course being Kenya’s obligations under its Extended Credit Facility. When protesters held signs reading “IMF, World Bank Stop the Modern Day Slavery” outside a burning parliament, they were identifying the bill’s true authors more accurately than most diplomatic analysis managed. Independent human rights organizations estimated that in the crackdown there were between <a href="https://lethalindisguise.org/case-studies/kenya-anti-finance-bill/">60 and 65 deaths</a>, with more than 1,200 arrests and more than 60 documented enforced disappearances. Two years on, the bill is withdrawn, and Kenya has drawn the logical conclusion: a state that cannot make autonomous fiscal decisions cannot credibly perform autonomous foreign policy. The state’s violence against its own citizens, and the IMF conditionality that provoked it, destroyed Kenya’s credibility as a neutral broker in precisely the moment the Horn needed one most. Sudan’s armed forces <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/analysis/2025/05/23/the-protracted-sudan-conflict-and-why-mediation-has-failed/">had already rejected</a> Ruto’s leadership of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Quartet, accusing him of commercial ties with the RSF. Kenya’s credibility as a mediator in the Sudanese conflict further deteriorated when, in February 2025, Kenya hosted an RSF-aligned political roadmap, leading analysts to describe Ruto as a “war enabler.”</p><p>It would be naive and colonial to name this as a failure of Kenya’s rather than the economic system it is hostage to. The African Union has committed to financing <a href="https://au.int/en/PeaceFund">25%</a> of its own peace operations. The remaining <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/qna/africa/african-union-regional-bodies/security-council-agrees-consider-funding-au-peace-operations">75%</a> comes from Brussels, Washington, and Beijing. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the body through which Kenya was supposed to be mediating Sudan, runs its peace and security division on <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/54650_en">EU Trust Funds</a>. The AU Mission to Somalia <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/african-union-regional-bodies/297-how-spend-it-new-eu-funding-african-peace-and-security">received €1.94 billion from the European Union between 2007 and 2019</a>; when Brussels threatened to reduce contributions, AU officials were unprepared, and the mission remained donor-dependent. The EU has now replaced the African Peace Facility with the European Peace Facility, a restructuring that <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/eu-peace-and-security-funds-can-now-bypass-the-african-union">explicitly allows Brussels to bypass the AU’s own PSC mandate</a> and fund African military operations directly when it judges this as more strategically convenient. The architecture of African peace and security, from the individual indebted state to the regional body to the continental organization, is structurally dependent on external money that comes with conditions, directions, and the ability to be withdrawn.</p><p>To ask why Kenya could not be a neutral broker in Sudan is to ask the wrong question. Neutrality is a luxury unavailable to states whose fiscal choices are made in a foreign capital. The more honest question is: what would genuine African diplomatic sovereignty actually require? An African peace architecture that does not depend on the European Peace Facility for 75% of its funding, and African states that do not spend two-thirds of their revenue servicing loans before they can afford to send an envoy.</p><p>The AU’s first <a href="https://au.int/en/newsevents/20250512/african-union-conference-debt">Debt Conference</a>, held in Lomé in May 2025, gestured toward this by proposing a Pan-African Credit Rating Agency and reforms to enforce creditor participation in debt restructuring. It is a beginning. Whether those proposals survive contact with the IMF’s next review cycle is the real question, and the answer will determine whether the Horn has any prospect of being stabilised by Africans rather than managed by the conditions attached to the money that pays for the management.</p><p>Kenya’s pivot to economic diplomacy at last month’s Ambassadors&amp;#39; Conference was not cynical. It reflects the colonial economic system that, like Kenya, holds so many African nations hostage to debt repayment. It is a luxury to be neutral. It is a luxury to have an independent foreign policy.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-30T13:59:57.904551Z</published><summary type="text">Kenya’s shift toward trade-led diplomacy underscores the difficulty of sustaining regional leadership under conditions of fiscal dependence.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/kenyas-goon-economy</id><title type="text">Kenya’s goon economy</title><updated>2026-04-29T16:21:49.80146Z</updated><author><name>Tribeless Youth</name></author><author><name>Odipo Dev</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>In the socio-economic underclasses around Nairobi, Kenya — a certain kind of market opens for business each day. It’s not a market for food or clothing, but for violence. The currency is desperation, and the commodities are young men whose bodies and futures are traded for quick cash. The brokers are politicians, from Members of County Assembly (MCAs), businessmen seeking to enforce market cartels, and the chain goes all the way to the top. The input is masculine anxiety; the output is chaos.</p><p>This is the world of the political militia, locally known as goons, a term our sources used with a mixture of resignation and grim pride. Over weeks in September and October 2025, <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/documents/goonland-looking-beyond-the-money-and-violence-in-the-political-exploitation-of-young-men/">Odipodev conducted a series of interviews with young Kenyan men aged 18–30</a>. Their testimonies pulled back the curtain on a sophisticated, brutal, and deeply entrenched system — weaponized masculinities for hire. This ranges from random hooliganism to an elaborate freelance security sector for the political elite, operating on a clear price list, a defined hierarchy, and a chilling understanding of its own disposability.</p><p>The service has a fixed, depressingly low market rate, with charges increasing depending on the hierarchy of the politician who’s asking: Local council members (MCAs): 500 Kenyan Shillings (approx. $3.50 USD). “It won’t even finish your hunger,” Maurice scoffs. Members of Parliament (MPs): 1,000 KSH (approx. $7 USD) — the standard rate for most jobs. County Governors: 1,500–2,000 KSH (approx. $10–$14 USD). “When you hear the governor&amp;#39;s name, you start shaking your head,” says Maurice. “You expect to earn well.”</p><p>Payment is per task, distributed just before the job starts. The work involves disturbing rival meetings, causing fracas, beating protesters, and land-grabbing. For specialized tasks, like what goons call “slaughtering people,” the pay can be higher.</p><p>The first thing that’s striking, beyond the violence, is the profound vulnerability that precedes it. These men are not natural-born vandals, but a group of unemployed graduates and young fathers pushed to the brink. Dennis, a university-educated garbage collector from Dandora, frames his motivation in existential terms: “What motivates me in life at the moment is the fact that I can sleep and wake up in the morning.” For others, the drive is direct. Sharif, a 24-year-old from Kiamaiko, states: “I have a little girl. So, I have to push.”</p><p>This raw need is the engine. As Maurice from Korogocho explains, the ghetto is the perfect recruiting ground because it is filled with people who are “illiterate,” “unemployed,” young men who “put money first as the priority.” He articulates the grim transaction: “As long as the money is guaranteed, we will do everything just to make him satisfied with his own needs.”</p><p>In this shadowy network of illicit wealth and performative bravado, new Kenyan masculinities are forged. This realm offers young men a perverse meritocracy, where audacity substitutes for stalled social mobility. The flaunted threats and rivalries are not mere showmanship but armor, projecting a hyper-competent virility that mainstream society denies them. This display of masculine performance exists both in the physical enclaves of Nairobi and in digital spaces where aspirational “big men” curate their conquests online, merging cyber-savvy with physical intimidation. Even then, this desire for recognition often masks a profound vulnerability: a craving for traditional respect and economic stability, redirected through dangerous channels. The goon, therefore, is both a rebel against a system and its most tragic product, his motivations a complex alloy of lack, ambition, and the desperate performance of power.</p><p>The goon economy is a structured enterprise populated by different hierarchies, each seeking to fulfill a need, all intertwined in the broader universe of bravado. At the bottom are the foot soldiers, or “goons,” who operate in crews of 20 to 50. “We call ourselves brothers,” says Dennis.</p><p>Above them are the on-ground leaders, the “representatives” or “wasangwenya.” These individuals are the crucial link, known to both politicians and gangs. They receive orders, negotiate payment, and appoint front-line leaders. They rarely get their hands dirty. Sharif notes, “He gets a big share of the money. . . .  he is most respected in the ghetto.”</p><p>At the top are the “Kingpins” or “Big Fish.” Maurice explains their role: “Without them, we can’t operate. . . .  They are the ones who meet with the politicians.” These figures insulate the political class. And then there are the clients themselves, from local MCAs to the highest county office. Dennis explicitly describes being hired by senior officials. “Sorry to say,” he states, recalling the first Gen Z protests: “he paid us to burn the county government offices so as to destroy the evidence. So, they blamed the protesters, but in real sense, he wanted it to happen.”</p><p>Politicians are not just financiers; they are quartermasters. Weapons — <i>rungus</i> (clubs), <i>pangas</i> (machetes), and slashers — are provided directly by the clients. Dennis describes being given rungus by the governor’s team to disrupt Gen Z protests.</p><p>Logistics are hidden in plain sight. Weapons are sometimes transported in county government vehicles, disguised as part of state youth programs. Crucially, weapons are meant to be ephemeral. “After being paid, we don’t see the reason for carrying these weapons anymore,” says Maurice, describing discarding blood-stained pangas in public washrooms. “They don’t want to be associated.”</p><p>The system is built on the absolute disposability of these young men. There is no insurance, no safety net. Dennis recounts fatal incidents during community disputes and protests. “My crew were like six guys. . . .  one of us was captured by the protesters and was badly beaten, and he later died.”</p><p>If a goon is arrested or injured, the universal response is “you sort yourself.” The politicians vanish. “You cannot say the truth coz even the police will deal with you,” Dennis states. The police are often described as complicit. Maurice is direct: “The police know they’re on the payroll. So, they don’t want to interfere with you.”</p><p>Leaving this life is perilous. The primary barrier is economic. Sharif says, “The easiest way is getting employment.” But employment is what they lack. Pascal clarifies: “The ‘Big Fish’ who calls you for mjengo [casual labor] is the same one who calls you for shugli ya mhesh [political work].”</p><p>The secondary barrier is intimidation and the threat of violence. Dennis says refusing a job makes him a target. Maurice provides the chilling details: “Once people know that you want to leave the industry, that’s when they start to sense that the betrayal has begun. . . . People are going to kill you.” His advice is to leave Nairobi entirely for the rural home for at least six months to be forgotten.</p><p>In the end, their power is borrowed — a violent illusion that vanishes the moment the job is done, leaving them with a few hundred shillings and the scars to prove it. They are, as one respondent said, “soldiers” in a war they didn’t start, fighting for a cause that offers them no future, trapped in an economy where the only growth industry is their own misery.</p><p>From Nairobi’s slums to the suburbs of Sydney, this volatile commodity is frequently traded: the anxiety of displaced young men. Political elites broker this desperation to fuel their power.</p><p>In established democracies, the weaponization is often discursive but no less potent. Young men are lurching right, channeling precarity and alienation into support for populist, often far-right narratives. The currency is not cash, but identity and belonging.</p><p>This pattern repeats globally. In India, ethnoreligious nationalism mobilizes young men. In Nigeria and Kenya, the transaction is brutally direct: poverty is exchanged for political violence. In South Africa, grievances are harnessed, leading to communal violence. In the United States, resentments are channeled into movements that convert racial anxiety into political energy.</p><p>Globally, the story of weaponized young men is not just a story of crime; it is a story of a failed social contract with a generation of men. It is the story of how a generation of young, capable, and desperately poor people have had their masculine ambitions systematically weaponized by the political class. They are not admired in society — they are feared, exploited, and pitied, their manhood both their most marketable asset and their most fatal vulnerability.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-29T16:21:49.80146Z</published><summary type="text">Across the country’s urban centers, young men are being recruited into political militias that offer quick cash, fleeting power, and little chance of escape.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/preaching-to-the-powerful</id><title type="text">Pope Leo and the strongmen</title><updated>2026-04-27T19:35:10.844518Z</updated><author><name>Zahra Rahmouni</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>They say there’s no point preaching to the converted, but on his African tour, Pope Leo XIV went further, speaking hard truths to those who least wanted to hear them. His visits to Algeria, Cameroon, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea were scrutinized across the world, and the choice of these countries raised questions among human rights and individual freedoms advocates. Why would the pope travel to Algeria when several Algerians remain detained for their opinions? Why go to Cameroon, where President Paul Biya has been in power for 44 years, or to Equatorial Guinea, where President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has reigned for 47?</p><p>Those questions kept the tour under a microscope. Yet Leo XIV walked a careful line, keeping his distance from the political establishments while genuinely connecting with ordinary people. Known to be discreet and reserved, Pope Leo XIV revealed a different side of himself in Africa.</p><p>The pope calls himself a “son of Saint Augustine.” That is why his visit to Algeria, which he decided to undertake shortly after the beginning of his pontificate in May 2025, carried such deep meaning. On a personal level, it was his third visit to the country, but his first as pope. Catholics are a small minority in the North African nation, with roughly 8,500 worshippers, most of which are expatriates and students.</p><p>Before the pope’s arrival in Algeria, NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, sent him a letter urging him to challenge the authorities on violations of individual freedoms and religious freedom, citing in particular the closure of Protestant churches in the country. In Algeria, Protestants — and especially evangelicals — are kept under close watch. Proselytizing aimed at converting Muslims is banned under Algerian law, as it is considered an attack on the foundations of the state.</p><p>These questions of individual freedoms and religious practice were not publicly addressed by the pontiff during his visit. Nevertheless, he called on the authorities to promote “a living, dynamic and free civil society.”</p><p>On his first day in Algeria, standing before President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, the pope called on leaders “not to dominate, but to serve the people and their development.” A pointed critique, given that at least 200 political detainees are still imprisoned after being arrested during the Hirak protests of 2019 and 2020, which were peaceful demonstrations that led to the resignation of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who had been in power for 20 years.</p><p>He delivered a similar message days later in Cameroon, facing Paul Biya, who was reelected in October 2025 for an eighth consecutive term amid violence that left at least 20 protesters dead. Ranked 142nd out of 182 countries on Transparency International’s corruption index, Cameroon gave the pope an unmissable opening. He took it — likening corruption to “idolatry” and insisting that “true gain is the integral development of human beings.” He called for transparency in public resource management and respect for the rule of law, as Biya sat stone-faced beside him.</p><p>In a curious episode, Cameroon’s state broadcaster, CRTV, cut its live feed of the papal address mid-speech. Officials blamed a fiber optic failure, but that claim was flatly contradicted by Camtel, the network’s own operator, which said no technical fault had been detected. Deliberate censorship or a coincidence? The question remains.</p><p>In Angola, the pope addressed a crowd of 100,000 faithful and didn’t soften his message. One-third of Angolans live in poverty — despite the country being Africa’s fourth-largest oil producer and the world’s third-largest diamond producer. Leo XIV condemned the “logic of exploitation” of natural resources that generates “social and environmental catastrophe,” taking clear aim at the foreign corporations and domestic elites that pocket the country’s wealth.</p><p>“Many people no longer believe in elections,” said Angolan journalist Omar Prata, describing a climate of deep polarization and social unrest. Still, he noted that in the days following the papal visit, the government announced emergency measures to assist thousands of families displaced by flooding in Benguela. That was a limited but tangible shift in attention toward those most in need, particularly with the increased cost of living due to America’s war in Iran.</p><p>In Equatorial Guinea, the final stop, the pope pressed on. “The greed for mineral and oil wealth fuels wars in contempt of international law and the self-determination of peoples,” he declared. The visit was shadowed by a pre-arrival scandal: Reports, gathered by AFP, alleged that civil servants and soldiers had seen wages docked to fund the papal preparations, while university students in Malabo were reportedly required to purchase their own matching uniforms for the occasion.</p><p>The last pope to visit Equatorial Guinea was John Paul II in 1982. Back then, Teodoro Obiang had been in power for just three years, having overthrown his own uncle in a military coup. Forty-four years later, Leo XIV arrived to meet the same man in office, now as the longest-serving non-monarchical head of state in the world.</p><p>In a country of two million people, over 1.4 million are Catholic. The Church’s influence is immense. And that weight cuts both ways. Critics argue that papal visits, however well-intentioned, ultimately serve as a form of international legitimization for authoritarian rulers, offering them a boost in global image and a dose of credibility with their own populations.</p><p>In a piece published on our website, Cameroonian theology professor David Tonghou Ngong argues that the Catholic Church has a troubling habit of providing moral and political cover to the Biya regime precisely when it needs it most and that the pope’s visit, coming during an ongoing Anglophone conflict in the country’s northwest, benefits the very power it appeared to challenge.</p><p>However, it is worth noting that separatist groups in Cameroon declared a three-day ceasefire to mark the pope’s arrival. Leo XIV traveled to Bamenda, the epicenter of the crisis, where he called for peace and reconciliation.</p><p>Cameroonian journalist Eugene Ndi sees it differently. “He didn’t mince his words in front of our president,” he said, noting that Leo XIV openly told Biya that breaking the chains of corruption is a precondition for peace. “It is now incumbent on the government to move forward, through the Church, through civil society, through diplomacy. The pope has done his part. What remains is for the government of Cameroon to make sure what he started bears fruit.”</p><p>Through unambiguous messages delivered face-to-face with some of Africa’s most entrenched rulers, Pope Leo XIV emerged as an unlikely spokesman for the voiceless. This tour seemed to reveal who he really is: a pontiff determined not to let the papacy, or religion itself, be used as a prop by those in power, whether in Africa or anywhere else.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-27T19:35:10.844518Z</published><summary type="text">The Pope’s African tour tested whether the papacy can speak to ordinary people without becoming a prop for authoritarian power.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/the-heart-of-the-south-african-film-industry</id><title type="text">The heart of the South African film industry</title><updated>2026-05-01T03:08:40.355423Z</updated><author><name>Tsogo Kupa</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>In Njabulo S. Ndebele’s essay “<a href="https://www.njabulondebele.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Rediscovery_of_the_Ordinary.pdf">The Rediscovery of the Ordinary</a>,” Ndebele observes that South Africa’s “overwhelmingly oppressive” social formation prompted a school of literature that orientated itself towards spectacle. From coast to coast, the absurdity of colonialism and apartheid created a fractured and cratered landscape of a country, and any attempt to reconcile these fragments into a coherent narrative work inevitably found itself in the realm of sensationalism. The true measure of any South African storyteller isn’t to out-sensationalize a country spoiled rotten with it, but to rummage through the noise and find the tender root of how South Africans live and relate to themselves.</p><p>The debut feature film from writer/director Imran Hamdulay, <cite>The Heart Is a Muscle</cite>, reclaims the ordinary out of the absurd. It’s a humble independent film about a father on a path towards self-discovery after his son is kidnapped. In lesser hands, the stakes and dramatic arc of the film would’ve been ratcheted up to a substandard <cite>John Wick</cite> — esque crime-action thriller. In Hamdulay’s, it becomes a tender portrait of masculinity, fatherhood, and how the Cape Flats have molded those identities.</p><p>Previously an urban wasteland, the Cape Flats became Cape Town’s “dumping ground” to house families of color forcibly removed from the inner city during apartheid. Unlike Soweto or other urban constructs built to house people of color in apartheid, the soil on which the Cape Flats was built was scarcely a home to anyone at all, and thus this township was born of exile and grief. It’s <a href="https://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0259-94222014000300033">argued</a> that the forced removals from people’s original neighborhoods fractured embedded familial and social networks (which in part curbed local gang activity through informal social control), and opened the opportunity for piddling gangs to transform into sophisticated crime syndicates. Cape Town remains the most unequal city in one of the most unequal countries in the world, and the endemic poverty and unemployment exacerbated by the Flats’ distance to education and employment in the town’s inner city compounds the material and social conditions for gang culture to thrive. Regardless, it’s a place where human life is settled, and despite the shroud of historical grief and contemporary violence that cloaks the Flats in infamy, people continue to live, struggle, love, and flourish. It’s in that warmth of humanity that <cite>The Heart Is a Muscle</cite> finds its home.</p><p>The film’s story is mostly set in Ottery, a suburb on the outskirts of the Cape Flats, a liminal space between secure middle-class quietude and the looming threat of crime and gang violence next door. Ryan (Keenan Arrison) is introduced with a close-up of his knuckles, coated in gang-related tattoos. He’s pushing a grocery trolley with his young son (Jude) as he begs for a treasure trove of sweets and treats his father should buy him as they pass through the aisles. The contrast of the archetypal middle-class chore and the stamped legacy of his past is a striking metaphor of the central tension throughout the film and of his character.</p><p>Keenan Arrison plays Ryan with an anxious tension resting in his chest, knowing, like all good actors do, that the key to a character’s interiority is in their eyes. Ryan is always guarding something. With a keen sense of the magnetism of his expressions and physicality, Arrison’s eyes communicate the gentle pressure and release of Ryan’s consciousness, allowing Ryan to unfurl and retreat as the film’s narrative challenges and stretches him.</p><p>Through Jude, Ryan yearns to rewrite the history of violence that runs through his personal life and lineage. As rich as the potential of the father-son relationship is for Ryan’s redemptive arc, the relationship with another character is where the majority of the film’s drama lies. Whilst searching for Jude, Ryan attacks André, a resident of the Cape Flats, whom he falsely accuses of kidnapping Jude. After Jude is found, Ryan seeks out André, wishing to make amends, ultimately hoping that if André can forgive him, countless others before him will. A script contrivance ties the characters closer to each other, and the dramatic tension doesn’t have the legs to carry a feature length’s worth of drama, yet it provides some of the more revelatory scenes in the film.</p><p>The film is steeped in many contemporary platitudes on how Black male masculinity should be interrogated, and they are sometimes delivered flatly without complication. The script can struggle to bear the heaviness of its weighty themes, and can opt for the expected as far as dialogue goes, but what saves the film is when Hamdulay allows his images to speak for him. A beach scene, as derivative of Barry Jenkins’s <cite>Moonlight</cite> as it may be, is a deeply emotive moment for reflection for Ryan, and the film’s conclusion allows more room for fruitful imagination than many open endings do in cinema.</p><p>Wholesale, it’s the quintessential debut feature for an impressively talented filmmaker. It is as earnest as it is clumsy, and Hamdulay’s strengths shine just as much as his weaknesses. It’s a compelling film amongst a growing filmography of standout South African films in recent years. However, it won’t be seen by a majority of South Africans.</p><p><cite>The Heart Is a Muscle</cite> is also South Africa’s submission for the Best Foreign Film at this year’s Academy Awards. The nominees for the last Academy Awards were announced on the same day as an <a href="https://variety.com/2026/film/global/south-african-rebate-system-industry-crisis-1236679101/">industry-wide protest</a> at the Department of Trade, Industry and Commerce. Under the “SAVE SA FILM &amp;amp; TV JOBS” banner, thousands of film practitioners marched to Parliament to address the delays in the DTIC rebate system (a government system within which South African productions are paid back up to 35 percent of their total expenditure for their film). The delays meant scores of film practitioners and production houses had not been paid in months, and people were foreclosed from their houses, blacklisted from banks, dispossessed from their homes and assets, amidst other financial hardships.</p><p>As per the <a href="https://www.nfvf.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2023-Box-Office-Report.pdf">last official box office report released for 2023</a>, South African films accounted for only 0.9 percent of the country’s total box office spend. Therefore, film practitioners are largely reliant on various government-funded bodies to both fund their practice and recoup filmmaking expenses. At this year’s South African Film and Television Awards ceremony, Sports, Arts and Culture Minister Gayton McKenzie echoed the call for increased capacity in film distribution and audience development, expanding local cinema’s reach. He further promised nominees and attendees that their overdue DTIC rebates will come soon. The response to Minister McKenzie’s trademark egoistic assurances was tepid applause. Many industry veterans in the room understood with a painful intuition that his promises were vapid and soon to be neglected once the glitter and sheen of the ceremony was behind them.</p><p>If <cite>The Heart Is a Muscle</cite> were nominated for or won at the Academy Awards, there would be great fanfare amongst those in the industry sheltered from its disrepair. Diatribes would be written, speechified and posted about how the South African film industry is finally on the rise. It would be a tremendous and deserved victory for Hamdulay and the film’s cast and crew, securing them future work they would’ve otherwise still deserved, and their film would get the theatrical release it always deserved. After everything is said and done, the status quo would return. This is true of South Africa’s first Best Foreign Film award winner, <cite>Tsotsi</cite>.</p><p>In referring to the Oscars, Bong Joon Ho, the director of the Oscar-winning <cite>Parasite</cite>, <a href="https://wesleyanargus.com/2020/02/14/bong-joon-ho-at-the-local-film-festival/">lamented</a>, “It’s not an international film festival, it’s very local.” The anti-imperialist fervor from the school of mid-century filmmakers in the Global South has withered, and filmmakers from around the world tacitly understand the Oscars are cinema’s local-but-international award ceremony. Bong Joon Ho’s Best Picture win for <cite>Parasite</cite> marked what many thought to be a reorientation of the Academy Awards towards a more multipolar ceremony, where the Best Foreign Film category would retreat into redundancy, and all the world’s cinema could compete at the awards for an equal chance at local-but-international recognition.</p><p>There is a pervasive belief that proximity to Hollywood grants an industry a piece of its stature. What’s neglected in that aspiration is that to create it. America <a href="https://www.carlkruse.com/how-hollywood-ate-the-world/">breached international antitrust laws and handicapped domestic industries</a> in other countries to expand its reach and revenue when its own domestic market couldn’t sustain its own ambitions. Hollywood did not independently manifest an international entertainment ecosystem that made it exceptionally profitable; it created one where it could only be exceptionally profitable. <a href="https://news.cornell.edu/media-relations/tip-sheets/cornell-expert-international-markets-account-over-70-hollywoods-box">It’s reported that over 70 percent</a> of Hollywood’s gross box office comes from international markets, and this figure comes at the expense of many domestic film industries across the world, including South Africa, where Hollywood accounts for the remaining 99 percent of our box office spend. For the Best Foreign Film category, international countries aren’t being offered a seat at the most prestigious table there is in cinema; they’re jockeying for a seat at a table they helped build. For almost every year in the 21st century, more than any other African country, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_South_African_submissions_for_the_Academy_Award_for_Best_International_Feature_Film">South Africa has thrown its hat in that ring</a>.</p><p>In line with the welcoming of Netflix, Amazon Prime, and most recently, Canal+, too much weight has been placed on the importance of integrating our industry into an international framework at the expense of developing distribution avenues and fostering a more independent media economy. After French media giant Canal+’s recent acquisition of Multichoice and the <a href="https://www.canalplusgroup.com/en/mandatoryoffermultichoice/multichoice-post-76">cancellation of the beloved streaming platform Showmax</a>, which also employed dozens of filmmakers, shareholders are making their reservations to invest in the industry known, and the impacts on film practitioners are devastating. As previously mentioned, local productions gross a next-to-negligible percentage of the country’s box office spend. Any attempts to supplement this are obstructed by a conglomeration of cinema distributors that are privately owned and are under no present obligations to comply with domestic screening quotas to screen local films for wide-release and for a significant amount of time (as exists in <a href="https://minister.infrastructure.gov.au/wells/media-release/local-content-requirements-streaming-services">Australia</a>, <a href="https://www.unesco.org/creativity/en/policy-monitoring-platform/screen-quota-brazilian-audiovisual">Brazil</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/10/south-korea-film-movie-industry-screen-quota-protectionism-free-trade-covid/">South Korea</a>). A similar measure in South Africa would only take hold after a significant organizing force and political will. As of writing this article, <cite>The Heart Is a Muscle</cite> is only available to watch through select screenings, film festivals, and limited theatrical releases lasting a few weeks at a time at smaller cinema outlets. The first of those limited theatrical releases was to qualify the film for the Best Foreign Film category award. I shudder to think of the number of South Africans who would’ve gotten the chance to watch the film if it weren’t for that ulterior motive.</p><p>And still, against it all, filmmakers continue to make films, and contrary to the belief of an unfortunate number of South Africans, they’re damn good. It is not simply that more people should see <cite>The Heart Is a Muscle</cite> because it’s a film that I adore, it’s because it’s a film amongst a good company of recent South African films that deserves our patronage. It also deserves a concerted effort from our government and a curtailing of private cinema distributors to prioritize domestic film distribution. I don’t imagine that under a more progressive domestic cinema ecosystem, South Africans will, overnight, choose to watch local films at the expense of more polished and reliably entertaining Hollywood productions; what I believe is that they deserve a competitive choice between the two. Our industry cannot set its aspirations towards becoming a simulacrum of Hollywood without understanding that paving the road towards media independence is part of the route you take to get there.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-26T15:35:33.679Z</published><summary type="text">A debut feature set on the Cape Flats turns a familiar crime premise into a quiet study of fatherhood, masculinity, and survival. But its limited reach reveals the deeper problems facing South African film.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/the-game-behind-the-game</id><title type="text">The game behind the game</title><updated>2026-04-24T13:03:51.976601Z</updated><author><name>Kenyua Gachecheh</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>Across much of the investigative writing around gambling, betting, and football, the most obvious narrative is usually told in four ways: Footballers, referees, and the institutions responsible for developing the sport are corrupted; betting destroys youth; gambling companies exploit poor people; society has lost its morals.</p><p>None of these are wrong, but over time they seem to produce more outrage than understanding about how football leaves itself open to betting.</p><p>Betting does not actually create football’s culture of risk from scratch. It finds and enters a game already built and already training millions to become fanatical about living inside long odds, uncertain progression, selective visibility, and emotionally charged hope.</p><p>Along with many others across the grassroots levels of the game, every weekend I watch football and ask young people to make a socially acceptable, life-defining bet: to risk time, identity, and often education for a very narrow chance of going pro. Football invites hundreds of millions into its emotional and aspirational universe, while offering genuinely professional outcomes to only a microscopic fraction. This extreme-risk aspiration is a fundamental feature and story of the game.</p><p>FIFA’s own <a href="https://documents.fifaglobalfootballdevelopment.org/afea_flipbook_eng/full-view.html">amateur football environment analysis</a> suggests a global football population of roughly 28 million registered players, 75 million unregistered competitive players, and 300 million casual players. The <a href="https://inside.fifa.com/legal/news/fifa-publishes-professional-football-report-2023">FIFA Professional Football Report</a> then shows that the global professional layer is only 128,694 professional players across 3,986 professional clubs in 135 countries, with 71 countries reporting no professional players at all.</p><p>That means football’s aspirational universe is vastly larger than the formal pathways and structures through which the game is governed and administered. For many young players, the game becomes a structure of long odds before the betting industry enters the picture and sets up to monetize them.</p><p>This is part of what makes the Kenyan game so revealing. Here, football is socially enormous but thin developmentally. The game is present everywhere: in schools, estates, villages, WhatsApp groups, betting slips, matatu conversations, TV broadcasts, and on young bodies carrying ambition far larger than the structures meant to hold it.</p><p>Football is one of the most emotionally available things in public life, and the mobile phone is the new football terrace. Through it the game has outgrown the pitch and the stadium, migrated through the screen to where it now also lives across social media platforms, betting wallets, deposit prompts, odds pages, accumulator screenshots, and loan apps. At the same time, real-life stable pathways through the game are rare, uneven, and weakly protected.</p><p>The amateur football environment analysis goes on to show that only 73 percent of member associations have regional associations, 74% collaborate with the confederation on development, 20 percent of governments have plans to improve health and well-being through amateur football, and 76 percent of member associations are not well-connected with private organizations. It also says 84 percent of countries report that governments are responsible for amateur football infrastructure, while only 20 percent of governments have active plans to use amateur football to improve health and well-being.</p><p>Taken together, this suggests that football, given its cultural capital, is often expected to carry significant social weight without a correspondingly strong public-development framework around it. If public systems are weak in such ways, other actors step in.</p><p>Weak public-development frameworks also tend to produce weak labor protection inside football. Here, the Professional Football Report continues to be useful: Globally, only 69 percent of member associations have a standard contract, 50 percent have a player association, 41 percent have a minimum salary requirement, and only 19 percent report a collective-bargaining agreement.</p><p>In Africa specifically, the landscape is weaker. The report says the current register shows 8,485 professional players in CAF reporting countries, with 92 percent of players homegrown. But only 50 percent of CAF member associations have a standard contract, 46% have a player association, 28 percent have a minimum salary, and just 4 percent have collective bargaining agreements.</p><p>This matters because it means the betting and match-fixing story should not be told only as a moral story about bad actors. FIFA’s own data helps show that many football labor environments are weakly protected, and betting preys most easily where football labor is least protected.</p><p>The young player, the underpaid player, the unpaid player, the coach without structure, the referee without cover, the club without stability — these are not side stories to football’s betting problem. They are part of the environment that makes the problem possible.</p><p>FIFA also shows that globally 55 percent of top-tier competitions have a title sponsor, and among the top three sectors, betting companies rank second at 18 percent, behind telecommunications at 26 percent and ahead of banks at 14 percent. CAF’s snapshot shows 56 percent of top-tier competitions have a title sponsor, with betting companies second at 12 percent, behind telecommunications and ahead of alcoholic beverages.</p><p><a href="https://ntvkenya.co.ke/news/sportpesa-returns-as-fkf-premier-league-sponsor-in-sh1-12bn-deal/">The 10-year KES 1 billion (8 million USD) SportPesa sponsorship of the Kenyan Premier League</a> is a local example of the point made by FIFA’s own global benchmarking: Betting is not some fringe commercial category hovering at the margins of the game. It is already one of the leading title-sponsor sectors in top-tier football competitions and a key player in the operating logic and marketing of the game.</p><p>The fact that in CAF the homegrown proportion of players is 92 percent shows clearly that football is still overwhelmingly local in terms of who plays it. However, the game is rarely local in terms of who profits from it. The problem is the degree to which it is increasingly shaped by commercial systems that are not local and which monetize it in ways that are extractive, external, or indifferent to development.</p><p>The gap between development rhetoric and commercial reality is also highlighted by one of the most revealing statistics in the Professional Football Report: regulations specifically designed to support homegrown players exist in only 27 percent of countries globally. In CAF, only 11 percent of member associations have such regulations, yet betting is already one of the top title-sponsor sectors.</p><p>In other words, many football systems are not even strongly regulated around developing homegrown players in the first place. In these kinds of contexts and environments, football easily becomes more organized around competitions, sponsorship, transfers, and audience extraction than around actual player development.</p><p>Alongside this lack of public-development will and frameworks, the reports also highlight how football, despite being so socially huge, is at the same time physically underprovided for. With just 59 pitches per 1 million people around the world, the game has been developing mass participation on relatively thin infrastructure. So, betting appears both as temptation and as one of the few highly organized monetization systems attached to the game. The developmental ecosystem is underbuilt, while the systems, platforms, and business models that monetize attention are not.</p><p>This is what football ends up looking like when development has not been built strongly enough to resist extractive forces. It is not just that betting is harmful; it is that the game is weak where it is strong.</p><p>Betting succeeds in football not only because people like risk but also because football already operates as a world of mass hope and the long odds that come with weak labor protections, low homegrown regulation, incomplete amateur support structures, limited infrastructure, and uneven professional opportunity.</p><p>The game’s cultural and economic universe is enormous, but its developmental frameworks and guarantees are not. Betting enters that gap, studies it, and learns how to profit from it.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-24T12:41:08.415Z</published><summary type="text">The football gambling industry across Africa preys on the risk factors built into the game. The only viable solution is investing in durable, developmental frameworks at the grassroots level.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/the-shadow-of-the-fatherland</id><title type="text">The shadow of the fatherland</title><updated>2026-04-24T13:05:31.768752Z</updated><author><name>Achille Tenkiang</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>In the credits of <cite>My Father&amp;#39;s Shadow</cite>, Akinola Davies Jr.’s devastating debut feature, one of the production companies listed is <a href="https://fatherlandlive.com/">Fatherland Productions</a>. Fatherland. The word sits there like a confession hiding in plain sight, a suggestion of the film’s deepest argument: In postcolonial Africa, the story of the father and the story of the nation have always been the same, and the strongman state didn&amp;#39;t merely fail its citizens. It orphaned them.</p><p><cite>My Father’s Shadow</cite> is set on June 12, 1993, <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2014/12/the-history-of-nigerias-democracy-movement">a date</a> on which an entire national imagination swung shut. On that day, Nigerians went to the polls in the first democratic election since a military coup a decade earlier, and they elected Moshood Abiola in what political observers at the time widely regarded as the freest vote the country had ever seen. Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim, won across ethnic and religious lines, building an aspirational pan-Nigerian coalition. For a brief, vertiginous moment, the country cohered around a shared democratic future. Then General Ibrahim Babangida — who had ruled since seizing power in <a href="https://guardian.ng/opinion/the-1985-coup/">the 1985 palace coup</a> and had already postponed the transition to civilian rule twice — simply annulled the results, invoking unspecified &amp;quot;irregularities&amp;quot; to void the most credible election the country had ever held. The future collapsed.</p><p>Davies chose this date <a href="https://afrocritik.com/akinola-davies-jr-interview-my-fathers-shadow/">because it is personal</a> — he and his brother Wale, who co-wrote the screenplay, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/13/arts/my-fathers-shadow-movie.html">lost their father</a> to an epileptic seizure when Akinola was 20 months old and Wale was four. By 1993, they were roughly the same ages as the film’s protagonists, two boys growing up fatherless in a country in crisis. The film, set against a political crisis the young could not fully understand, reimagines a day Davies and his brother never had with their father. June 12 is also the day on which a particular kind of African fatherhood became impossible.</p><p>The annulment didn&amp;#39;t just end an election. It inaugurated the Abacha years, among the most brutal dictatorships in Nigerian history, and confirmed what millions of Nigerians already suspected: that the military state would sooner destroy the country than relinquish its grip. Men like Folarin, the father in the film, played with quiet ferocity by Sopé Dirisu, were caught in the wreckage. A factory worker who hasn&amp;#39;t been paid in six months, a suspected political activist whose friend tells him the regime has killed four of their people, a man whose nosebleeds accumulate across the film like a ledger of debts the state has written on his body. Folarin is not merely a character. He is a condition.</p><p><cite>My Father&amp;#39;s Shadow</cite> is not just a film about one father and two sons. It is a film about what military rule cost African families at the level of the kitchen table, the bedtime story, and unanswered questions. Much of the critical apparatus around the film, particularly in the West, has foregrounded the personal elements while treating the political dimension as ancillary. The reviewers make comparisons to Barry Jenkins’ 2016 coming-of-age drama Moonlight, focus on the autofictional framing, and praise Jermaine Edwards&amp;#39;s cinematography, but Davies has made a film in which the political is not backdrop. It is the thing itself. When the election is annulled, the father dies. This is not a coincidence. The film does not need to explicitly state this connection; it builds it into the structure of every scene, until the collapse of the election and the loss of father feel like the same event.</p><p>Consider what the film shows us. Folarin takes his sons to Lagos to collect his back pay — an economic errand that is itself a consequence of the military state&amp;#39;s mismanagement. Along the way, the boys glimpse newspapers about a massacre at the fictional Bonny Camp, overhear adults debating whether military control is necessary, watch trucks full of soldiers pass by — &amp;quot;stupid people,” their father mutters. Politics is not merely context; it is the medium through which the family moves, the air it breathes, the danger that tightens around every scene until the checkpoint where a soldier claims to recognize Folarin and the film shatters into state violence. The confrontation is terrifying. Folarin’s nose bleeds heavily, his sons watch in silence, and they are eventually allowed to pass. But the damage is done. Not long after, in the film’s devastating final moment, Folarin is dead, and his sons are attending his funeral. Folarin&amp;#39;s body — bleeding, laboring, gone — is the site where the political and the personal become indistinguishable. The strongman state didn&amp;#39;t just kill democracy. It killed fathers. And it did so across the continent.</p><p>The early 1990s were the hinge decade for postcolonial Africa. The Cold War&amp;#39;s end destabilized the superpower patronage that had propped up dictators from Kinshasa to Nairobi — less a withdrawal than a reconfiguration, one that created both democratic openings and desperate, violent last stands by regimes that had no intention of ceding power. <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2014/12/the-history-of-nigerias-democracy-movement">Babangida&amp;#39;s annulment</a> sits alongside <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1FWiNVqfOc">Mobutu&amp;#39;s final looting</a> of Zaire, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/kenya2/7.htm">Moi&amp;#39;s rigged elections</a> in Kenya, <a href="https://www.tournonslapage.org/en/documents/togo-le-regne-du-coup-d-etat-permanent">Eyadéma&amp;#39;s constitutional manipulations</a> in Togo, and Abacha&amp;#39;s subsequent coup in Nigeria. Across the continent, a generation of strongmen — men who styled themselves as Fathers of the Nation, who demanded the filial obedience of entire populations — systematically destroyed the conditions under which actual fathers could exist. They created economies that forced men like Folarin to leave their families for months. They created security states in which political engagement could be fatal. And they created cultures of silence so totalizing that even fathers who survived could not speak to their children about what they had endured.</p><p>“If you&amp;#39;re from an African household, our parents don’t talk very much,” Davies said after a screening at Angelika Film Center in New York in February. “It means a lot to try and humanize their experiences. Because a lot of what they went through, they didn&amp;#39;t have outlets to talk about it.” Many have referenced this observation in profiles and reviews, but few have asked the obvious next question: Where did the silence come from? It was manufactured by regimes under which speech was dangerous, under which knowing too much about your father&amp;#39;s political life could put you at risk, under which the safest thing a parent could do was tell their children nothing. In Nigeria, this had a material form. Under the military regimes that followed June 12, Abacha’s government dissolved political parties, shuttered newspapers, and jailed journalists. Dele Giwa, the founding editor of <cite>Newswatch</cite> and one of the country’s most prominent investigative journalists, <a href="https://cpj.org/2009/10/nigerian-editor-dele-giwas-unsolved-murder/">had already been killed</a> by a letter bomb widely attributed to state security forces in 1986. Families of the disappeared learned not to ask questions.</p><p>The regime that denied the Bonny Camp killings, the very headline the boys glimpse in the film, was teaching an entire population that what you saw with your own eyes had not happened. Folarin&amp;#39;s stoicism in the film — the stern expressions, the terse deflections, the way he holds his sons at arm&amp;#39;s length even as he clearly loves them — is too easily read as personal, a quality of the man rather than a condition of the state. It is a survival strategy forged in the furnace of the military state. Frantz Fanon described exactly this mechanism in <cite>The Wretched of the Earth</cite>: The colonized man, humiliated in the public sphere by a power he cannot confront, returns home and reproduces that constriction in the domestic sphere. The postcolonial strongman updated the pattern. He made silence not just a habit but a necessity.</p><p>The beach scene — the film’s emotional centre, the one most critics compare to Moonlight — is where this silence finally breaks. Sitting together on a shoreline littered with the rusting carcass of a shipwreck, Folarin tells his sons about how his older brother, who drowned as a child, was treated “as if he never existed.” This is the primal scene of African intergenerational trauma: the erasure of the dead, the refusal to grieve openly, the learned conviction that to survive is to forget. It is a pattern with deep roots in Nigerian life.</p><p>After the civil war of 1967–1970, which killed as many as three million people, the Gowon government <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2017/07/nationhood-and-the-struggle-for-biafra">adopted a policy</a> of “no victor, no vanquished” — a reconciliation framework that in practice meant the war’s atrocities were never officially examined, its dead never publicly mourned, its survivors expected to simply move forward. An entire generation learned that grief was private at best, dangerous at worst. Folarin, who would have been a child during or just after the war, inherited that lesson. But then Folarin does the revolutionary thing: He speaks. He names his dead brother. He tells his sons, in a line that carries the weight of the entire film: “The memories that pain you when people go are the same memories that will comfort you later.” He is describing, without knowing it, what his own sons will one day need to do — not just with his memory, but with the memory of the nation that took him.</p><p>Because the Davies brothers are not just making a film about their father. They are making a film about a father they never had, from a country they were raised between, in a language — Yoruba — <a href="https://letterboxd.com/journal/sope-dirisu-akinola-davies-my-fathers-shadow-interview/">that Dirisu himself had to relearn</a> because his parents’ social workers in Britain told them not to speak it to their children. That detail, buried in a Letterboxd interview, contains the film&amp;#39;s entire thesis. The strongman state produces economic displacement. Displacement produces migration. Migration produces diaspora children forced to shed their languages, their accents, their connections to home. And yet the language was relearned. The father was reimagined. The production company was named Fatherland. Neither brother has publicly explained the choice of the name. They don’t need to. The word does its work silently, collapsing the distance between the man they lost and the country that shaped his loss — between the father and the land, between the personal and national grief.</p><p>This is the deepest thing <cite>My Father’s Shadow</cite> does: it reclaims the father from the fatherland. Not the father as symbol or national allegory, but the flawed, absent, bleeding, tender, and doomed man who was always more real than any patriarch the state could offer. And it insists that the act of remembering him, imperfectly, speculatively, through the haze of secondhand memory and diasporic longing, is itself a form of resistance against the state that tried to make him disappear.</p><p>“I will see you in my dreams,” says the younger son, Remi, in the film’s first and last line. It is a sentiment expressed to his father. But it is also, whether Davies intended it or not, a line spoken to a country — to the Nigeria that might have been, to the democracy that was annulled, to the generation of fathers who were silenced, scattered, or killed before they could tell their children who they were. The shadow in the film’s title is not one man’s shadow. It is the shadow cast by every fatherland that devoured its fathers, and it falls, still, on every child who inherited the silence without understanding its source.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-23T17:27:10.991Z</published><summary type="text">Akinola Davies Jr’s feature-length debut traces how Nigeria’s military rule collapsed the boundary between political crisis and intimate life, leaving families to bear the cost of authoritarian power.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/after-the-jamahiriya</id><title type="text">After the Jamahiriya</title><updated>2026-04-24T13:06:26.037658Z</updated><author><name>Owen Schalk</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>Since the 2011 NATO war on Libya, the once prosperous North African country has been marked by grinding poverty, institutional dysfunction, and the constant threat of civil war. Many Libyans long for a return to state functionality. This yearning often manifests as nostalgia for the Jamahiriya period, when Libya was helmed by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who led the Al-Fatah Revolution of 1969 and oversaw the construction of a sovereign state along the lines of his Third Universal Theory, a unique form of Islamic socialism and anti-imperialism explicated in Gaddafi’s Green Book.</p><p>Today, Libya is partitioned between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), recognized by the United Nations and led by Abdulhamid Dabaiba, and the House of Representatives, effectively a military government under the command of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Both governments rely on foreign backing: the GNU on Türkiye, Qatar, and the US, and the House of Representatives on Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, among others.</p><p>Support for Gaddafi and his theories did not die when the man himself was killed by NATO-backed Misratan rebels on October 20, 2011. The Jamahiriya’s legacy looms large over Libya today, and Gaddafi nostalgia remains a significant force in the country’s politics. It is primarily as a mass movement from below, with various political instantiations such as the Popular National Movement (PNM) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Libya (PFLL), the latter of which was led by the late Saif al-Islam Gaddafi until his assassination earlier this year.</p><p>For many in Libya, the Jamahiriya remains a reference point of lost sovereignty and stability. Such views are reinforced with every new revelation about Libya’s subjugation to outside forces. One of the latest insights into this subjugation came when the US Department of Justice released documents revealing that, during NATO’s intervention in Libya, Jeffrey Epstein <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/1/epstein-email-reveals-plan-to-access-libyas-frozen-state-assets">worked</a> with former British and Israeli intelligence officers in an effort to access billions in Libyan state assets frozen in Western countries.</p><p>In a sign of Libya’s ongoing dysfunction, many former anti-Gaddafi rebels have been converted to the “Green Resistance,” as the constellation of loyalist councils, tribal alliances, and clandestine networks is often called. When Libyan academic Dr Mustafa Fetouri journeyed to the Nafusa Mountains in January 2026 to meet Saif al-Islam — a trip eloquently described in a <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/first-person/a-desert-picnic-with-libyas-most-wanted-man/">recent </a><i><a href="https://newlinesmag.com/first-person/a-desert-picnic-with-libyas-most-wanted-man/">New Lines Magazine</a></i> <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/first-person/a-desert-picnic-with-libyas-most-wanted-man/">article</a> — he found that one of Saif’s bodyguards was a former rebel from Zintan who described himself as belonging to the “mugharrar bihim,” meaning “duped.” In 2016, a Zimbabwean newspaper <a href="https://truthout.org/articles/libyans-who-once-opposed-gaddafi-now-regret-us-led-regime-change/">interviewed</a> former anti-Gaddafi fighters about the situation in Libya; they expressed nostalgia for the government they helped overthrow. One former anti-government fighter remarked, “Before 2011, I hated Gaddafi more than anyone. But now, life is much, much harder, and I have become his biggest fan.” While writing my book, <i><a href="https://formaclorimerbooks.ca/product/targeting-libya/">Targeting Libya</a></i><i>, </i>a Libyan man from Benghazi informed me that “most” former rebels in the city regret their role in toppling the Jamahiriya.</p><p>Among the working and middle classes in Libya, there remains a vast base of support for the Green Resistance. Organizationally, however, the Resistance is fragmented, lacking a unified command structure. This is representative of internal divisions, but it is also a survival tactic; after all, it is harder for the post-2011 authorities to stamp out Gaddafi loyalism when the Green Resistance remains diffuse.</p><p>While the excesses of the Gaddafi period are well-known, its positive aspects, which serve as the basis for the present nostalgia, tend to be elided, especially in Western media coverage. Such a lopsided analysis does a disservice to Westerners and Libyans both. It severs one’s connection to realities on the ground, and filters descriptions of events through a preconditioned hostility to the Jamahiriya period. Any full, reasoned analysis of Libya’s political system today, and the Green Resistance that influences political discourse both within and outside government institutions, must account for Libyans’ own feelings about the 42-year political experiment that still occupies the nation’s collective memory.</p><p>Between 1969 and 2011, Libya was transformed from a desperately poor country into the most prosperous nation in Africa, with human development indicators more comparable to Southern Europe than the rest of the African continent. The state reclaimed natural resources, most importantly oil, from foreign control and used revenues to fund a system of universal healthcare and education. Women’s rights were expanded, and widespread literacy was achieved. In 1976, Colonel Gaddafi personally bulldozed the last shanty in Libya to celebrate the construction of more than 100,000 new homes (during this period, the only Western countries with higher rates of construction were Sweden and Denmark). A political system arose, rooted in Green Book theory, that granted Libyans a greater degree of political participation than they’d experienced under the Senussi monarchy of King Idris (1951-1969), the postwar domination by Allied powers (1945-1951), the Italian colonization (1911-1943), and the preceding Ottoman era.</p><p>Green nostalgia fundamentally represents a longing for public order, economic stability, and functional institutions — all of which were destroyed by NATO bombs in 2011. As Mustafa Fetouri described in an interview with the author:</p><blockquote><p>The working and middle classes [of Libya] have borne the brunt of the post-2011 economic collapse, insecurity, and institutional fragmentation. For many, this nostalgia is not necessarily a yearning for a specific political ideology of the past, but rather a longing for the ‘state of order’ and the basic life dignity that has since evaporated.</p></blockquote><p>However, it is surely not lost on Libyans that such order and dignity were secured in the context of resource nationalization and strong anti-imperialist policies.</p><p>In Libya today, the two leading political formations of the Green movement are the PFLL and the PNM. The groups have similarities and differences. The PFLL, in Fetouri’s words, “functions more as a socio-political movement than a traditional party.” It has no formal organization nor an established hierarchy, although authority indisputably rested in the hands of Saif al-Islam, Muammar Gaddafi’s son, who was assassinated on February 3, 2026.</p><p>Operationally, the PFLL functions “through a network of influential key players who often remain behind the scenes for security reasons.” Hostile to both Libyan governments, the PFLL was nonetheless influential enough to warrant inclusion in the United Nations Support Mission in Libya’s “<a href="https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/structured-dialogue">structured dialogue</a>” involving the country’s various factions.</p><p>Summarizing the PFLL, Fetouri explained:</p><blockquote><p>The Front acts as an umbrella for the ‘Greens.’ Its relationship with Saif al-Islam was one of profound ideological alignment rather than a rigid bureaucratic command structure. Within Libya, the Front draws its strength from a deep-seated base of supporters, particularly among tribes and communities that feel marginalized by the post-2011 political order.</p></blockquote><p>Before his assassination, Saif al-Islam was the most popular political figure in Libya. During the final decade of his father&amp;#39;s rule, Saif was a champion of economic liberalization. After NATO&amp;#39;s 2011 war on Libya, he was imprisoned by rebels in Zintan for several years. Following his release in 2017, he once again became a national political figure, defending his father&amp;#39;s legacy while criticizing both the UN-recognized government in Tripoli and the House of Representatives. As such, he was isolated by both Libyan governments. As Anas El Gomati <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/10/why-did-saif-al-islam-gaddafi-have-to-die">writes</a>: “[Saif] remained outside the system, tolerated, contained, and watched, a reminder of an alternative line of inheritance that could never be fully neutralised. He had lived under the persistent threat of assassination since 2017.”</p><p>The Gaddafi scion ran for president during the December 2021 election; however, the election was ultimately cancelled and postponed several times. Some in the Libyan government asserted that the election was cancelled at the behest of Washington to prevent the popular Saif from winning power; the US government <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/middle-east-north-africa/libya/b085-steering-libya-past-another-perilous-crossroads">dismissed</a> these suspicions as “conspiracy theories.”</p><p>Saif al-Islam planned to run in the <a href="https://english.news.cn/africa/20251209/91f32138544a4fe08809a447ab1faa25/c.html">April 2026 presidential election</a>, which has been delayed since December 2018; <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2026/02/04/seif-al-islam-gaddafi-enigmatic-son-of-the-libyan-dictator-murdered-in-his-mountain-hideout_6750145_124.html">unofficial polls</a> showed him receiving a high level of popular support. Interestingly, his assassination occurred one week after a <a href="https://libyaherald.com/2026/02/boulos-confirms-holding-paris-meeting-last-week-between-east-and-west-libya/">meeting</a> in Paris between US officials and high-level representatives from Libya’s two governments, and on the heels of the Donald Trump administration&amp;#39;s efforts to <a href="https://www.libyanexpress.com/trump-eyes-libyas-energy-wealth-in-8-billion-drive/">ramp up</a> its exploitation of Libyan oil; naturally, this has fueled speculation about the motives of Saif al-Islam’s assassins.</p><p>With Saif dead, the PFLL’s future is uncertain. “The absence of Saif al-Islam leaves the movement at a critical crossroads,” Fetouri stated. “It must now navigate the challenge of transitioning from a personality-driven entity to a more institutionalized resistance or political bloc if it hopes to survive the loss of its central figure.”</p><p>The Popular National Movement (PNM) is led by Dr Mustafa al-Zaidi, a prominent plastic surgeon, who called for the <a href="https://libyaupdate.com/al-zaidi-calls-for-a-national-uprising-to-overthrow-the-dbeibeh-government/">overthrow</a> of the Tripoli-based Dabaiba government in 2022. Unlike the PFLL, the PNM has forged inroads with Haftar’s government in eastern Libya, where the PNM also publishes its newspaper.</p><p>The PNM is more structured than the PFLL. Despite its limited resources — it relies primarily on contributions from supporters — the PNM managed to hold two consecutive annual conferences on Libyan soil, both in Benghazi. “This indicates a level of grassroots mobilization and internal management that sets it apart from more clandestine or personality-driven factions,” noted Dr Fetouri. “While the [PFLL] often functions through symbolic and clandestine networks, the PNM acts as the more ‘institutionalized’ and ‘diplomatic’ face of the movement, seeking to re-integrate the loyalist base into the formal political process.” This integration has involved pragmatic, transactional interactions with Libyan authorities, primarily in the east.</p><p>Beyond his dealings with the PNM, Haftar has regularly played the “Green card,” flaunting his connections to Gaddafi-era officials in hopes of benefitting from the popular Gaddafi nostalgia — quite ironic given the fact that Haftar himself defected from Libya in the 1980s and lived for years in Virginia. Nevertheless, Haftar has integrated numerous Gaddafi-era military officers and administrative figures into his command, and he has received support from prominent Gaddafi-era figures like Abu Zaid Dorda and Moussa Ibrahim.</p><p>Fifteen years after the destruction of the Jamahiriya, Libyan authorities must still contend with Gaddafi’s legacy. Government repression of the Green Resistance has forced members into hiding and secrecy, while some, like Haftar, attempt to co-opt Gaddafi’s legacy for their own political purposes while remaining hostile to Gaddafi-era ideology.</p><p>In a grim illustration of post-2011 repression, Libyan authorities forbid supporters of Saif al-Islam from burying their leader in Sirte, the hometown and tribal seat of Muammar Gaddafi. Public remembrance of the one-time presidential hopeful was suppressed. As Anas El Gomati describes: “Condolence receptions were blocked. Public mourning was prevented. Saif spent a decade being told where he could live, who he could see, and when he could speak. His killers decided where he could die. His rivals decided where he could be buried. No one has been arrested. No one will be.”</p><p>Despite the public restrictions, thousands of Saif’s supporters converged on the city of Bani Walid for his funeral. Dr Fetouri was in attendance. He described tens of thousands of Libyans gathered in a “massive, silent referendum.” While Bani Walid has long been a center of Gaddafi loyalism in Libya, Fetouri stressed that “this is no longer a fringe or isolated group; it has manifested into a broad social base that views the pre-2011 era as a benchmark for stability in contrast to the current protracted crisis.”</p><p>The longer Libya’s crisis continues, the longer it is subjugated to foreign powers, the more widespread Gaddafi nostalgia will become. This is hardly surprising. Promised freedom and Western-style democracy, Libyans instead received bombs, civil war, and rampant corruption.</p><p>It is highly unlikely that a Green phoenix will rise from Libya’s ashes and restore stability and sovereignty to the country. At the very least, however, Gaddafi nostalgia will remain a popular force that all factions in Libya must contend with — through repression, cooptation, or a combination of the two.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-23T13:25:29.675Z</published><summary type="text">Fifteen years after  NATO’s intervention in Libya, economic collapse and foreign subjugation have fueled renewed support for Gaddafi-era stability.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/how-to-fix-a-match-for-280</id><title type="text">How to fix a match for $280</title><updated>2026-04-23T03:10:46.089491Z</updated><author><name>Romain Molina</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>In October 2025, the International Betting Integrity Association (IBIA) flagged five suspicious bets placed on Burundian league matches between June and September of the previous year. These were the first such alerts the organization had recorded in the country since 2020.</p><p>FIFA had already been in contact with the Burundi Football Federation (FFB) earlier that year over suspected manipulation in the top flight. Alexandre Muyenge, the President of the FFB, and also a police brigadier general, moved quickly, notifying national authorities and stepping up surveillance efforts.</p><p>All coaches, players, officials and independent observers contacted during this investigation maintain that match-fixing has become routine in Burundi’s top division. One club, in particular, Deira Academy, stands out to investigators above all others.</p><p>On October 30, 2024, Deira hosted Lydia Ludic Burundi Academic FC. Until that point in the season, LLB Academic FC had collected zero points from six games, and they had even been thrashed 9-1 by Musongati. Yet, in this match, LLB Academic stunned onlookers by scoring first. They were then pegged back for the duration of the match until they scored a decisive second-half winner to register their first points of the season. For those who had placed live bets on the outcome at the right moment, as the odds shifted, the returns were considerable.</p><p>Other matches also alarmed the authorities, who ultimately arrested six players (Masumbuko Jules, Ndayishimiye Gloire, Nzoyisaba Epimaque, Ntahoturi Hussein, Uwimana Morgan and Shabani Ramadhan) and Deira’s coach (Jaffar Djumapili) on charges of match-fixing before the end of the calendar year. They have since been released.</p><p>Aware of the growing problem, the FFB organized an integrity workshop in January 2025, targeting referees from the first and second divisions in particular. It was a commendable initiative, though it drew some criticism given that the federation announced a partnership with betting operator 1XBet just five days later.</p><p>To his credit, President Muyenge has not sought to minimize the problem, describing a grim reality with regional, continental, and even international ramifications. “No team is spared,” he said. “Match-fixing is present in every club in Ligue A.” In mid-January, Gilbert Nkurunziza of <cite>Burundi-Eco </cite>spoke to the FFB president, who noted: “The people involved in match-fixing come from all over the world — Russians, Belgians, French, Congolese, Ugandans, etc.”</p><p>The Ugandan connection is particularly telling. Uganda is among the most match-fixing-affected countries in the region, alongside Kenya. In June 2024, the Ugandan federation suspended 13 individuals (including 10 referees) with links to a criminal syndicate believed to be directed from South Africa. In March 2026, five more were provisionally suspended over a December 2024 match between Kitara FC and Express FC that ended 7-0. Beneath those headline cases lies a broader infrastructure from Kampala and Nairobi that regional fixing networks have long operated within. Now neighboring countries are increasingly in their sights.</p><p>Ugandan operatives had already set up networks in Burundi around 2020, when a series of international alerts led to arrests. Since then, Kenyan, Ugandan, and Congolese middlemen have acted as local brokers for larger continental and international organizations.</p><p>The logic is straightforward. “Burundi was an obvious choice,” said one investigator working for an international body that monitors betting markets, speaking on condition of anonymity:</p><blockquote><p>We were used to numerous alerts in Southern Africa and some in East Africa, mainly in Kenya and Uganda, but the phenomenon has grown in this region. The Burundi championship gets almost no media coverage, and the players earn next to nothing. Fixing a result here is cheap.</p></blockquote><p>The average Burundian footballer in the top division earns around $30 a month, in a country where 87% of the population lives on less than $2 a day, according to the World Bank. For criminal syndicates that place hundreds of thousands of dollars to launder money or simply turn a profit, the cost of corrupting players is negligible.</p><p>According to the various sources interviewed during this investigation, sums as little as $100 or $200 are sometimes enough to corrupt a player. “Relative to the standard of living here, that’s six months of peace of mind for the family,” one of them noted.</p><p>Payments rarely exceed $1,000, a trivial sum for the organizations behind the schemes, which are carefully insulated by layers of intermediaries. More worryingly, Burundian players and officials have begun acting as fixers themselves, cutting out neighboring East African middlemen.</p><p>An FFB spokesperson described how the investigation unfolded:</p><blockquote><p>Interpol provided the initial intelligence, and we worked with national authorities from there. We found that external actors were paying players, coaches and club officials to deliver pre-arranged scores. Sometimes this was for an entire match, sometimes just a half or a specific minute. Since last season, several betting operators have also come to us directly. They were seeing new accounts being opened and those same people betting on the same matches with exact scores.</p></blockquote><p>While the federation’s efforts deserve recognition, the “vast network” described will require sustained support from international governing bodies, including FIFA, which did not respond to requests for comment. Separately, FIFA has faced criticism from the Afghan national team players over its handling of match-fixing allegations against officials of the Afghan federation.</p><p>Deira Academy goalkeeper Epimaque Nzoyisaba provided investigators with a window into how the operation worked. He described being contacted through a US phone number by someone known only as the “American Ninja,” alongside a Kenyan and a Russian whose identities he never learned.</p><p>A man named Morisho Kibasomba — now being sought by authorities — paid Nzoyisaba the equivalent of roughly $2,700 to fix the match against Vital’o. A second contact, identified only as “Alain” and also wanted by authorities, offered him around $6,730 to engineer a six-goal defeat to Olympic Star. That deal fell through when the players refused to go along with such a lopsided scoreline.</p><p>Nzoyisaba then recruited his own teammates — and the club’s technical director — distributing approximately $280 each to ensure the 0-3 loss to Vital’o went as planned. In March 2025, the FFB’s Ethics and Discipline Commission handed five-year bans and fines of around $3,300 to eight individuals, including players from Deira Academy and one from Inter Star.</p><p>“It has become so widespread here that our own players now act as fixers for foreign organizations,” lamented a Burundian coach speaking anonymously. “It’s a way to make quick money, and given that our championship is relatively low-profile . . . ”</p><p>Despite the arrests and suspensions, the networks have not retreated. The “American Ninja,” according to sources, was exploring the possibility of purchasing a club outright, which could provide them control from the inside. Who exactly is operating behind that pseudonym, connected to an untraceable US number and anonymous accomplices across multiple countries, remains unknown.</p><p>For his part, President Muyenge strikes a cautiously optimistic note. “We continue to fight this plague,” he said, “and we are halfway satisfied compared to last year. Its scale has noticeably diminished.”</p><p>Yet what cannot be denied is that Burundi has become the latest quiet frontier in a global match-fixing industry that keeps finding new places to operate.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-22T15:30:34Z</published><summary type="text">Burundi’s football league rarely draws headlines — making it an easy target for match-fixing networks now entrenched in its top division.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/truquer-un-match-pour-280-dollars</id><title type="text">Truquer un match pour 280 dollars</title><updated>2026-04-23T16:31:25.267971Z</updated><author><name>Romain Molina</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>En octobre dernier, l’IBIA (International Betting Integrity Association) annonçait avoir détecté cinq paris suspects entre juin et septembre 2024 pour des matchs au Burundi. Cet organisme qui répertorie les manipulations sur le marché des paris mondiaux ajoutait que de pareilles alertes n’avaient pas été enregistrées depuis 2020 au Burundi.</p><p>Ces avertissements rejoignaient ceux transmis par la FIFA à la Fédération de football du Burundi dans le courant de l’année 2024 sur de possibles truquages de matchs en première division. Mis au courant, le président de la FFB, Alexandre Muyenge, général de brigade de police dans le civil, alertait immédiatement les autorités nationales pour entreprendre un travail accru de vigilance.</p><p>Selon l’ensemble des sources contactées par <cite>Africa Is A Country</cite> comprenant des entraîneurs, dirigeants, joueurs et observateurs, les matchs truqués se sont répandues comme un fléau habituel dans l’élite du championnat burundais. Une équipe attirait cependant particulièrement l’attention des enquêteurs : Deira Academy.</p><p>Le 30 octobre 2024, par exemple, Deira recevait Lydia Ludic Burundi Academic, une des plus petites formations du championnat qui avait enregistré jusqu’ici 0 point en 6 journées (incluant une défaite 9-1 à Musongati).</p><p>A la stupeur générale, les visiteurs ouvraient rapidement la marque avant d’être rejoints au score. En seconde période, au moment où les côtes grimpaient, le LLBA marquait un second but synonyme de première victoire de la saison et de gains importants pour les audacieux parieurs en direct.</p><p>D’autres rencontres alertèrent les autorités qui arrêtèrent peu avant la fin de l’année civile six joueurs (Masumbuko Jules, Ndayishimiye Gloire, Nzoyisaba Epimaque, Ntahoturi Hussein, Uwimana Morgan, Shabani Ramadhan) et l’entraîneur de Deira (Jaffar Djumapili). Emprisonnés un temps, ils furent relâchés depuis.</p><p>Conscient du fléau grandissant, la fédération organisa un atelier de sensibilisation le 8 janvier 2025 auprès des arbitres de première et seconde division notamment. Une initiative louable bien que certains pointaient un double standard avec la promotion, cinq jours plus tard, d’une société de paris sportifs (1XBet).</p><p>Cependant, contrairement à l’immense majorité des fédérations sportives internationales ignorant ce sujet (ou amenuisant sa portée), le président de la FFB a pris ses responsabilités avec des mots forts : « Aucune équipe n’est épargnée par le trucage de matchs. Cette tricherie est sensible dans tous les clubs de Ligue A. »</p><p>Ne cachant pas le problème, Muyenge décrit une triste réalité qui a des ramifications régionales, continentales et même internationales. Le journaliste Gilbert Nkurunziza de Burundi-Eco rapportait mi-janvier des propos explicites tenus par le président : « Les personnes impliquées dans le trucage de matchs viennent de divers horizons : les Russes, les Belges, les Français, les Congolais, les Ougandais, etc. »</p><p>La mention de l’Ouganda prend tout son sens puisque le pays est le plus touché par le match-fixing dans la région – avec le Kenya. En juin 2024, la fédération ougandaise suspendait par exemple 13 individus dont 10 arbitres pour matchs truqués dans le championnat local avec l’ombre d’un syndicat criminel dirigé depuis l’Afrique du Sud. En mars 2026, la FUFA suspendait provisoirement pour 90 jours cinq autres individus pour une rencontre disputée le 21 décembre 2024 entre Kitara FC et Express FC soldée par un 7-0. Des affaires connues qui en cachaient d’autres : c’était depuis Kampala (et Nairobi) que les réseaux impliqués dans le truquage de matchs des pays voisins débutait.</p><p>Selon les informations recueillies par <cite>Africa Is A County</cite>, plusieurs ougandais avaient déjà implanté un premier réseau au Burundi ; certains étant arrêtés pour cela en marge des alertes internationales de 2020.</p><p>Bénéficiant de la précarité des joueurs locaux, certaines individus d’Afrique de l’Est (kényans et ougandais mais également quelques congolais) ont servi de « fixer » pour des organisations continentales et même internationales. « Le Burundi a été un choix logique car c’est un championnat très peu médiatisé et sans grand recours économique », explique sous couvert d’anonymat un enquêteur détaché à une structure internationale surveillant les paris suspects. « Ces dernières années, les trucages en Afrique se sont déplacés. On était habitué à de nombreuses alertes en Afrique australe et quelques unes en Afrique de l’est, surtout au Kenya et en Ouganda, mais le phénomène s’est accru dans cette région désormais. Par ricochet, cela s’est même déplacé au Burundi où les joueurs gagnent encore moins d’argent. Cela coûte très peu pour truquer un résultat. »</p><p>Avec un salaire moyen d’environ une trentaine de dollars par mois, le Burundi est considéré comme l’une des nations avec les plus faibles ressources économiques au monde (87 % de sa population vit avec moins de 2 dollars par jour selon la Banque mondiale).</p><p>De fait, les émoluments gagnés par les footballeurs de première division sont très faibles, a fortiori pour des syndicats capables de débourser des centaines de milliers de dollars sur divers paris selon les rencontres afin de blanchir de l’argent ou générer un simple profit.</p><p>Selon les différentes sources interrogées, des sommes comprises entre « 100 et 200 dollars » sont parfois suffisantes pour corrompre un joueur. « Par rapport au niveau de vie ici, c’est six mois de tranquillité pour la famille », pointe l’un d’entre eux.</p><p>Si certains récupèrent plus d’argent, les montants ne dépassent jamais 1 000 dollars. Un investissement minime pour les commanditaires qui restent bien cachés dans l’anonymat d’une kyrielle d’intermédiaires et de réseaux différents. Pis encore, plusieurs burundais ont désormais remplacé des fixers d’Afrique de l’est et approchent désormais certaines familles, incluant des arbitres et entraîneurs.</p><p>Une « maladie » comme le rappelait le président Muyenge que la fédération entend combattre. Un porte-parole a d’ailleurs expliqué à <cite>Africa Is A Country</cite> les dessous des enquêtes. « Les informations ont été données par Interpol, et la fédération, en collaboration avec les autorités compétentes du pays, ont fait des investigations et ont pu identifier l’origine dans le cas de Deira.</p><p>La fédération a trouvé qu’il y a des gens qui paient certains membres des staffs des équipes, des joueurs ou même les dirigeants des clubs en leur recommandant des scores. Ces gens proviennent de différents pays [ . . . ] C’est un grand réseau. Depuis la saison dernière, différentes sociétés de paris sportifs sont venues nous notifier sur ces cas. Par exemple, ils constataient l’ouverture de nouveaux comptes et ces gens-là misaient sur les mêmes matchs avec des scores exacts . . .  »</p><p>Si les efforts de la FFB sont louables, ce « grand réseau » nécessitera l’appui de structures internationales, dont la FIFA, qui n’a pas répondu à nos questions et qui a été pointée du doigt récemment par des joueurs de l’équipe nationale d’Afghanistan pour son inaction quant aux matchs truqués impliquant des dirigeants de la fédération afghane, dont le président Kargar.</p><p>Laissée à la Commission d’éthique et de discipline de la fédération, l’enquête déboucha en mars 2025 sur la suspension de huit personnes pour une durée de cinq ans et une amende de dix millions de francs burundais chacun (environ 3 300 dollars) :</p><p>– Epimaque Nzoyisaba (Deira Academy, gardien) - Mwamba Mwanza Gloire (Deira Academy, joueur)</p><p>– Hussein Ntahoturi (Deira Academy, joueur)</p><p>– Ramadhan Shaban (Deira Acadamy, joueur)</p><p>– Jules Masumbuko (Deira Academy, joueur)</p><p>– Mossi Moussa (Deira Academy, joueur)</p><p>– Jafari Jumapili (Deira Academy, directeur technique)</p><p>– Kevin Hakizimana (Inter Star, joueur)</p><p>Si la majorité, issue de Deira Academy, avait déjà été incarcéré à l’approche de Noël (puis remise en liberté au début d’année), d’autres noms apparaissent, notamment un joueur de l’Inter Star, autre club de première division.</p><p>Dans sa décision, la Commission d’éthique et de discipline donne des détails sur la manière dont les rencontres ont été truquées :</p><p>« Les activités criminelles se réalisent, s’effectuent par des partenaires externes en collaboration avec des personnes se trouvant à l’intérieur du pays et qui sont proches des joueurs. L’opération de manipulation débute dès qu’une équipe est programmée sur 1X Bet ; les partenaires externes donnent de l’argent à leurs collaborateurs internes qui sont chargés de corrompre les joueurs et les entraîneurs pour se faire perdre les matchs pour des scores convenus d’avance soit pour tout le match, soit pour une mi-temps ou pour la minute du match convenue. »</p><p>Partenaire officiel de la fédération, 1X Bet est donc la plateforme par laquelle « l’opération de manipulation débute » même si d’autres opérateurs ont aussi émis des alertes.</p><p>Le gardien de Deira Academy, Epimaque Nzoyisaba, a donné des détails lors de son interrogatoire sur le modus operandi. Un certain « Ninja américain » était en contact régulier avec lui à travers un numéro américain, ainsi qu’un Kényan et un Russe dont il n’avait ni les noms, ni les coordonnées.</p><p>Un autre individu, Morisho Kibasomba (recherché par les autorités), lui a donné 8 millions de francs burundais (environ 2 700 dollars) pour truquer la rencontre contre Vital’o. Une autre personne, uniquement connue comme Alain – également recherché par les autorités – lui avait promis 20 millions de francs burundais (environ 6 730 dollars) pour une défaite contre Olympic Star sur un score de six buts ; une opération finalement avortée car les joueurs ont refusé de s’engager pour un « pareil score fleuve ».</p><p>Epimaque Nzoyisaba s’est ensuite occuper de corrompre lui-même ses propres partenaires (et son propre directeur technique!) de Deira Academy en distribuant à chacun 830 000 francs burundais, soit environ 280 dollars, pour le match contre Vital’o qui se solda sur une défaite 0-3. « C’est devenu tellement répandu chez nous que nos propres joueurs font désormais office de fixer pour des organisations étrangères », s’émeut un entraîneur burundais témoignant sous couvert d’anonymat. « C’est une manière de gagner de l’argent rapidement et vu que notre championnat est relativement confidentiel . . .  »</p><p>Bénéficiant de l’anonymat du football burundais, les opérateurs mafieux n’ont pas abandonné l’idée d’influencer d’autres rencontres malgré les arrestations et suspensions. Selon nos informations, le « Ninja américain » cherchait à racheter une équipe sans que personne ne soit au courant de la manœuvre afin de poursuivre son business. Reste encore à savoir qui se trouve derrière ce pseudonyme opérant d’un numéro américain, lié à un Kényan et à un Russe sans identité, eux-mêmes en contact avec d’autres personnes ici et là. Un réseau criminel régional, continental et même international selon le président de la fédération qui a fait du Burundi son discret terrain de jeu.</p><p>Un réseau criminel régional, continental et même international qui a fait du Burundi son discret terrain de jeu. « Nous essayons de lutter toujours contre ce fléau », tempère le président de la fédération, Alexandre Muyenge. « Nous sommes à moitié satisfait par rapport à l’année passée. Son ampleur a sensiblement diminué. » Une diminution réelle mais loin d’être définitive : à Bujumbura, les fixers sont simplement plus discrets qu’auparavant.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-22T15:29:28Z</published><summary type="text">Le championnat burundais fait rarement les gros titres — une discrétion qui en fait une cible facile pour des réseaux de matchs truqués désormais ancrés dans l’élite.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/the-music-is-not-yours</id><title type="text">The music is not yours</title><updated>2026-04-23T03:10:45.604606Z</updated><author><name>Dami Ajayi</name></author><author><name>Emeka Ugwu</name></author><author><name>Sa’eed Husaini</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>Our most recent recording features the celebrated Nigerian poet, psychiatrist, and music critic Dami Ajayi. The major thread of discussion centers on the evolution of Afrobeats — its origins, global rise, and current uncertainties. Ajayi argues that what is now called “Afrobeats” emerged through a mix of local innovation, diaspora influence, and global market forces, rather than a clean lineage from Fela Kuti’s Afrobeat. He highlights key turning points such as the late 2000s shift in Nigerian listening habits, the 2012 breakout generation of artists, and the role of streaming and international labels. While acknowledging the genre’s global success, he expresses concern about creative stagnation, commercialization, and weak value capture for Nigerian stakeholders, suggesting that the industry may be entering a plateau phase shaped as much by global capital as by local artistic direction. We also briefly reflect on Ajayi’s multidisciplinary career and intellectual journey, situating his work within broader Nigerian cultural production, touching on literature, criticism, and the role of the public intellectual.</p><audio controls=""><source src="https://episodes.captivate.fm/episode/9bf9027a-9d4b-49db-8a43-40a96950d88d.mp3?_=1" type="audio/mpeg"/></audio></div><section id="sec-1"><header><hr/></header><dl><div><dt>Emeka Ugwu</dt><dd><p>Unfortunately, it’s your boys again. We have as a guest in the house a poet and a music critic — at least, those are one or two of the hats he wears. His name is Dami Ajayi. Full disclosure, Dami is my guy; we go way back. One of the things that we’ve tried to do is to get people like Dami on the show. We’ll be discussing everything from poetry to Afrobeats. As is the staple on the show, I’ll leave Dami to introduce himself and tell us more about those other hats that I haven’t mentioned.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>Hi everyone. Lovely to be here. Thank you for the invite, Emeka and Sa’eed. It’s an interesting day for me, actually, because I never have to introduce myself. As you said, I do a few things. I studied medicine and surgery, then I trained in psychiatry in Nigeria, moved to the UK six years ago, and I’ve been working as a psychiatrist since. Whilst in medical school, I discovered that I really wanted to be a writer. I found inspiration in the likes of Chekhov and Femi Osofisan and Niyi Kiwale, who wore both arts easily. And then I became a music critic, because I found that I was interested in reading about music. I mean, I was very much interested in talking about music, but I found there wasn’t so much of that sort of conversation occurring. So I found myself writing as a way to, you know, fill that void — in quotes. Soon enough, people started paying attention to what I was saying. I got a few gigs and got paid to do it. And, as you know, money sweet. Someone pays you to do what you love, to do what you would have done anyway — that’s good passive income. And I found that music, as a form of expression, speaks differently to every generation. My generation — Nigerians who grew up in the ’80s and ’90s — we’re a very unique generation, because we have all of this music, all sorts of influences from our parents, from America, and we were able to fuse all of that into what is ours, or what we call Afrobeats, or what we’re forced to call Afrobeats. I can say that I’ve just followed the journey of Afrobeats from the first time I heard it on radio to date. What else? I’m married, live in London with my wife and six house plants. Family and friends scattered around the world, so I’m interested in what’s going on everywhere — including what’s going on in the Gulf, and of course in Nigeria as well, where the sense of crime is a bit worrying. I’m interested in everything, and I use Twitter a bit too much.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Emeka Ugwu</dt><dd><p>Where you have been known to get into some drama. It comes with the terrain. As someone who has followed your work — even though, I must confess, because of time I haven’t followed it as keenly in maybe the last year or two — I know that you have published a chapbook and two books of poetry, if I’m not wrong. But before we get into those works, which always fascinate me, one of them especially because of the title. It’s interesting that in your introduction you spoke almost exclusively as a music critic, as though that was your number one passion. Afrobeats is something we can speak about now without it being the Afrobeat of Fela. Is there anything you can tell us — something like those insights you usually churn out — about what moment defined this seeming transition? Because there still seems to be a bit of friction; people haven’t quite come to grips with the fact that Afrobeat might be one thing and Afrobeats another. Some of that can be gleaned from an article you published on <cite>Africa Is a Country</cite> recently, where you waded into the friction between Femi Kuti and Wizkid. So where would you say the defining moment was? In terms of the transition from Afrobeat — with Fela as the big influence — to what’s happening on the Nigerian scene these days, and whether what’s happening there has any real meaning beyond the monetary value or the hype.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>You’ve packed a lot of things into that question. As a poet, I always like to be short, but I’ll try to break it down as best I can. There’s always been this — would I say dialogue or conversation or controversy — around Fela’s Afrobeat and Afrobeats with an<i> s</i>. The controversy is that the name Afrobeats became the catch-all phrase to describe contemporary dance music coming out of Nigeria, Ghana, and their diaspora from around 2011. It was a name foisted on everyone. But because of the collectivist nature of how the music industry and most cottage industries emerge in Nigeria, people just have an interest, they’re doing something, and then they begin to gather around it. I don’t think there was a lot of thought given to “What are we going to call this? What name would stick?” Because as much as people talk about creativity in Nigeria, there’s also a lot of individualism in it. You can date that back to the likes of the Travellin’ Theatre, the Thespians like Kokumo and all of them — everybody tried to do their own thing. Even if you take that into the ’70s, which was seen as the golden era of Nigerian music after the civil war, you’d see that most of the big musicians who played live music had their own band, their own record label, their own joints or clubs where they played. So it’s difficult to agree on a name. Usually when the music catches the attention of the West, a name is foisted on it, because you need a name to market things. That’s where I think Afrobeats came from.</p><p>Of course, the music began to emerge after Fela passed away, or around that time — no one is really clear on exactly when the sound began. But we know when it became something that could no longer be ignored. For me personally, the time I began to realize I had to start taking this music very seriously was maybe 2007, 2008, when suddenly, on campus, DJs would play an entire set of just Nigerian music and then maybe splash some hip hop in between. Because what used to happen before was that the DJ would play an entire set of hip hop, and when they eventually played Afrobeats — or Eedris Abdulkareem and those — it meant the guy was going to finish his set in the next five to ten minutes. It was almost like a signal to start packing your bags. But around 2007, 2008, that changed. You’d go to a party and you might not even hear one hip hop song. That’s when, for me, it began to be a thing. I’m probably revealing my village now. Obviously we don’t do a lot of archiving, a lot of history-taking or stock-taking. People personalize their own histories. But I think we can agree that the music began to make meaning and catch attention when the Banky W brand started to break, say, around 2004. That’s where you can say, “Okay, this thing now began to emerge as something we had to take seriously.” Add to that the infamous controversy between Eedris Abdulkareem and 50 Cent, or the organizers — no one really knows exactly if things happened the way they’re described, but we know there was an altercation, and it was almost like what you get when people unionize, except it wasn’t a union. It was just one guy, Eedris Abdulkareem, who was clear: “You guys have to take me seriously. You have to give me everything you’re giving this international star.” Previously, they’d just give you a platform and say, “Well, you can come and open for this person — you should be happy we’re even asking.”</p></dd></div><div><dt>Sa’eed Husaini</dt><dd><p>That’s a series of interesting answers. And how you’ve woven your biography into it is relevant, because the development of Afrobeats and the narration of Afrobeats — which you’ve been a central part of — have been intertwined, and I think you’re suggesting as much in your answer. I do want to come back to some of the biographical elements of that story. But in talking about periodization, and the ’70s moment, it led me to ponder whether there’s an extent to which this is a bit of a fad — whether we have waves of global attention that go to Nigeria sometimes, then move somewhere else, then come back. And if that might be the case, then is it really that Afrobeats has arrived and is here to stay? Or are we just in a moment that might also pass?</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>You’re right. The world is talking about the AI bubble at the moment, and a lot of it is, you know, warranted. You can extend that analogy to music, and to pop music in particular. The global pop scene is always looking for what is hot, what is new. The record labels are always looking for what can sell, what novelty factor they can use. The ’70s boom in Nigeria was a consequence of Nigeria’s economic abundance. I didn’t live through it — I wasn’t born — but you hear everyone talk about how things were. My father went to university in the ’70s, and when he talks about the life they were living, you know, you had a concierge in your hall, you had good food in the cafeteria, you were paid. And there are record label executives who say they were doing millions of records in Nigeria at the time. You just listen to the music from that era and there was something unusual going on. The juju musicians were so expansive. It had an orchestral feel. You had Sunny Adé with maybe six or seven guitars, interlocking rhythms, a medley going on for 22, 23 minutes. These guys had all-night parties where they’d do an afternoon party, stop, go and rest, then come back at ten and play from ten to seven in the morning. That era was Nigeria’s own golden age, because there was money. They had just fought a war, so there was a kind of subduing — everyone processing the horrors the war had brought — and then all this money on top of it.</p><p>In the ’80s, Bob Marley had passed away, his music was very successful, and Island Records was actively looking for someone to step into his shoes. The myth — and you can’t fact-check these things, but they’ve been repeated so many times they’ve become their own mythology — is that they were looking for Fela, couldn’t get him because Fela was Fela, and then they went for Sunny Adé. Sunny Adé was open to it. He was signed to Mango and did three albums through the ’80s. He toured America, toured Europe, played Glastonbury, played in Japan. But after about four years, they dropped him because the return on investment wasn’t significant enough. And it wasn’t just Sunny who had that juju break — Shina Peters and Segun Adewale were also taken on around the same time that Paul Simon was doing his thing with South African music, and then <cite>Graceland</cite> came out shortly afterwards. <cite>Graceland </cite>won Album of the Year at the Grammys. There was genuine attention on Africa. But obviously that faded. In the ’90s, there wasn’t so much going on for Africa on the global scene, except maybe Majek Fashek, who was not that big a success — there was a lack of consistency, partly, sadly, owing to his health. Of course, Dr. Alban was big on the European circuit. So there’s always been one person popping. But not in a while had we had what happened in the last six or seven years, and a lot of that you can attribute to globalization and technology. It could be sustained for a while — maybe the best we’ve ever had it. But I don’t think these things last forever. There’s always something new to catch people’s attention. And as much as we like to think Afrobeats is the next sliced bread, it isn’t the most sophisticated music ever. It isn’t. And I think that novelty has started to wear off.</p><p>I think the musicians themselves, instead of doubling down and leaning into musical traditions that could make it a more formidable sound, have gotten into this attitude of just saying whatever they want and getting the paycheck. That was part of what I was trying to say in that essay — that you have Wizkid and Asake giving you a four-song EP which is really underwhelming. Underwhelming to the point where you’re like, “Okay, maybe we’re done here.” Maybe it’s like that DJ set where you play the African music — you’ve come to the end of the show.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Sa’eed Husaini</dt><dd><p>Maybe it’s time to go home. Before we do, it would be helpful to zoom in a bit on this wave — if that’s what we want to call it — of attention, especially since global attention is part of what defines it. You said Nigerian attention to the fact that Nigerians are listening to their own music more, but there’s something about someone else valuing it that has also increased its value at home, at least that’s one way to look at it. So I’m curious about what for you were the important touchpoints — what marked that this was happening and gaining momentum, and then where the momentum started slowing.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>I’ve always felt that the generation of musicians who all released debut albums around 2012 have an outsized personality — it’s almost like thinking of the military Class of ’66, but for Afrobeats. You have Burna Boy, Olamide, Davido, Wizkid — how can I forget Wizkid — and in being appropriately inclusive, Tiwa Savage as well. And the moment they crossed into getting international label deals, that was the turning point. It was a bit staggered, but once they all got there, things shifted. It wasn’t all immediately successful — Wizkid’s<cite> Sounds from the Other Side</cite>, which was his attempt to consolidate what had happened with Drake, wasn’t that great. But we had “One Dance,” which was a massive song with Drake. And the moment international musicians started getting into Afrobeats, trying out the styles — the Justin Biebers, the Ed Sheerans — that’s really when things began to go crazy. Of course, you have to give special mention to Wande Coal’s “Oliver Twist,” which conquered the United Kingdom.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Sa’eed Husaini</dt><dd><p>I wanted to briefly ask about the crew that came slightly before that — the 2Face, the Plantashun Boiz kind of generation. Would you consider them pioneers? Or were they more like John the Baptist, preparing the way?</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>I think what the 2012 generation were able to do was galvanize. That’s the key word. It was all hitting back to back to back to back, and that created a certain kind of attention. What the earlier guys did — and you can’t sleep on it — was a lot of hard work. A lot of them went to America, they were paying for features, building contacts. They knew that was the direction to take and they pursued it. Look at someone like Olamide, who of the five we spoke about was the most reluctant to go international initially. But even he kept trying, and what he did was build — he expanded his own skill set. And he was able to deliver someone like Asake, whose rise to meteoric status looks almost like a form of magic, honestly. So people pay it forward. You learn from your predecessors, take what they’ve given you, and push it further. But I think what this generation had was the ability to galvanize, and a few other things were happening at the same time. There was also the brain drain — a lot of people pushing into the diaspora, like myself. So these artists had ambassadors all over the world, people listening to their music and influencing others. That builds cultural capital. Because in the diaspora, for a long time, Africans — I still hear these stories — would rather people thought they were from the Caribbean. But Afrobeats suddenly became something they could all identify with, a source of pride, ancestral pride. So all of that was happening simultaneously. Usually it’s not just one thing happening — it’s three, four, five, six things happening at once. And then of course streaming, streaming, streaming. Streaming made it easier to cross barriers, because the statistics can’t lie. You see where the listeners are coming from, and then you pursue it.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Emeka Ugwu</dt><dd><p>I know exactly where I was when I found out that you can’t sleep on Afrobeats anymore. It was with “Oliver Twist.” This was in London, sometime around 2010, in a club that you could have described as more of an all-white club. And I can still feel the way I felt when that moment happened — towards the end of the night, everybody was seated, I didn’t even know the intro to the song. But I realized that people around me — white girls, white guys, a bunch of people — were already jumping. This is maybe 3 a.m. So I take that. I also take the point you made that a lot of how Afrobeats has evolved is not disconnected from the large diasporan population that Nigeria has — and Ghana — and maybe even Africa in general, because you find people from all parts of Africa vibing to this Nigerian thing. But to keep it short so you can answer: What do you think the emerging or future trends of Afrobeats might be? And maybe this will sound a bit cheeky — do you think Afrobeats is or even could be displaced by amapiano?</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>I wrote a piece for Afrocritik for their reports recently, and I addressed some of these questions, because everyone in the music industry is a bit on edge. Not since Asake has there been a big breakout star, and it’s been a while since then. No one has really set the world alight since. And the music itself is not performing as well globally — the quality has somehow been woeful in the last two, three years. That gives everyone pause, because in terms of the money that has been pumped into the industry, you have the big players here with big checks and big accounts. Everyone who comes to the party expects a return on their investment. And if the numbers are not going up, what do you usually do? If a corporation finds they don’t have money anymore, they sack everybody and give them redundancy.</p><p>What has happened over the years is that what we call Afrobeats — really, popular Nigerian music — finds a new trend to sit on. What has happened since around 2019, pre-Covid, is that we began to experiment with South Africa and amapiano, and a lot of our producers, who are really the engine room of Afrobeats — the guys who do the heavy lifting — sat in that space and carved out something that was not quite Afrobeats, not quite amapiano. Some people have suggested calling it Afro-piano, or whatever, to express what was going on at the time. That sound was popular and did quite well. But since then, I don’t think we’ve had any new sound that has emerged and caught everyone’s attention. The creativity feels stuck. Even the latest Wizkid and Asake EP is that amapiano sound. So the question is: Are we going to find the next sound? Everyone is waiting to see. There’s a sense of stuckness in the genre.</p><p>And it’s a make-or-break moment. But if you look at genres generally, it’s very rare for any genre to sustain this long in public spaces. I was saying to my wife — and she was quite surprised — that if you look at Caribbean influences in American music, the Kevin Lyttles and the Sean Pauls of that era, what they did was import those artists, use their music, try to get them into the market. And then you had someone like Rihanna, who came in with the old Caribbean thing, and then suddenly had an album where she was marketed properly as an American pop star and went on to do big things. I think that’s probably what’s going to happen with someone like Tyla as well, who is getting bigger — she may be Africa’s response to Rihanna in that very specific sense. My view is that capitalism will always exploit in its own way. It takes what it needs, takes your secret formula, uses it for themselves, enriches themselves, and leaves you high and dry. So if in all your optimism you did not envisage that a day would come where you’d come to work and they’d say, “Well, we’re so sorry, nothing doing” — then you are the fool. I think that’s really where everyone is now. They’ve all taken these big advances, they’ve enjoyed themselves with it, and the next paycheck may not be coming, and everyone is in a bit of a state of panic.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Emeka Ugwu</dt><dd><p>I like where you arrive with that. This issue of talking back to Afrobeats in relation to Fela and his quote-unquote message — because if Afrobeats is stuck in a time warp, I don’t know, given the connection it has to Fela, whether it’s for those of us who look for message, who look for meaning in sounds and lyrics. Maybe that’s why I’m drawn to Afrobeats but not as invested in it as you are. I’d like to think some of the reason is that I don’t understand what these people are saying, they’re not saying anything. Sometimes I’m drawn to Burna Boy because for imagery he occasionally gets close to it, but it’s obvious he doesn’t fully know what’s at stake. So I don’t throw my whole heart in when he gets into trouble every once in a while.</p><p>How off is it for people like us to want to make those kinds of comparisons? And might we get back to a time where the music connects to what’s happening in society and in literature — as opposed to what you’re describing, where capitalism and the way the music industry has become structured means people can just come and say a lot of nonsense and get away with it because the production sounds great?</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>A lot of it is probably generational as well. Because the real indicator for knowing that you’ve become an old man is to say, “Oh, this music is not like the music of the other day.” Once you hit that Rubicon — and I think you’ve just crossed it, Mr. Emeka. But jokes apart, I think if you look at the sort of expression across the board — look at the contemporaries of the Afrobeats musicians in other genres, in other places — you wouldn’t find much of a difference. We are in a place where there’s slop everywhere. People no longer use music for messaging, perhaps because of how chaotic life has become, how much information we’re fed on a day-to-day basis. The information overload means people want to use music to relax, to feel something different, to escape. We don’t talk enough about how these conditionings change and shape music for us.</p><p>And then there’s the fact that the kind of society Nigeria has become — if you do not give yourself the education you deserve, you find that the values have eroded. There was a time when, if your father was a bad man, your family would have to leave the area because people would look at you funny. But now, if you’re a Yahoo boy or involved in any sort of fraud, your parents welcome you and drive the car you bought them. We’ve gotten to a point where that has all eroded. So what messaging do you then want to give? What values do you want to express in your music?</p><p>And I’ve always stood by the fact that the success of even the claim — that there’s a relationship between Fela and the new guys — is the success of a mythology that was given to us. Nobody could draw a proper, true line between Fela and what these guys are doing. We were given these things. And if you go back in history, it’s really the Kuti family themselves who would always say, “Well, this thing you’re saying, we don’t quite agree with it.” But okay, cool. So there’s a grudging acceptance, and it’s now become the myth of choice. I don’t think there’s any real connection. What there is, is a sense of Fela as the patron saint of Nigerian music — in the way that maybe Fela himself saw Ambrose Campbell as the father of modern Nigerian music. There’s that sense of Fela as this outsized patron. And it doesn’t hurt that he was bohemian and excellent. The younger musicians are able to identify with certain aspects of Fela’s life. Like the guy who, a long time ago, went to an audition and wore trousers. So people are able to tap into parts of Fela that resonate with them. Someone like Burna Boy, for instance, styles himself like Fela, takes some of his messaging. But you and I know that Burna Boy will never lead a protest. He will buy a billboard and send a tweet saying, “Have you seen my billboard?” He’s an influencer. So what I’m essentially saying is that the connection between Fela and the new generation is simplistic — and it’s useful precisely as a simplification when you’re marketing something to people outside Nigeria. It’s like when someone at work asks you where you traveled, and you say Africa, and then you explain, “Oh, this is how we do it in Africa.” It’s an oversimplification for external audiences. As a marketing ploy, it works. But you and I know Afrobeats is not a monolith. There’s so much going on inside.</p><p>That said, I do think that if you listen to some of the guys who make the Afro-Adura music in particular, there’s something they’re doing with language. They’re taking language from the streets and from Pentecostalism, talking about struggles, about urban poverty, depicting stories and anecdotes with a lot of craft. It’s almost like what Nas achieves in his early music — depicting the society as it is, and society looks at itself and laughs back. A good place to start would be Odumodublvck, Qdot, Shallipopi, and even the late MohBad. And to an extent, Naira Marley, though his music leans a bit too hard on shock value.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Sa’eed Husaini</dt><dd><p>That’s quite interesting. One of the threads you’ve woven into the narrative that I want to pull on is the industry element, and I want to come back to recommendations before we close. But stepping back to draw out the trajectory of the wider industry: One way to summarize what you’re saying is that this is definitely not the ’70s anymore — not just in terms of demand, as in the audience has changed and people aren’t looking for anti-imperialism or bohemian anticapitalist sentiments in their Afrobeats; they want to chill. But there’s also the economics. What I’m still not clear on is the division of labor in the global music industry, and whether Nigeria’s role has shifted at all. Because the picture you described from the ’70s sounds like one where Nigeria was both producer and consumer — there wasn’t, not to be too grandiose, the classic dependency-theory supply chain where we produce raw materials that are refined externally and sold back to us. But it sounds like this current wave has mirrored that dynamic more closely — talents discovered in Lagos, exported, refined, and brought back under foreign labels. Is that too harsh a framing, and does it over-romanticize the ’70s?</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>Let me start with the ’70s. From what I’ve read and heard about the scene then, a lot of the record labels were owned by suits in London and New York, but they had offices in Nigeria — offices that were almost autonomous in their operation. You had recording engineers, band men, band executives based there; they had their own walk-ins. Of course, aspects of the music — the processing, making up the masters — I think a lot of those things were done over in England. But they were bringing the music back to the continent, to Nigeria, where people had money to buy it. Let’s not forget that in that period, owning a vinyl player was a status symbol. It was a hierarchy of possessions for a young man — that was the first thing, then a bicycle, then a car. But what then happened was the military passed their indigenization decrees, and a lot of those companies had to restructure. Nigeria was trying to keep the money in. And then the corporations were very keen and quick to leave when things got really bad in the ’80s. By about 1996, none of those guys were in Nigeria anymore — I think Sony CBS was one of the last to leave. When they left, there was a vacuum. That’s why if you look at the ’90s, you can’t really find much music from there, because it wasn’t being produced to international standards. A lot of the people who were making music were just indies.</p><p>But in the 2000s — the late 2000s and into the 2010s — those same sorts of organizations came back. They’re back in Lagos. They have their subsidiaries, their A&amp;amp;R people, because it’s hot again, and they’re looking for talents to showcase to the world. For them it’s a game of numbers — sign as many talents as you can and see if enough of them can deliver a profit. The end game is economics; it’s a boardroom. But if you want to deal in the emotions of it, the emotions tell you categorically that a lot of the gains Afrobeats has made in the last five or six years, the money doesn’t trickle down to Nigeria. Because the A&amp;amp;Rs now are guys who are probably Nigerian, but they went to university with people like Emeka — they can speak the right accent, say the right things, and get it.</p><p>What tends to happen with the record labels now is more decentralized. They give you money, a budget for everything you need — go, make your music, and then deliver your raw files to us. We’ll process it. So the musician goes and camps out in an Airbnb with his boys. And the A&amp;amp;R — the artists and repertoire person — is essentially your handler. They’re the one saying, “This sound is not there yet, maybe we should feature this person.” A lot of people who get those jobs understand where the music is going. But the problem is who is getting those jobs. For instance, a lot of the early Fireboy work — and the Asake songs — was actually A&amp;amp;R’d by Olamide himself. He said himself that it was his idea to do a song with Lagbaja. And that song, when you look at Fireboy’s catalog, stands out completely. These are songs that will age well. So the money is not trickling down anymore because a new set of bosses has come to town. The old guys have become podcasters — telling stories about the old days, which is what I think someone like Paul Play should not be doing. Instead of sitting behind those conversations and being the actual A&amp;amp;R for the music we’re listening to now, they’re the ones telling the stories of who slapped who in the studio. And then the segment comes where you’re in your 50s and 60s and your body is breaking down, there’s no money for hospital or food, and you ask yourself, “Was it really worth it?” So that’s the existential angst everyone has now. The guy who took the big advance is looking at his career, at 40,000 listeners on Spotify, wondering what comes next. The people who make the real decisions are sitting in air-conditioned boardrooms, sipping their coffees and saying, cut it out — no emotion, it’s just business and numbers.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Sa’eed Husaini</dt><dd><p>So then it doesn’t differ so dramatically from any other African raw material in how its price and market value is determined. You’re describing licensed buying agents who buy cocoa when there’s a surplus.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>That’s exactly what it is. And then you add streaming on top, which is now like another business on top of the business. Before, you’d sell the music yourself and the record label takes the money. Now there’s a streaming company taking most of it as well. So yeah, I’m just interested in what would happen after streaming. I’ve actually started buying my vinyls back, because at least when they take everything off the internet, I can listen to some music. Because what you listen to on your phone, online — you don’t really own it. It’s paid for on your behalf.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Sa’eed Husaini</dt><dd><p>It’s not really yours. And it’s increasingly AI nonsense anyway — maybe you’ll start writing reviews for machine-generated music one of these days. On a slightly lighter note, I’m wondering how, or to what extent, you feel that the music industry and the literary scene track together or diverge. There’s probably not the same kind of flamboyance in terms of cars people drive, but there might be some similarities. In a way, Nigeria seemed to be having a moment in the 2000s where Nollywood was increasingly recognized, big names emerged in Nigerian literature on the global scene, and Afrobeats was also emerging. Nigerian cultural production in general seemed to be globalizing. I wondered if from that vantage point there are ways in which those two worlds are related or have had similar dynamics shape them.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>I think the root cause of all the problems in African literature is that the biggest patrons of African literature are not Africans. That’s the first thing. And then there are competing interests, competing talent, and the deck is stacked against the African or Nigerian writer. In time, you’d always have one or two or three or four writers who are in the limelight. Those who stay in the limelight, or go into what you might call pop glory, always have to diversify. You have to cut media, be controversial, be beautiful, speak very well — do all the other things that are not quite legible as the writing itself. And if you really want to be a writer, you may have to embrace obscurity if you’re not willing to do all of those things. Because you have to market yourself, you have to take all the opportunities. And in my view, there are very few of those opportunities available for writers of African descent in the West — they take one or two, there’s usually one or two slots, and once those are saturated, that’s it.</p><p>Take the Black Lives Matter period. There was a flip in publishing where you had more writers from ethnic minorities getting published as a direct consequence of what was going on politically. But you and I know the political space has flipped now, and if you look closely, you see that flip reflected in publishing too. Growing up, I used to think talent was enough, that you just had to write well and have good ideas and lean into tradition. But I find that the world goes in the direction of the politics around it, and all of those responses are more legitimate in determining who becomes what. And you have to be willing to accept that your best writing may be read only by your friends and your lovers.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Sa’eed Husaini</dt><dd><p>Not entirely dissimilar to your best podcasting reaching a modest audience. But to that point — and this is the final question I want to pose before Emeka comes back in — what is the role of the critic, especially a critic who sits between the worlds of literature and music? Who is your audience, and what do you feel is your responsibility to that audience? What are the underlying motivations or philosophies that undergird your approach to criticism?</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>I started writing music criticism for myself in the first instance. When I was doing my work, some people came and said, “Dami, how about you write for us and we’ll pay you?” I took the money. And when they stopped paying me, I continued to do my work. Because my work is my work. I feel weird about music, and writing about it helps me feel better about it. So I’m my most important audience in that sense. And I feel that the real role of the writer is to speak to their times. There’s no human experience that is truly different — what makes it different is how it’s expressed in words, in film, in whatever form. In doing your expression, you’re still trying to connect with people. I’ve written so much about music that sometimes I come across a piece I’ve written and think, “When did you write this one?” So yes, prolific — but I find it serves its own purpose. When a work is sent out into the world, it goes, not unlike the bird that is set free. If it falls in nice places and people like it, wonderful. And I’m fortunate that at least I’ve been read. The fact that you’d even have me on this podcast — that’s a big deal to me. I still see myself as that little child who just cares about music and wants to talk about it. And people now want to listen. My bars are low, so to speak — if you have low expectations, you’ll be happy. I’m just going to do the work I think I was put here to do.</p><p>What I’ve also observed about music journalism is that there isn’t much in the way of career progression. After some time, the next step is either joining the suits — going A&amp;amp;R, rising up the ranks, running a record label — or working with the talent as a PR person. Or you become a politician, or write a book, or become an influencer. Any career pathway that kills your ability to sit at the laptop and pour your thoughts out, to do the actual writing — I find that problematic. I knew this early. That’s why I stayed in school, finished my degree, became a psychiatrist. So I can do what I want to do without wondering, “Do I have to get paid for this? Do I have to pay rent?” I can do all those things without thinking about money first when it comes to my writing. I’m a very privileged person, and I accept that. But I wanted to do my work, and I’ve found a way.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Emeka Ugwu</dt><dd><p>Dami is being modest. And I say this — maybe because we’re friends — but let me wear my literary critic hat for a moment. If I have any criticism of the older generation of writers — the Soyinkas, the Achebes, perhaps even the Nwigwes, that cohort, and even some who came after them — I think what they didn’t quite do, even in the ’70s, was pay much attention to the music that was being created at the time. We didn’t get music critics of the sort that Dami is, or at least not in the same public register. I don’t know who I would go and read if I wanted to think seriously about the music of the ’70s. You find some of it in academic papers, maybe in passing in a Saro-Wiwa or a Lola Shoneyin, but basically, it was almost as if those writers thought they were above the music of their time. What the likes of Dami did was break that myth. In that cohort of writers you find people who stuck to music as music critics, and people who stuck to film. How they’ve evolved from there — well, that’s partly why I haven’t caught up much on the literary side lately.</p><p>What I think they’ve managed to do is cultivate a following as the industries — film, music, all the entertainment compartments — developed. And I think I can say this for film especially, though I wouldn’t be surprised if Dami has had the same experience: people who write criticism of a particular film or single, and then the producer or artist — someone with some street credibility — says publicly, if I catch you outside, you are in trouble for what you wrote. Or, in this age of fan bases, Wizkid FC comes for your timeline. That kind of controversy makes me think there’s a world in which a music critic can build something real. Maybe it’s not quite been built yet. Maybe people like Dami would build it. He has newsletters coming into my inbox every week, and I know people are actively listening to what he has to say. This might be a case — and I hope not — of coming ahead of your time. But I think there’ll be time enough for Dami to respond to that.</p><p>Now, a closing question. In much of our conversation today, we haven’t focused much on your work as a psychiatrist. When I first read your poetry — and by the way, Dami has a collection called <cite>A Woman’s Body Is a Country</cite> — my thought was that you were writing sensual poetry. Upon reflection, I realized there are aspects of you as the psychiatrist that come into you writing as a poet. Earlier in this conversation you mentioned that as a poet, one of your biggest assets is brevity. Is this something you’re consciously aware of that you also bring into writing music reviews, or into how you respond to the arts around you? And how much of this involves your politics — some of which you’ve begun to articulate, in terms of the privileges you’ve tried to build around yourself to insulate you from the roadblocks of the industry?</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>What you’re trying to ask, I think, is: How do my many parts work together? Yes. And the most important thing to me as a poet is mischief. If you read my poetry and you understand it, you’ll understand that mischief is at the heart of what I’m doing. I was having a conversation with a professor of literature once, and I told him I consider Eshu my patron god in writing.</p><p>The mischief drives a lot of the poetry. And the thing is, everyone who comes and says, “Oh, this guy’s poetry is shallow” — you’ve missed it. On one layer it is. But if you take time and go over it again, you find layers beneath. For instance, the book <cite>A Woman’s Body Is a Country</cite> — about five years after it was published, someone wrote a review looking at the social and political aspects of it, and said, “This is the most political book I’ve read in a long time.” And I thought, “Yes, you get it.” Because the book is really about Nigeria. It’s about patriotism in a very specific sense. But of course I was using and utilizing metaphors available to me as a young person in Nigeria who cares about music and dance and all those things. I needed to co-opt metaphors that were accessible to me at the time. So there is that sense of politics in the work. And I think even in this conversation today I’ve been quite political, clearly, in a lot of the ideas I’ve shared.</p><p>The mischief doesn’t travel very well into my work as a psychiatrist, because the skill you need to be a good psychiatrist in the NHS — in particular — is not mischief. You need empathy. You need to be sensitive to people’s feelings. You need to be kind, professional, and you need to know your onions in the service of helping the patient. But rigor — you need that to be a good poet as well. And listening, you need to listen. So I’m just trying to see which skills travel between these different parts of me.</p><p>For me as a music writer, the real reason I do what I do is simply that I care very much about music. Even when I speak to my parents, they’ve always said, “We knew you had an unusual relationship with music since you were a child, since you were a baby.” I’ve just sort of found a way to cope with that unusual relationship, and writing has been that vehicle. The people who most identify with my work have the same problem I have. They can’t get the music out of their head, so they have to find people like them who will keep talking about it.</p><p>And on the poetry: Poets should be sensual, because we’re working with language in a very specific way. If you as a poet don’t have that uncanny relationship with language, maybe you should become an accountant. My wife’s an accountant, by the way. And Jesus was a carpenter. I also didn’t want to write the kind of poems that Niyi Osundare wrote, or that Christopher Okigbo wrote, or even Tanure Ojaide. I wanted to write something uniquely mine — so that you read a line from my poem and you get a sense of my style. That’s a Dami Ajayi line, you know, in the way that when I come across a Soyinka poem I know it’s Soyinka. For me it was about finding my own voice.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Sa’eed Husaini</dt><dd><p>Indeed. And I’m a hobbyist carpenter, but I can’t count much, and I’m certainly not a poet. But I will say that, to quote you quoting a friend: Finding meaning in Afrobeats is as efficient as fetching water from a well with a basket. Despite that, I think you’ve managed to quench some of our thirst for knowledge. You can see why I’m not a poet. What I’m trying to say is this has been a fantastic conversation, and we’ve kept you for a while, so we should probably let you go — with the hope that we’ll be able to catch you again for another discussion down the line. Thank you for joining us today.</p></dd></div><div><dt>Dami Ajayi</dt><dd><p>It’s been great being here. Thank you very much. I had a good time with you guys. Hopefully soon we should be able to break bread and drink beer in person. That would be nice.</p></dd></div></dl></section></article></content><published>2026-04-22T01:30:48Z</published><summary type="text">On the latest AIAC podcast, the gang from the Nigerian Scam explores how Afrobeats got globalized, who captured the value, and why the party may be ending.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/sovereignty-beyond-the-nation</id><title type="text">Sovereignty beyond the nation</title><updated>2026-04-23T03:10:45.174665Z</updated><author><name>Jacques Coste</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>In the early 1920s, the Latin American landscape was rocked by two political earthquakes. Though different in nature, the Mexican and Russian Revolutions shared much in common: domestically, both fought for the cause of social justice, while abroad both raised the flag of sovereignty against imperialist interests. Most important of all, the triumph of the Mexican and Russian revolutions opened a new space for debate in Latin America, where egalitarian societies and pan–Latin American anti-imperialism were the order of the day.</p><p>Under the influence of both revolutions, radical leftists across Latin America developed different (sometimes competing) agendas to counterbalance US influence and ensure the dignity of the subaltern classes. However, those debates — and the revolutionary potential of Latin American societies in the 1920s and ’30s — have for too long been ignored by historians. In fact, before the publication of <cite>Radical Sovereignty: Debating Race, Nation, and Empire in Interwar Latin America</cite>, it was common to neglect the impact of the Russian Revolution in the region, to see Latin America’s political movements through a blinkered national lens, or to associate pan–Latin American internationalism with the Cold War era exclusively.</p><p>Tony Wood restores the border-crossing debates held by Latin American radicals in the interwar years, shedding light on the tensions, depth, and complexities of leftist thought as it tackled issues of race, the nation, internationalism, and class. Challenging the liberal critique that Marxists ignore the question of race, Wood demonstrates through vast archival evidence that Latin American radicals in fact spilled rivers of ink and held dozens of rich discussions about racial injustice — and imagined possible ways to eradicate it.</p><p>Even more, different strands of Latin American leftist thinkers and policymakers proposed creative solutions to liberate black and indigenous populations from oppression and bring them into the struggle against imperialism and capitalist exploitation. How to do so was a point of contention: some advocated for the integration of subaltern populations within the existing nation-states, granting them a high degree of autonomy and equality; others called for the formation of entirely alternative national units; and yet others imagined transnational solutions, such as a confederated Latin American polity.</p><p>Tracking those intellectual exchanges, Wood provides a portrait of a radical left consumed with the “entangled relationships” of race, nation, class, and citizenship, where the ultimate stakes of those exchanges were the liberation of the subaltern populations of the Americas. Moreover, those same debates extended beyond the interwar period, establishing a repertoire of ideas, discourses, and actions that were taken up by left-wing groups in the Cold War era and beyond.</p><p>Leading those discussions, radical leftists “called into question not only the external borders of existing nation-states, but also internal divisions between social classes, ethnic groups, and categories of citizen.” In doing so, they expanded the notion of citizenship — transcending political rights with a more robust vision of social justice — and of sovereignty, understood as a shield against imperialism and as a vehicle for local autonomy, freedom, and democratic self-governance.</p><p>The concept of self-determination is central to Wood’s analysis — so central that one might quibble that the author focuses on the Russian tradition to the neglect of the Mexican case. In Mexico, it was at the heart of the revolutionary struggle and helped consolidate the postrevolutionary state, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, Emiliano Zapata’s famous phrase “<i>La tierra es de quien la trabaja</i>” (“The land belongs to those who work it”) encapsulated the peasant’s right to self-determination as a founding principle of the ambitious redistributive land regime of the revolutionary 1917 Constitution. It also guided the agrarian policies pushed by the postrevolutionary government after 1920. Likewise, from the administration of Venustiano Carranza (1917–1920) onward, Mexico became a global leader calling for “the unrestricted respect of sovereignty, non-intervention, and the right of all peoples to self-determination” as central principles of interstate relations.</p><p>Wood primarily understands self-determination as defined by the Russian case. Specifically, in the early twentieth century, Vladimir Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg clashed over whether socialists should support the right of national self-determination. Lenin argued that backing oppressed nations’ right to secede from empires was a basic democratic principle and a strategic necessity: without it, workers in dominant nations would reproduce chauvinism, and genuine international solidarity would be impossible.</p><p>Luxemburg was more skeptical. She believed that “the nation” was not a unified democratic actor but a cross-class formation led by bourgeois elites. Luxemburg worried that nationalist movements would distract workers from class struggle and strengthen new capitalist states rather than advance socialism. At stake was a question that Wood pursues in Latin America across the interwar years: Does supporting national independence advance working-class emancipation, or does it risk subordinating it to nationalism?</p><p>During the interwar period, left-wing Latin American intellectuals — many militants and “fellow-travelers” of the Communist Party, others associated with the Mexican Revolution — revived these questions and wrestled with the concept of self-determination. Though the concept had different meanings for different groups, they shared “a common principle: that people should have the right to determine their own destinies.” In that same vein, Wood argues that self-determination was a radically democratic concept: “the true core of the idea [was] to extend the right to self-rule to groups long marginalized and denied that right.”</p><p>Focusing on interwar Communist and Communist-adjacent groups, Wood draws upon a vast corpus of archival materials, examining sources from dozens of repositories situated in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Russia, and the United States. Wood unveils a web of transnational connections that shaped radical leftists’ thinking on race, sovereignty, and anti-imperial struggle. <cite>Radical Sovereignty</cite> not only advances a novel argument about the centrality of race but also bucks the nation-centric histories of the Latin American left: debates over self-determination, class, and race were always transnational in nature. Exchanges among leftist thinkers and activists across Latin America were the driving force of radical political action in the region.</p><p>Wood argues that this transnational web of Communist-adjacent thought and action was far more complex than traditional accounts have suggested. The Comintern (or Communist International) was the coordinating body of global Communist parties, dominated by the Soviet Communist Party. It was the organ through which Moscow oriented the political thinking and action of allied parties worldwide. Several historical accounts have viewed the Comintern, especially under Joseph Stalin, as an instrument through which the Kremlin imposed policies on Communist parties abroad — those local parties either followed the Moscow line completely or were ostracized from the organization.</p><p>Wood, however, shows that the Soviet line was contested, negotiated, and adapted by Latin American radicals. Their ideas on racial equality, nationalities, self-determination, and anti-imperialism, although indebted to the Soviets, were also shaped by widespread indigenous movements, pan-African currents, and black thinkers, whose unique analyses of capitalist exploitation were informed by the historical experience of US domination and the triumph of the Mexican Revolution.</p><p>Wood argues that the Mexican Revolution, particularly in the 1920s, loomed almost as large as the Russian Revolution with the Latin American left. Little surprise, then, that Mexico City, as the capital of postrevolutionary Mexico, became a hub for leftist political imagination, discussion, and activism. Exiles and radical thinkers from across Latin America gathered there to analyze — and try to export — Mexico’s revolutionary political program, which included nationalizations, land redistribution, labor rights, and a fierce anti-imperialist rhetoric.</p><p>These transnational connections, Wood argues, were reciprocal: on the one hand, they shaped Mexico’s “political and cultural ferment,” contributing to the implementation of ambitious progressive policies under the postrevolutionary Mexican state (especially the political empowerment of peasants). On the other hand, transnational encounters in Mexico City influenced ideas about revolutionary movements, anti-imperialist struggles, and racial liberation that the exiles themselves nurtured and brought back to their own countries.</p><p>Mexico City, Wood shows, was a transnational hub where conversations about race, anti-imperialism, and sovereignty took on hemispheric proportions: Mexican peasant leagues (particularly their main leader, Úrsulo Galván) coordinated joint political action with Peruvian exiles of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA, especially its leader, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre), the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), the Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas (LADLA), and the Hands Off Nicaragua Committee (which supported Augusto Sandino’s struggle).</p><p>As Wood writes, “All [these movements] were rooted in a shared conviction that the national and the international realms were permeable; all shared the hope that faraway agencies might help reshape local fates, and the actions taken here and now might play their part in making the wider world anew.” Yet different strands of that radical leftism assigned divergent roles to the state. For instance, while APRA cadres argued that the nation-state should be strengthened to combat imperialism, the Communists thought the state — which responded to artificial frontiers — could and should be remade in the name of racial equality.</p><p>Internal differences were exacerbated as the external climate grew hostile. Mexican domestic politics, specifically, experienced a “conservative turn” in the late 1920s. Facing external and internal threats and crises, the postrevolutionary government looked to stabilize domestic political life, and transnational enclaves concentrated in Mexico City became an easy target. This included deporting several foreign-born Communists, such as the Cuban labor leader Sandalio Junco and the Italian photographer Tina Modotti. At the same time, fractures within the left intensified. If, during the early 1920s, diverse leftist currents could air their differences in creative debate, by the turn of the decade rivalries were becoming insurmountable.</p><p>Part II of <cite>Radical Sovereignty</cite> delves deeper into one of the book’s core revelations: debates within the Communist movement on black and indigenous self-determination were much more nuanced than is often credited. In this section, Wood shifts his attention to different sites — Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Moscow, Lima, and Havana — where discussions on race and sovereignty were foremost among the concerns of radicals.</p><p>Here, <cite>Radical Sovereignty</cite> challenges the existing consensus about the Latin American left’s alleged blind obedience to the Comintern’s ideological line. During the 1930s, the Comintern adopted a more confrontational approach known as “class against class” or the Third Period, which precluded Communists from forming alliances with social democrats and nationalists and instead advocated for more direct action to radicalize the working class against the “bourgeois state.”</p><p>As Wood notes, “while the Third Period brought a narrowing of ideological horizons, it paradoxically created some openings.” Those openings included more ambitious discussions on how to address racial injustice, as well as heated debates over the political significance of the category of race itself. In other words, the added emphasis on class politics precipitated an expanded conception of class-belonging and, with it, an exploration of how class was implicated in racial and national oppression.</p><p>Participants in those debates responded to national politics and social realities in their own countries, but they were heavily influenced by transnational connections. For instance, Harry Haywood’s famous “Black Belt Thesis,” presented during the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in 1928, may very well have influenced ideas about self-determination in Latin American communist movements. The Black Belt Thesis stated that the dense concentration of people of African descent in the rural Deep South presented the demographic, social, and cultural foundations for that population to achieve self-determination and to be recognized as a sovereign political entity.</p><p>For Latin American radicals, the Black Belt Thesis raised pressing questions: Did it also apply to their region? Did Latin American people of African descent suffer the same kind of oppression as their US counterparts? And what about indigenous peoples — was their oppression similar to that faced by African Americans? If so, should Communists fight for the self-determination of indigenous and people of African descent? And did that self-determination mean the creation of new states, or could it be guaranteed within the framework of already existing ones?</p><p>The Black Belt Thesis, originally informed by pan-Africanism, global anti-colonialism, and Soviet thinking about nations and nationalities, also shaped Communists’ thinking about race in the Americas. Here Wood sheds new light on the neglected links between global black liberation movements and the struggles of the indigenous and people of African descent in Latin America.</p><p>Through it all, Wood does not lose sight of the fact that self-determination and race were also stumbling blocks. In two important gatherings of Latin American Communists in 1929, hosted in Uruguay and Argentina, the Comintern’s doctrine of self-determination for black and indigenous people produced serious tensions. The Comintern viewed Latin American nations as political fictions that could be redrawn at will to secure the self-determination of black and indigenous populations. Latin American attendees, understandably, pushed back, arguing that existing states were vehicles for resisting imperial domination. Latin American thinkers held heated, often subtly critical, debates over the applicability of Stalin’s theory of nationality and the Black Belt Thesis.</p><p>For instance, renowned Peruvian intellectual José Carlos Mariátegui recognized discrimination against indigenous peoples in Latin America but argued that giving self-determination to these populations would only empower indigenous elites rather than landless peasants, creating new bourgeois states instead of liberating the oppressed masses. Afro-Cuban labor activist Sandalio Junco argued that people of African descent suffered multiple forms of racial oppression in the region but pushed back against self-determination. He promoted instead a “proletarian conception” of the “problem of race,” the solution being to demonstrate to working people of African descent that “their place is alongside the continental and world proletariat,” while promoting complete equality among the different races that formed the working class.</p><p>Often those debates went unresolved, and tensions around race and self-determination persisted within the left. But they also had direct implications for public policy and political action across Latin America. In the short term, some countries developed policies to better incorporate indigenous peoples into their nation-building projects, while Communist parties recognized the oppression of black workers and actively sought to recruit them. Later, those ideas shaped the political action of leftist groups during the Cold War and informed the legal codification of nondiscrimination and indigenous rights in the twentieth century.</p><p>Such a granular reconstruction of intellectual history is one of the strongest features of <cite>Radical Sovereignty</cite>. Nonetheless, by focusing on the Latin American softening of Moscow’s line, the author glosses over the Comintern envoys’ attitude to their Latin American counterparts, which was essentially paternalistic and condescending. Based on Wood’s citations and references, they regarded their Latin American comrades’ ideas on race and sovereignty as erroneous and rudimentary.</p><p>If, as Wood shows, the Latin Americans did not blindly follow the Soviet line, the question remains whether Latin American ideas influenced the Comintern’s views of race in the region. With the exception of the Black Belt Thesis, Comintern leaders did not seriously consider the discussions of Latin American intellectuals. In other words, did Latin American radicals merely negotiate and adapt Comintern policies at the local level, or did they reshape them at their roots? And to what extent did the Comintern rethink its policies and ideas on race, nation, and sovereignty in response to Latin American debates and adaptations?</p><p>Part III of <cite>Radical Sovereignty</cite> follows the path of self-determination as it moved from intellectual to policy circles in Cuba and Mexico. During the 1930s, the Cuban Communist Party embraced a more resolute position against racial oppression and, with it, reformulated its self-determination policy. This led to a significant growth in Afro-Cuban militancy in the party, both in the rank and file and in leadership positions.</p><p>The Cuban Communist Party initially promoted complete racial equality and self-determination for the black population in the region of Oriente. By the 1930s, it had refined the concept of self-determination: rather than thinking of the heavily Afro-Cuban region of Oriente as a separate political unit, it should instead form part of the Cuban national community, albeit with a high degree of autonomy and self-governance. Meanwhile, that autonomy should advance the cause of racial equality throughout the whole island. Wood demonstrates that Afro-Cuban intellectuals and activists were at the helm of a significant policy shift and were pivotal in reconceptualizing race as one of the leading national problems in the fight against imperialism.</p><p>Having redefined self-determination, the Cuban Communist Party felt emboldened to lead the charge for racial inclusion, helping to pass laws against racial discrimination in the island’s 1940 constitutional assembly. Their proposals triumphed and formed part of the new constitution — one of several concrete victories in which debates on self-determination and race translated into progressive policies and laws.</p><p>Race and self-determination also shaped Mexican public policy during the late 1930s. By that time, a dominant current of thought and policymaking had cohered around <i>indigenismo</i>, an ideological movement that celebrated indigenous populations as key historical actors and a foundational piece of “national consciousness.” However, concrete <i>indigenista</i> policies also sought to assimilate indigenous peoples into a Mexican nation understood as <i>mestizo</i> (mixed race), Spanish-speaking, and modern.</p><p>Wood maintains that radical ideas about self-determination infiltrated official <i>indigenismo</i>, moderating the dominant assimilationist approach while promoting a more pluralistic view of education and culture (for example, including indigenous language in primary instruction) and a more materialist vision of the “indigenous question” (for example, pushing for indigenous-led economic development programs).</p><p>Considering the contributions of labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano and scholar Jorge Vivó to this “radical pluralist” version of <i>indigenismo</i>, Wood neglects to ask why indigenous intellectuals, activists, and leaders themselves did not participate in the formulation of policies. This would have been a welcome reflection, especially after the author shows that black intellectuals participated so prominently in Communist-led policies on race and self-determination in Latin America.</p><p>In the epilogue, Wood argues that interwar debates on self-determination and race informed discussions about anti-imperialism during the Cold War and beyond, even influencing the ideas of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) in the 1990s. Moreover, century-old ideas of self-determination reappeared in twenty-first century struggles for indigenous autonomy in Bolivia and Mexico.</p><p>In an age of renewed American imperialism, it is more necessary than ever to think about how national and transnational collectivities can offer a common resistance. Likewise, as the international order trembles, the Left must rebuild spaces for ambitious political imagination — like the ones Wood evokes — and tackle forms of social injustice and exploitation, both new and old, at the global level.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-20T16:00:47Z</published><summary type="text">A new history of the interwar Latin American left recovers the rich debates over race and self-determination that shaped the region's anti-imperial politics — and still resonate today.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/fields-of-dependency</id><title type="text">Fields of dependency</title><updated>2026-04-23T03:10:44.767902Z</updated><author><name>Ocean Postman</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>American writer Barbara Tuchman remarked that “war is the unfolding of miscalculations.” As part of those calculations, the value of each of the lives lost to war should not be measured any differently, and yet in reality the lives and deaths of some in the world continue to be counted out of those calculations. While the unjustified and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/un-experts-denounce-aggression-iran-and-lebanon-warn-devastating-regional" rel="noopener" target="_blank">arguably illegal strike on Iran</a> in a joint US–Israeli operation has sprawled out, drawing in neighboring nations into a regional war, the harm to human life ripples throughout the rest of the world. Indeed, this war’s motivations seem opaque even to the strongmen drawn into them. Some of the lives on the periphery? Those on the African continent who, despite not being a direct party to the conflict, face the growing danger of deepened food insecurity the longer the war goes on.</p><p>Africa’s dependence on the Gulf region for its supply of synthetic fertilizer means that we could soon be witnessing a sharp rise in the price of food. Africa contains <a href="https://www.unep.org/regions/africa/our-work-africa" rel="noopener" target="_blank">more than 60 percent of the world’s arable land</a>, but in spite of this hunger remains a pressing injustice, with levels sitting at over 20 percent <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/the-state-of-food-security-and-nutrition-in-the-world-2025" rel="noopener" target="_blank">according to UN reports</a>. It has become clear that it is not the productivity of the agricultural industry that is the issue, but that man-made forces are at play, driving the price of food up and inhibiting access for the majority. Many of Africa’s economies remain structured around <a href="https://pdf.sciencedirectassets.com/271773/1-s2.0-S0305750X26X20022/1-s2.0-S0305750X26000835/main.pdf" rel="noopener" target="_blank">extractive export-oriented agricultural production</a>, this being a legacy of colonial extraction on the continent. Today, the input costs related to agricultural production form a part of this man-made calamity, such as the cost of imported fertilizers.</p><p>Synthetic fertilizers are created through the harnessing of natural gases, and the import of said fertilizers becomes a costly endeavor in the face of market volatility that is a product of regional conflict. Africa primarily depends on the synthetic fertilizer produced in and transported from Gulf states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and others. It also sources fertilizer from Russia, which is currently engaged in an illegal war with Ukraine. <a href="https://sagrainmag.co.za/2025/09/02/fertiliser-industry-in-sa-this-is-what-it-looks-like/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Consumption rates of synthetic fertilizer in South Africa</a>, the largest economy on the continent, sit at just over 1.2 million tons per 6 million hectares, per year.</p><p>Commercial farming takes place in the context of private ownership with profits remaining concentrated amongst the national and transnational economic elite. Part of the issue lies in the current food systems paradigm, in which production is driven by profit incentive of the private ownership class, many of them <a href="https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2023/03/31/four-multinational-companies-sell-half-of-all-seeds-globally-says-usda-report-on-agricultural-consolidation/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">huge conglomerates</a> that hold concentrated control over key resources to food production, such as land and seed. Their profit motive has resulted in the intensification of inputs (synthetic fertilizer being one), the costs of which are passed on to consumers.</p><p>Leaders of the “Green Revolution,” such as tech billionaire Bill Gates, believe that the solution to Africa’s hunger crisis lies in emulating their own success. The formula for success? Deepening dependence on chemicals, genetically modified seeds that are heavily patented restricting their use, and monocultural methods, as well as encouraging the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/08/food-finance-climate-playbook/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">financialization of agriculture</a>.</p><p><a href="https://viacampesina.org/en/what-is-food-sovereignty/">La Via Campesina</a>, a global food sovereignty coalition movement, recognizes the harm posed to food sovereignty by such corporate interests on the current global food systems. They define food sovereignty as the right of all people to food “produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems.” The solutions emanating from the Green Revolution fall short of satisfying the benchmark for food sovereignty, as by trapping African nations in cycles of debt and dependence, they exercise coercive control of agriculture on the continent. Global Bretton Woods legacy bodies such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) propose that measures such as (heavily conditional) loans and aid will act as a Band-Aid, but they only create a new frontier for the embedding of financialization in African agriculture and deepen the wound of food insecurity. The further <a href="https://www.globalagriculture.org/publications/transformation/book/updates/howard-hendrickson/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">concentration of resources and the profits reaped from food production remains a threat to food sovereignty</a>, deepening economic disparities between the wealthy and the poor. This folly has served to prove that the key to more sustainable food systems cannot be imposed from above by the already wealthy and powerful, whose own interests cloud the need for accessible, affordable, locally produced foods.</p><p>Instead, food insecurity can best begin to be addressed by drawing on existing practices that are not reliant on unsustainable inputs like synthetic fertilizers and genetically modified seeds. A shift to agroecological practices is taking place, albeit haltingly. The <a href="https://www.ecologicalcitizen.net/what-is.php?t=agroecology-definition" rel="noopener" target="_blank">agroecology movement</a> offers an alternative to dominant food systems; it is the application of sustainable agroecosystems focused on restorative agricultural practices that draw on indigenous knowledge systems and scientific research.</p><p>This is not a utopian fantasy but a means to challenge what is being called a green revolution, which has revealed itself to be a new frontier in extractivism. Some examples of agroecological practices are the use of locally sourced seeds that allows farmers to source and sell their own seed as needed, <a href="https://agroecology-coalition.org/can-agroecology-break-dependence-on-synthetic-fertilizer/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">intercropping and circular systems to encourage soil health and regeneration, and natural fertilizers</a>, to name a few. But with well-funded national agribusiness, tech-turned agriculture entrepreneurs and multinational conglomerates all with vested interests to contend with, the struggle within African countries to move towards food sovereignty and food security remains under immense threat. While governments still prioritize export orientation and conventional commercial farming, the very people the governments are meant to serve will remain trapped in a global food system that has perpetuated food insecurity.</p><p>The ongoing not-so-distant war presents a moment to practice alternatives shown to be viable, to lobby governments to use their budgets to provide material support to these sustainable alternatives, increase environmental regulations that support agroecology, and not to turn their backs on the millions of people who will be harmed when the effects of war ripple onto their shores.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-17T18:00:53Z</published><summary type="text">As the US-Israel war on Iran disrupts fertilizer supply, Africa’s reliance on imported inputs exposes the deeper political economy driving food insecurity.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/more-commerce-than-chaos</id><title type="text">More commerce than chaos</title><updated>2026-04-23T03:10:44.549754Z</updated><author><name>Stéphanie Perazzone</name></author><category label="Culture" term="Culture"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>Tanya Zack’s recent gem — <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/the-chaos-precinct-johannesburg-as-a-port-city/" rel="noopener" target="_blank"><cite>The Chaos Precinct: Johannesburg as Port City</cite></a> — is focused on the Jeppe precinct, the so-called “Ethiopian Quarter,” located in the heart of Johannesburg’s central business district. The book lends an ethnographic take on the cross-border trading activities the precinct’s largely migrant population has operated since the end of apartheid. Working against those who see the migrant-led enclave as anecdotal, invisible, and ungovernable, Zack offers to reconceptualize Jeppe as an entrepôt, a major transnational port — without sea access — in South Africa’s largest conurbation, responsible for the movement of goods and money in industrial proportions.</p><p>Long in the making, the book was a difficult and perilous task for Zack, who, to her own admission, had to navigate the emotion of unpacking her personal ties and doing justice to all the lives that make the book, that make Jeppe, while retaining a colder, analytical gaze throughout. I personally shed a tear over my discovery of some of her characters’ life stories — Yosef, Sem, Berta, Sultan Tiku, and many more; I felt like I was right there with them, sharing all their doubts, self-hatred, courage, wit, and simple joys. The book takes the reader through a journey of the unexplored corners of globalization, drawing on a rich and sophisticated account of how to rethink and remake a city in a postcolonial and post-apartheid environment.</p><p>It’s been a privilege to learn about yet another city within the African continent, one that I have only occasionally visited over the years, and in the end, knew very little about. Here, I want to share three inspirations that relate to the focus of my own work, but more specifically, on why I think this is an important book for anyone remotely interested in finding humanity in this world.</p><p>My first inspiration in reading this book has been to use it as a tool for thinking about structural, physical, and psychological violence. The lifeworld of the Chaos Precinct echoes that of many other urban spaces — from the bustling activities in the informal settlements of Kinshasa and the transborder commercial ventures of Butembo in eastern DRC, to the hawkers and shopkeepers hustling and toiling in Abidjan — that have, much like Jeppe, been categorized as anarchic, chaotic, ungovernable. But nested in the social fabric of Jeppe lies the desire to thrive, and an imperative to survive in a world economy that increasingly serves the interest of a privileged few, while feeding on the underpaid and often criminalized work of a majority of refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented workers.</p><p>At the low-end of globalization, sit the masses of underprivileged — the poor, the working class, the migrants represented here in the figure of the shopkeeper, owners, assistant, street vendors, taxi drivers — who, the book aptly demonstrates, occupy the ambivalent position of both wanting to become part of the global economy, and rejecting its very premises often based on labour exploitation, broken minds and disjointed homes. For example, Yosef’s loathing of his bosses, and of the money-oriented, sometimes illegal activities he must engage in, and other migrants’ longings for home, or a sense of home in a hostile city, speak to this. The fact that “everything is about money” drives xenophobia and disdain for the poor, making class prejudice transcendental to racial and gender prejudice.</p><p>The cruelty of police raids and harassment in Jeppe, the faultlines of the legal system, and the rigid hierarchies of community and economic practices by government bodies — people made illegal, the informal economy made illegal, and the practical, organic uses of infrastructure made illegal — illuminate the workings of state-violence, whose institutions are put to the service of a self-serving global elite. This captures the incessant police raids targeting the distribution of counterfeit goods, even as this market does not pose any serious threat to the authentic brand items meant for much higher-end consumers. State intervention in this age of late capitalism now focuses increasingly on categorizing people, securitizing wealth, and disciplining bodies — a feature of state power that takes on particularly brutal forms in what Achille Mbembe calls the postcolony. This provides further global lessons about the role of state action and neoliberalism in perpetuating the conditions for oppression and structural violence across the world.</p><p>Zack’s account also goes against many conventional views about Africa as a continent having integrated into the world economy too late and too little. It is made clear, thanks to the notion that Jeppe is a vast entrepot, that this is not the case. Many urban formations across the continent are complex networks of social, economic, and material practices that reach deep and far in supporting and shaping our global economy’s logistical, consumption, financial, and labour needs. Places like Jeppe are not lagging in economic development; if anything, they are situated right in the middle of the nervous system of globalization — from Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, and Mozambique, stretching all the way to China — and may offer a glimpse into our shared futures, if state structures and capitalist forces are left to work together unabated. The lethal combination of a politics of neglect and a politics of erasure, encapsulated in the book, impacts the communities of Jeppe, as the possibilities for leveraging “local energy” and nurturing “new mutuality” to achieve more inclusive development are ignored.</p><p>My second inspiration has been to reflect on the notion of chaos. The book stands with a host of scholarly works that endeavor to rethink politics across the Global South, against unhelpful binaries and semantics that describe African societies as pathologized sites of violence. Even though Jeppe is partially built on improvisation and provisional arrangements, the communities, social practices, and economic value that compose the area are anything but chaotic. “The apparent chaos of this precinct, Zack explains, conceals the logics of its system of codified rules and regulations. Its own innovative methods and efficiencies. And its reshaping of value.”</p><p>But chaos there is. And it may not be where we think it is.</p><p>First, there is chaos in government responses to the rise and renewal of Jeppe. One that embraces police violence, harassment, neglect, and erasure. Sporadic, overly militarized, and disproportionate use of force is deployed as a performative shorthand for state action that is cheaper, faster, and more readily visible than opting for the slower workings of democratic practice, consultation, research, and policy that can elevate and promote Jeppe as the important global economic centre that it is. If there is chaos in Jeppe, it originates more from law enforcement and municipal services supposedly aiming to impose “order” than from the regular tumult of daily urban life.</p><p>And then, there is chaos in the mind.</p><p>The migrant communities that populate the book struggle with the psychological pain of leading dislocated lives; lives that they attach to everywhere, but that really belong nowhere. They suffer the mental exhaustion of longing for home, finding a way out, and the urgent need to secure livelihoods. Their past is fragmented, their present is a haze, and their future is uncertain. The endless quest for dignity so vividly recounted in the book is a reminder of <a href="https://monoskop.org/images/0/05/Fanon_Frantz_Toward_the_African_Revolution_1967.pdf" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Frantz Fanon’s work</a> on the psychological damage people carry with them for having been robbed of their identity, for never being whole.</p><p>Finally, my third inspiration has been to revel in the wonders of human interactions, the hope that may or may not emerge from said interactions, and the gentle gaze and caring practices many ordinary men and women lay on the city that holds them, the buildings that shelter them, the communities that sustain them — even in the face of injustice and violence. The stories of the residents and workers of Jeppe reminded me of <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?hl=fr&amp;lr=&amp;id=_md-DwAAQBAJ&amp;oi=fnd&amp;pg=PR3&amp;dq=Abdoumaliq+simoneNo+matter+how+improvised,+lives+need+to+be+held,+supported.&amp;ots=IHLtopiEVw&amp;sig=Zc3OMbifhHC2kFk9g-AOcmkXBbE#v=onepage&amp;q=Abdoumaliq%20simoneNo%20matter%20how%20improvised%2C%20lives%20need%20to%20be%20held%2C%20supported.&amp;f=false" rel="noopener" target="_blank">AbdouMaliq Simone’s call</a> to move beyond formal accounts of order and legality, to look at what a city can hold: “No matter how improvised,” he said, “lives need to be held, supported. They need a somewhere in which to take place, and places need to be assessed in terms of what they are able to hold.”</p><p>This book, in both format and substance, is an homage to life, an ode to what Michel de Certeau referred to as the “ordinary man”, the “untold wanderer” of Jeppe, the “anonymous hero.” In other words, those who populate the “murmur of society” are too often ignored, occasionally despised, and manipulated. It is a powerful antidote against those of us in academia, in government, and other positions of decision-making, who build and rely on prejudice or simply truncated knowledge about how violence takes hold, how poverty spreads, and lives are lost.</p><p>In her concluding remarks, Zack writes: “Jeppe makes a powerful claim to be taken seriously.” The people of Jeppe, like so many others in all corners of the planet, make, to quote James Ferguson, “a haunting claim for equal rights of membership in a spectacularly unequal global society [ . . . ]; a moral claim to something like global citizenship” and an appeal to “a graciousness and solidarity” that are to this day, still “chillingly absent.”</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-16T13:00:56Z</published><summary type="text">In Johannesburg’s Jeppe precinct, what looks like disorder is in fact a dense, transnational system of trade, labor, and survival at the heart of the global economy.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/the-demographic-dividend-no-one-wants-to-pay</id><title type="text">The demographic dividend no one wants to pay</title><updated>2026-04-23T03:10:44.258264Z</updated><author><name>Cindy Kasanga</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>Africa’s youth have been called the continent’s greatest asset so many times that the phrase has lost its weight. Assets are meant to be invested in. The real question is who benefits from keeping this one deferred.</p><p>Africa is young; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/series/old-world-young-africa#:~:text=Africa%20has%20the%20fastest%20growing,already%20registering%20around%20the%20world." rel="noopener" target="_blank">its youth population is projected to rise by 132 million this decade alone.</a> But demographic scale is not destiny. A continent’s youth profile is not a strategy, and invoking it as one has become a way of avoiding the harder question: Why have the political, institutional, and economic investments needed to convert that demographic into shared prosperity been so consistently withheld?</p><p>The answer is not technical. It is political. African economies, as currently organized, are not generating enough productive, dignified work for their young people, and this is a crisis of accumulation. Those who bear the cost of that crisis most acutely have been systematically excluded from the political spaces where it can be prioritized and addressed. These two failures are not parallel — they compound each other.</p><p>“Gen Z” has had enough. Kenyan youth stormed parliament over a finance bill imposing new taxes on essential goods, arriving barely a year after a housing levy had already strained households. The anger ran deeper than the defeated bill: Despite Ruto winning office on a “hustler-friendly” platform, many young people grew disillusioned with a government that campaigned on economic relief but reverted to repression when confronted with dissent. Similar patterns emerge in Madagascar, where youth protests in 2025 over chronic power failures escalated into demands for political change and an end to corruption, set against a stark backdrop in which roughly 75 percent of the population lives below the poverty line — exposing an economy repeatedly unable to absorb its educated youth into meaningful employment. The same appears in Morocco, where youth demands for health care and education reform unfold against a backdrop of stark governmental misallocation of priorities. Amidst soaring youth unemployment and exclusion, large-scale infrastructure investments at the expense of dilapidated social services raise the question: “The stadiums are ready, but where are the hospitals?” These movements are not isolated disruptions but part of a continental script of exclusion and frustration rooted in the persistent infantilization of youth as political actors. Political power and decision-making remain concentrated among older generations — a persistent feature of postcolonial governance. This has contributed to political apathy, entrenching a culture that sidelines young voices. This exclusion is structural as well; despite pledges to eliminate youth marginalization, credible institutional follow-through remains lacking. Thus, while continental frameworks hold genuine promise as a blueprint for progress, ratification and implementation have stalled, reflecting not a technical failure but a political one.</p><p>Moreover, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/02/africa-losing-90-billion-annually-illicit-finance-united-nations-report-tax-havens/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Africa loses an estimated $90 billion annually to illicit financial flows</a> — resources that could fund the schools, infrastructure, and institutions young people demand. Beyond fiscal loss, corruption entrenches impunity, fuels nepotism, and erodes trust between youth and their governments. Economies and institutions cannot function while marginalizing their largest demographic. Ignoring these patterns undermines frameworks like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which depend on functional, credible institutions. Where these are hollowed out, the gains of liberalization fail to materialize.</p><p>Africa’s informal economy is vast and <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099062823181517622/txt/P169171059215a0460929c0bfa61edf8650.txt" rel="noopener" target="_blank">sustains nearly 70 percent of households</a>, serving as the primary livelihood for the vast majority of young workers on the continent. On the one hand, it’s easy to read this as straightforward precarity, and in some ways it is — enterprises in this sector are typically unregistered, receiving minimal government support, and are sometimes even deemed illegal, particularly when cross-border trade is involved. Moreover, the informal economy is marked by high economic risk, instability, and a lack of legal or social protections. <a href="https://worlddatalab.org/3347/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">A staggering 90 percent of employed young Africans work in informal jobs</a>, and 34 percent live in extreme poverty despite being employed. Working, in other words, does not guarantee a pathway out of poverty.</p><p>Still, informality is a structural feature of how African economies are currently organized. In this system, young people show real agency, maximizing limited opportunities such as freelancing, digital gigs, research, customer service, and content creation. The problem is not youth ingenuity; it is the government’s mistaken belief that this is a reason to disengage. Rather than confronting these structural gaps, the default policy response has been to hand the problem back to young people themselves. The assumption is that, with sufficient training, mentorship, and access to microfinance, youth will create their <i>own</i> opportunities. What this assumption quietly ignores is the chronic lack of institutional support for SMEs, the hostile credit environment, and the simple arithmetic that self-employment cannot substitute for an economy that is not producing enough “good” jobs.</p><p>Even so, promoting the expansion of formal employment as the sole gateway to a decent work economy has allowed a quieter, equally damaging crisis to go underaddressed. Africa’s youth employment problem is one of both unemployment <i>and </i>underemployment. Unemployment gets the headlines, but underemployment — millions of young people working without security, without adequate hours, without a living income — is just as corrosive, and receives a fraction of the policy attention.</p><p>More broadly, economies hollowed out by corruption and precarious work don’t become more equitable when borders open — they become more exposed. ​​The AfCFTA Protocol on Women and Youth in Trade, adopted in 2024, holds genuine promise — a continental framework with the potential to open markets, generate employment, and bring youth and women from the margins of trade into its center. Theoretically, open markets and deeper integration into global trade should generate economic activity that pulls millions of young Africans into productive employment. However, Africa’s exports remain overwhelmingly concentrated in raw commodities; the gains from trade openness do not reach workers or the broader economy. Without value addition, competitive industries and market depth, liberalization can hinder youth employment rather than augment it.</p><p>Reform must start at both political and economic levels — they’re inseparable. Addressing youth exclusion means youth must have genuine representation in AfCFTA implementation and continental bodies, not tokenism. One possible step is to establish continental quotas for youth inclusion and to implement data-collection mechanisms to track policy priorities, ensuring measurable progress on the Women and Youth Protocol.</p><p>Even so, political inclusion without economic reform means little. While the continent has made significant progress in accelerating financial inclusion through homegrown innovations like mobile money, ongoing gender and income disparities reveal the need to restructure systems to include SMEs, informal workers, and youth without access to credit. Africa needs a long-term industrial strategy oriented toward formal job creation — one that invests in education pipelines connected to labor markets and identifies youth opportunities across value chains. The continent has too often exported its youth to precarious jobs rather than invested at home, and this cannot continue. If youth are truly Africa’s greatest asset, investment must match the rhetoric.</p><p>The protests that have swept the continent are not a phase but a verdict on governments that have invoked youth potential without delivering on it. Comrades lost their lives in these movements, and this cannot be treated as the acceptable cost of “business as usual.”</p><p>At the same time, Africa’s youth are not standing by waiting to be invested in. Whether it’s in informal markets, digital spaces, or the streets, they are a constituency, legitimate, active, and precise in their demands. The question is no longer whether Africa’s youth are ready. It is whether its governments are. The task is clear: Restructure the economic models that have kept young people precarious, and redistribute the political power that has kept them voiceless. These two priorities are inseparable and require a deliberate choice by states and institutions that have deferred.</p><p>The demographic dividend has been promised long enough. It is time to pay up.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-15T21:45:07Z</published><summary type="text">Although increasingly celebrated as an asset, Africa’s youth remain locked out of power and decent work.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://africasacountry.com/2026/04/the-debts-our-parents-left-us</id><title type="text">The debts our parents left us</title><updated>2026-04-23T03:10:46.810968Z</updated><author><name>Ivan Mayabi</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><article xmlns=""><div><p>The language of economic policy is designed to obscure. Fiscal consolidation sounds responsible, even prudent. “Structural adjustment” suggests repair, improvement, and optimization. “Widening the tax base” evokes democratic participation, a broadening of civic duty. These are the euphemisms that dress violence in the rhetoric of necessity.</p><p>I learned this first not from reading economic theory but from watching my bank account. In September 2022, when President Ruto took office, I was an undergraduate freelance content creator, one of thousands of young Kenyans who had found in the digital economy what some in our parents’ generation found in the informal sectors that bloomed in the ‘90s: a livable, though precarious income, a sense of purpose, the possibility of a future. Within two years, that possibility <a href="https://www.bdo-ea.com/en-gb/insights/understanding-significant-economic-presence-tax-a-shift-from-digital-service-tax-in-kenya" rel="noopener" target="_blank">has been systematically dismantled by a series of tax measures that transformed my modest earnings into a labyrinth of deductions</a>, each one justified by prescriptions handed down by International Financial Institutions and donors.</p><p>In the early ‘90s, the government fired civil servants and called it restructuring. Thirty years later, the gig economy is similarly being dismantled through austerity measures in the name of widening the tax base. The mechanism differs, but the outcome is identical. Both times, an entire generation found the ground beneath them removed by policy, their livelihoods sacrificed at the altar of International Monetary Fund conditionalities.</p><p>The late African economist Professor Thandika Mkandawire once described the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed on Africa in the 1980s as <a href="https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=202004071501299" rel="noopener" target="_blank">the Great African Depression.</a> Due to Kenya’s highly accruing debt, the IMF and the World Bank imposed SAPs as a condition for receiving further financial aid, forcing the country to adopt neoliberal policies by prioritizing export markets and drastically cutting social spending on public services. The SAPs intended to create rapid and sustainable economic growth, but <a href="https://roape.net/2025/01/08/debt-and-austerity-the-imfs-legacy-of-structural-violence-in-the-global-south/#_edn8" rel="noopener" target="_blank">instead precipitated widespread unemployment as public-sector jobs were slashed</a>. Those who fled to the burgeoning informal sector had to contend with its precarity and low wages, their plight exacerbated by the overnight collapse of social systems as essential services became inaccessible to many due to the removal of subsidies and increased user fees. Cost sharing became mandatory, resulting in higher dropout rates and reduced access to medical care, especially for the proletariat and rural populations. Before the advent of SAPs, the state financed the entire university education, including providing students with a “boom” allowance for personal effects. The 1991 implementation of SAPs required undergraduates to pay KSh6,000 (50 USD) per year as part of a newly introduced, non-negotiable student loan scheme, signaling the end of the “boom” allowance. This policy change was met with fierce resistance, leading to student protests and the closure of Moi and Kenyatta Universities. It heralded the new era where now, decades later, students either fund themselves through campus, or bear the weight of student loans.</p><p>My father, who had finished secondary school a year earlier, had harbored dreams of higher education and social mobility, only to watch his dreams snuffed out: the cost-sharing policy proved too steep a cliff for my ailing grandfather to scale, given he had invested his retirement package in my aunts’ and uncles’ secondary school education. So my father did what the economy required of the young and ambitious; he improvised.</p><p>Arriving in Nairobi in ’92, my father found work in Industrial Area, among the plastic and chemical factories that line Enterprise Road. He initially intended it to be a detour on the way to something better. But the 1990s had other designs. The same SAPs that had restructured university funding were simultaneously dismantling the formal sector he hoped to enter. Parastatals were privatized or dissolved. The civil service contracted. The stable jobs with pensions and predictable trajectories — the jobs that had built Kenya’s middle class in the Kenyatta years — were now artifacts of a previous economic era, like rotary phones.</p><p>The factory job became permanent in the way that temporary things do when there are no alternatives. He has worked there for thirty years since, breathing in plastic fumes, operating the same machines, watching younger men arrive with the same desperate optimism he had carried. Some saved enough for a <i>boda boda</i>, a small kiosk. Most didn’t. The private sector, structured on contracts predicated on fluctuating markets and thus prone to mass layoffs even then, seemed to offer no formal path forward, only lateral movement, only survival.</p><p>I think about this often now — the way history doesn’t merely repeat but rhymes, the way the children inherit the debts of their fathers, literally and metaphorically. When I entered university in 2020, I did so under the same cost-sharing system that had excluded my father, although by then it had reformed, expanded, and become slightly more accessible. I qualified for a loan. This felt, at the time, like progress.</p><p>The loan covered tuition and part of the upkeep, but the upkeep is a euphemism that doesn’t account for the actual cost of existing in Nairobi — rent in the overcrowded neighborhood near campus, food, transport and the textbooks that lecturers require but that the library doesn’t stock. The gap between what HELB (Higher Education Loans Board) provided and what survival required was wide enough to swallow ambition whole. So, I too, improvised.</p><p>The informal sector had evolved by the time my generation came along, had gone digital, had acquired new vocabularies of precarity. I wrote articles for content mills at three dollars per thousand words. I designed graphics on Fiverr. I transcribed audio files for Indian platforms that paid per task, not per hour, a distinction that proved significant once the tasks dried up, or the rates dropped. I learned to navigate Upwork, Mpesa, PayPal, the contemporary infrastructure of hustle. The gig economy became our refuge where we could still harbor dreams of social mobility in that digital frontier to which the government’s reach had not yet extended.</p><p>I graduated in 2024 with a degree and a debt that I’ll be repaying for years, probably a decade. The loan accumulates interest at rates that feel punitive given the job market I am entering — or rather, not entering — since the formal sector continues to contract, with AI automation and austerity combining to eliminate entry-level positions. But I had a laptop, an internet connection, and a PayPal account, and that seemed enough to suggest I could navigate this new phase of my life, this new frontier of “adulting”. The sense that if I worked hard enough, fast enough, I could make it work.</p><p>That was before they decided we needed to be taxed. The IMF’s <a href="https://newsite.treasury.go.ke/kenya-imf-program" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Extended Credit Facility (ECF)</a> arrangements, which were initiated to address debt vulnerabilities and the economic shocks following the global pandemic — US$2.34 billion over 38 months — arrived wrapped in the language of necessity and inevitability. With the facilities came the familiar prescriptions: Kenya must consolidate its fiscal position. Revenue must increase. Expenditure must decrease. These are not political choices but mathematical imperatives.</p><p>However, mathematics can be ideological. The decision to increase revenue through taxation rather than through repatriating stolen wealth, the choice to decrease expenditure by cutting subsidies rather than by reducing corruption, these are political acts disguised as technical ones. When fuel subsidies were removed and VAT on fuel doubled, the cost was not borne equally. The wealthy absorbed the increase. The poor and the precariously employed — which is to say most of us — saw our margins of survival narrow to slivers.</p><p>Let me be clear: I’m not opposed to taxation in principle. I understand that governments need revenue, that we all have obligations to the collective. What I oppose is the particular arithmetic of this taxation, the way it’s been calculated to extract maximum revenue from minimal resistance. We’re easy targets, we freelancers and gig workers. We don’t have unions or lobbying groups or parliamentary representation. We’re scattered, atomized, connected only by WhatsApp groups where we share screenshots of unpaid invoices and commiserate about client ghosting. We exist in a legal gray zone where employment law doesn’t quite apply, and tax law applies too much.</p><p><a href="https://www.grantthornton.co.za/insights2/significant-economic-presence-tax/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">The Significant Economic Presence Tax</a> was the first blow. Three percent doesn’t sound like much until you realize it’s three percent on top of everything else, three percent that foreign platforms are now obligated to withhold before they pay you, three percent that assumes you’re earning enough for three percent to be negligible. For someone making $500 a month — which is a good month, an excellent month, a month where everything went right — that’s $15 gone immediately. In a country where $15 can be transport for a week or data bundles for a month, or the difference between eating and not eating enough, 3 percent is not negligible.</p><p>Then came the Digital Content Monetization Tax, which is perhaps the most elegantly cruel piece of fiscal policy I’ve encountered. It targets the dream itself — the possibility that your YouTube channel or Instagram account, or TikTok videos might generate income. Never mind that for every influencer making millions, there are ten thousand making minimal dividends to nothing at all, posting into the void, hoping. The state has looked at this landscape of hustle and aspiration and decided it needs a cut.</p><p>Five to twenty percent, depending on your earnings bracket, which means the more successful you are at this precarious endeavor, the more you’re punished for succeeding. It’s a tax on hope, essentially. A tax on the idea that you might, through creativity and sheer force of will, build something that sustains you.</p><p>And then there’s SHIF. The Social Health Insurance Fund, uncapped, ambitious in its vision of universal healthcare and devastating in its execution. In theory, it’s beautiful; everyone contributes, everyone benefits, healthcare for all. In practice, it’s another deduction from an already decimated income. For salaried employees, it’s manageable — deducted automatically, matched by employers, spread across monthly earnings, <a href="https://ieakenya.or.ke/blog/the-irony-of-shif-a-hindrance-to-universal-health-coverage-in-kenya/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">although there have been reports of subpar performance</a>. For us in the gig economy, it’s chaos. How do you calculate contributions on irregular income? What do you do in the months when there’s no income at all?</p><p>Terry could tell you more about SHIF than I can. I met her last December in Bungoma through a friend of a friend’s sister. Terry runs a small business, importing goods — clothes, shoes, accessories — from Uganda through the Malaba border to sell in the local Bungoma town market, Chepkube. She has managed to raise her three children mostly on her own, and recently she was blessed with an infant daughter. She’s exactly the kind of informal entrepreneur the government claims to support with its hustle fund rhetoric, its NYOTA loans, and its promises of bottom-up economics.</p><p>When her daughter developed a fever that wouldn’t break, Terry took her to the local dispensary. They referred her to the district hospital — the fever was high, the baby was listless, it needed further investigation. At the hospital, they asked for her SHIF number. She gave it. They asked for her employment details. She explained: informal sector, self-employed, irregular income. They told her she SHIF did not work for non-civil servants seeking outpatient services — she needed to be admitted first.</p><p>Terry paid out of her pocket. Four thousand shillings for tests and consultation, and medication. Four thousand shillings meant for restocking her clothes inventory. Four thousand shillings meant to cover her daughter’s needs for a month. The baby recovered, thank God, but Terry’s business was set back a few months. She’s still trying to recover what that emergency depleted.</p><p>This is what they meant by “widening the tax base”: finding new people to extract from, new populations to monetize, all while providing none of the services that taxation is meant to fund. It’s taxation without representation, without infrastructure, without healthcare, without education — taxation as pure extraction, as punishment for the crime of trying to survive. And what does the government offer in return? Hustler Funds, the <a href="https://nyotaproject.go.ke/faqs" rel="noopener" target="_blank">NYOTA</a> program — the former, small loans with high interest rates, the latter, a mentorship and grant program supported by the World Bank. Terry was a beneficiary of the hustler fund at its inception. However, the rising cost of living — driven by the removal of maize flour subsidies and the spike in fuel prices — meant her business margins had evaporated. The loan, rather than providing capital for growth, became another debt obligation. This is the 21st-century version of the “golden handshake” they gave civil servants in 1993 when they retrenched them en masse under similar IMF pressure.</p><p>What haunts me the most are the students I encountered at my alma mater, pursuing the same degree I completed a year ago. Under the old HELB system, the state aimed to cover 80 per cent of the cost of each degree programme, and in my case, as a government-sponsored student, tuition fees were capped at KSh16,000 a semester, totalling about KSh22,000 (170 USD), inclusive of other statutory fees. I could fund my education well enough with a loan of KSh19,500 (150 USD): KSh4000 for tuition, KSh15,500 for upkeep. With a plethora of part-time jobs supplementing me, I managed. Under the new model, universities charge the full market rate for degree programmes. Now, for a Bachelor of Science in Telecommunications and IT, the annual fee is set at KSh245,950 (1900 USD). The Universities Fund (UF) provides scholarships, while HELB provides loans. The allocation is determined by the Means Testing Instrument (MTI), a tool designed to categorize students into five “bands” based on their level of need. While the model is presented as a progressive reform, students placed in the most vulnerable category are now required to make a 5 per cent household contribution towards tuition, in addition to other levies and accommodation costs. For higher bands, the financial requirements become prohibitive for the average Kenyan families, particularly those whose children have been <a href="https://www.jepaafrica.com/insights/wdrxeaf2jmut1m0q6yf8i7pt1xu8ku" rel="noopener" target="_blank">wrongly placed due to flaws in the MTI assessment</a>.</p><p>One student told me he was considering dropping out to work online for a while as a freelance content writer. I didn’t have the heart to tell him that the gig economy he was fleeing towards was collapsing under the same policy regime that had made her education unaffordable. The trap was perfect: education has become inaccessible, and the informal work that might have paid for it was being taxed into oblivion.</p><p>I often think about David Ndii’s comment about the IMF: “When the IMF comes knocking, it essentially means the country is under receivership.” The metaphor is precise. In receivership, the interests of the creditors supersede those of stakeholders. This is the condition we inhabit: a country in receivership, where the IMF’s conditions take precedence over the survival of the population, where social investment is redefined as fiscal irresponsibility, where the gig economy — our last refuge — is being dismantled in the name of monetization.</p><p>But receivership is a legal status, not a natural condition. It is imposed and can be challenged. The demonstrations of 2024 were an assertion of this possibility, a refusal to accept the inevitability narrative. They were suppressed, but the questions they raised remain. Can we imagine an economy that serves the people who inhabit it rather than external creditors? Can we conceive of fiscal policy as an instrument of social welfare rather than extraction? Can we challenge the state of affairs we have accepted up to now? These are survival questions. For those of us being fiscally retrenched — forced out of our livelihoods by policy disguised as mathematics — the answers will determine whether we have a future in this country at all.</p><p>The language of economic policy is designed to be obscure. Our task is to make visible what that language hides: the human cost of austerity, the political nature of supposedly technical decisions, the violence of policies that dismantle livelihoods. This essay is one attempt at a work of revelation. It won’t be the last.</p></div></article></content><published>2026-04-14T16:00:45Z</published><summary type="text">The language of fiscal consolidation is meant to sound inevitable. But for Kenya's informal workers, the human cost is anything but abstract.</summary></entry></feed>